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Abstract 
Despite the prevalence of mixed race people in Britain and in Further Education, the 
study of mixed race identity remains an under-researched area, and little or no 
research appears to have been done on mixed race identity in relation to the Further 
Education sector. By bringing mixed race to the forefront of discussion, this PhD 
thesis endeavours to open up a space for interrogating some much vaunted concepts of 
personhood and equity evident in the theoretical literature on identity and in education 
policy. The thesis explores how normative theories and discourses underlying political 
and cultural constructions of personhood and equity are represented in a selection of 
recent UK post compulsory education policy texts, and uses the case of -10 mixed-race 
women studying in Further Education colleges in Inner London to identify similarities 
and discrepancies between theory, policy and experience. The empirical investigation 
involves policy analysis and semi-structured interviews with mixed race women. 
Discourse analysis and content analysis are the main methods used to analyse the 
data. The theories and discourses of personhood and equity identUied in the literature 
and the poliGY documents are compared with the discourses articulated by the 
respondents on their constructions of self, their experiences ofeducation, and on their 
opinions on government/education policy discourses. The thesis seeks to contribute to 
ongoing debates around identity and equality, and to provide some insights which may 
be helpful in moving us beyond the universalist/relativist impasse towards a concept of 
personhood in which identifies may be recognised simultaneously as 'fixed' and as 
'fluid'. It also hopes to provide a usefol source for sociologists and education policy 
makers in working towards more equitable policy in the field of education. 
v 
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between mixed race identity and post compulsory education is the focus 
of this study, and is an area of research which warrants investigation for several reasons. 
First, despite the prevalence of mixed race people in Britain and in further education, 
relatively few studies exist on mixed race identity and no empirical or theoretical research 
appears to have been done in relation to mixed race people in the Further Education sector 
(although some research has been done in relation to the school sector); as such, any 
identity-specific needs which mixed race people may have remain invisible, and cannot be 
accounted for in education policy. Second, mixed race people are not located within any 
single normative racial or cultural category, but rather, transverse two or more 
racial/cultural/community boundaries: thus, again, although there have been recent 
changes in census policy and an increase in research into mixed race identity, the 
experiences of mixed race people still, to a large extent, remain unacknowledged. Third, 
mixed race women, as opposed to mixed race men, have been chosen for study as they are 
marginalised in terms of male norms (Walkerdine, 1990), an issue which may have 
implications for a gendered account of mixed race people's experiences. Fourth, and 
related to the previous points, a study of mixed race adds a new dimension to the problem 
of how the 'universal' might account for the 'particular', a subject widely debated in 
social science literature, research in the field of mixed race and education may take this 
debate forward a step or two. The thesis is an attempt to begin to redress these gaps in the 
research. The main aims of the investigation are as follows:
a) To examine how normative theories and discourses underlying political and cultural 
constructions of personhood in western thought are represented in contemporary post 
compulsory education policy in Britain, and how these relate to notions of equity.
b) To use the case of mixed race student women to explore the impact of the concepts of 
personhood and equity reflected in the theory and the policy on the lives of these women, 
and to identify similarities and discrepancies between theory, policy and experience.
c) To contribute to ongoing debates around identity and equality, and to provide some 
insights which may be helpful in working towards a model of personhood which take 
mixed race women's self-conceptions of identity into account.
d) To ascertain whether mixed race women have identity-specific needs, and if so, to 
examine to what extent these may be provided for by post compulsory education policy.
By bringing mixed race to the forefront of discussion, a space has been opened up for 
interrogating some much vaunted conceptualisations of personhood and equity evident in 
some of the theoretical literature on identity and education policy. In postmodern literature 
there has been a tendency to view personhood as 'fluid' rather than 'fixed'. British liberal 
political discourse and education policy, conversely, have tended to represent the self as a 
rational coherent entity; in recent years, there has been a shift away from a culturally 
relativist agenda in policy, in which race and culture are understood as essentialist and 
reified, towards a universalistic conception of personhood in which the person is 
understood in primarily individualistic ways.
The literature review explores concepts of personhood within feminist debates, in the 
academic literature and discourses around race, ethnicity and culture in Britain, and in the 
research on mixed race identity. The empirical investigation involves policy analysis and 
semi-structured interviews with a sample of 40 mixed race women studying in Further 
Education colleges in London. The policy analysis engages with a discussion of major 
government discourses on education, and identifies and analyses discourses of personhood 
and equity in three selected British post compulsory education policy texts published in 
the UK since 1997. These documents are Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 
1997), The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998), and Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 1999).
The policy and interview data are analysed using content and discourse analysis (Burman 
and Parker, 1993; Ball, 2000 [1993b]). The theories and discourses of personhood 
identified in the literature and the policy documents are compared with the discourses 
articulated by the respondents in interviews on their constructions of self, their
experiences of education in FE colleges, and on their opinions of government/policy 
discourses. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the key concepts and issues which 
have arisen from the investigation. This discussion focuses in particular on the interplay 
between postmodernist, essentialist and individualist positions in relation to the mixed 
race women researched, and the implications concepts of the contemporary subject may 
have for an emancipatory feminist political project which has mixed race people in mind.
CHAPTER ONE: THEORIES OF PERSONHOQD 
INTRODUCTION
For several decades many academic disciplines have been concerned with the question of 
what constitutes 'personhood'. In both the fields of gender and ethnic relations, the 
question of whether biology or sociology determines who we are has been intrinsic to this 
discussion, and has been played out through the debate between two seemingly 
irreconcilable positions, biologism and sociologism. In biologism, any theory of structure 
and the development of social relations and human experience looks to biology as its 
source, where biology is the causal explanation for everything we attribute to conscious 
life. In sociology, the understanding of the person/body can take two forms: it can be 
understood either as bio-physical material which is shaped into units of behaviour which 
correlate with certain variables, or it is organised by interpretative actions which reflect 
socio-political systems, and are internalised through symbolic processes (Welton, 1998).
These two positions have formed the basis for discussions around the 'self in feminist 
studies and for debates around ethnic identification in studies around ethnicity. Whilst a 
parallel history exists in the study of gender and race, essentialism has been understood 
quite differently in the two disciplines: my observation is that although it appears to be a 
fundamental part of social science research to question the basis of gender as either 
biological or social, race essentialism has for the most part been discredited, and critiques 
of race difference have generally focussed on the social constructed-ness of race. Outside 
the field of sociology, however, behaviour genetics has always allowed race scientism to 
exist, an area which has seen renewed interest in recent years. In gender studies, and 
feminism in particular, the debate has centred on whether biological foundationalism or 
social constructionism constitute gender/ed identities, whereas in studies around race, 
discussion has focussed on cultural and/or social - as opposed to racial - allegiances and 
identifications based on common interests and experiences. Despite the substitution of the 
term 'race' for 'ethnicity', the reality of race/ethnic difference is still palpable in social 
relations through racialisation and related discriminatory attitudes and practices.
Part One of this chapter examines the concept of personhood in feminist debates. A brief 
overview of the theory of postmodernism in relation to modernism is given, followed by a 
consideration of key tensions around the critique of the subject which focuses on some 
aspects of Foucault's (1979, 1981) theories, and the work of Susan Bordo (1989) and 
Judith Butler (1990/1999, 1993). The main section in Part One examines debates within 
feminism and focuses in particular on the challenges feminists face on the question of 
whether the category 'woman' is requisite for effective political action; it also discusses 
black feminism, especially the issue of white hegemony and its implications for the 
feminist project. The final section in Part One explores some of the issues around selfhood 
and structuralism in the context of education, mainly through the work of Bourdieu 
(1997). Part Two of this chapter briefly explores general theories and dominant discourses 
around race, ethnicity and culture, with particular reference to the British context. Part 
Three explores current concepts and theories around mixed race identity (with reference to 
the UK and the US), gives an overview of mixed race research in Britain, and applies 
some of the issues previously discussed in the context of feminism and race to the case of 
mixed race identity.
PART ONE: THE CONCEPT OF PERSONHOOD IN FEMINIST DEBATES 
Framing the debates: modernism and postmodernism
Whilst postmodernism as a reaction to 'aesthetic modernism' can be traced back to the 
early twentieth century, its contemporary understanding as a radical movement against 
modernism began in the 1960s. It arose out of a reaction against Marxism, the 'reason' of 
science, and modernism's grand narratives based on Enlightenment rationalism and 
universalism. Postmodernism differed from modernism in two important ways: one, it 
replaced the totalising 'truths' of meta-narratives with a relativism of discourse, and two, 
it did away with foundationalism and the fixed rational subject, replacing this with the 
idea of'subject positions', problematising the idea of the universal subject against which 
all others are defined (Peters, 1996). Postmodernism heralded an epistemological crisis, 
rejecting the idea that a stable real world existed, and claiming that there was no
transcendent position from which the real could be apprehended and against which ideas 
could be tested. It therefore concerned the conditions of knowing rather than the 
epistemological variant itself. The argument was that philosophy in its current form was 
no longer viable as a legitimator of knowledge: knowledge meant representing the world 
accurately, but if there was no final neutral source of knowledge, and all truth claims were 
in principle undecidable, then philosophy could not set the standards by which this could 
be measured. As such, postmodernism is best understood as an ontological stance, a 
position which is deliberately relativistic with respect to epistemology, and as such 
intensely anti-hegemonic in character (Dear, 2000).
Many contemporary sociologists and philosophers have either asserted that 
postmodernism is a form or process internal to late modernity (Habermas, 1987; Beck, 
1992), or that it is a separate development or condition which is external to modernity 
(Harvey, 1989; Bauman, 1992). Gellner (1992) believes that postmodernism is tangential 
and that modernity remains centre-stage, justifying this position in his claim that 
Enlightenment thought is the preferred mode of thought for most educated people and is 
being adopted by most societies (78). According to Wellmer (1991), a follower of 
Habermas, postmodernism should be seen as a redirection of modernism, a 'post- 
metaphysical modernism', rather than as its radical alternative. Habermas (1987) sees 
postmodernity as a conservative ideology which is premature in its rejection of modernity, 
and claims that modernity is our fate. Renouncing the grand narratives of modernity which 
encompass the instrumental rationality underlying powerful technological and 
bureaucratic structures of capitalism would mean making us powerless. The challenge 
according to Habermas is how to fulfil modernity's promise of universal 'self- 
consciousness, self-determination and self-realisation', and he asserts that modernity itself 
can provide the tools with which to deal with this problem (Habermas, 1987, 338). 
Habermas attempts to save the modernist project of universal emancipation and a rational 
society by asserting a belief in humanity as a universal human subject, and in finding a 
structure of agreed or general rules which governs all forms of interaction.
From the 1960s onwards, in both the UK and the US, established canons were opened up 
and the universal white male 'knowing' subject at the heart of philosophy was challenged. 
In many US schools, black authors such as Toni Morrison and Maya Angelou were 
studied, and educational trips were organised for poor working-class children. The shift 
away from paternalism towards pluralism was coupled with an increasing dominance of 
market models, in which consumerism was understood as an antidote to paternalism, and 
so could enable greater class mobility. Irony was a popular feature of postmodernism, 
which meant that racist and sexist comments could be 'got away with'; this was linked to 
the preoccupation with surface value, and the idea that 'image is everything'.
Postmodernism was invariably described not only as an epistemological crisis but also as 
an artistic movement, a cultural trend, and an historical epoch. The poststructuralist 
movement, although fundamentally linked to postmodernism in that both emphasised 
fragmentation, multiplicity, and the absence of any totalising force, focussed on the 
critique of the subject. Marxism was one of the first critiques of the subject: Marx argued 
that history is made under conditions which are not of our own choosing in that subjects 
are part of existing social practices but not the sole creators of these practices. 
Freudianism first referred to the relation between the psychic and the social. It 
deconstructed the idea of the unity of the individual subject, in that the conscious self was 
split from the unconscious self, and undermined the possibility of the self as a coherent, 
rational agent capable of access to truth. Derrida (1976) was concerned primarily with the 
subject and its place within the production of language. He proposed a radical 'de-centring 
of the subject' in which the subject and text were merely linguistic products, and because 
there was no such thing as an authentic or privileged reading, no universal meaning could 
be reached. Identity in this critique of the subject came to be seen as pluralistic, fluid and 
flexible, impermanent and unpredictable, a position in which the person can be described 
as a 'multiple and contradictory subject....contingent and precarious' (Mouffe, 1992, 
372).
The main critique of deconstructionism, postmodernism and post-structuralism has been 
that they advocate an apolitical agenda: not only does the 'death' of the meta-narrative
signify a profound disillusionment with ideology, and suggests that the Enlightenment 
goals of universal emancipation and a rational society are things of the past, but also, the 
eradication of the subject necessarily means the suppression of a directional social and 
political force. In the place of the subject is an empty apolitical void of competing subject 
positions which have no history or foundation, are sceptical of the validity of universal 
moral truths and collective politics, and so can bear no determinate path. In this critique, 
'the rational autonomous individual of liberal theory has been dissolved - 'deconstructed' 
- into a multiplicity of overlapping and mutually inconsistent persons possessing different 
identities and interests' (Kumar, 1997, 105), a position which may be described as the 
'end of history' (see Fukayama, 1989) in that it heralds the end of ideology and politics. 
Other criticisms have been that deconstruction is similar to liberalism in so far as they are 
both private positions, and that deconstruction is closer to modernism than postmodernism 
in that both espouse the autonomous and separated world of culture (Huyssen, 1992; 
Connor, 1989). Herman (1992), a staunch defender of modernism, disparagingly asserts 
that the postmodernists have 'dug themselves into a grand metaphysical tomb' (42), whilst 
some anti-postmodernists have accused the French thinkers of the 1970s of retreating into 
an esoteric intellectual world separated from social and political reality, a world in which 
modernist language has been appropriated, taken from its moral and political context, and 
turned into an aesthetic language game.
Much of the debate around the modernity/postmodernity conjunction has centred on the 
question of equality, particularly in relation to class, gender and ethnicity. Theorists 
writing on these issues can be seen as belonging to one of three bands: one, those who 
explicitly favour postmodern forms of sociological enquiry as only these can account for 
difference (Weedon, 1989; Bauman, 1992; Ashenden, 1997; Davies, 1997); two, those 
who condemn postmodernism's relativism for being anti-scientific (Schroeder, 1997; 
Sokal and Bricmont, 1997); and three, those who argue for a 'modernist' approach to 
postmodernism, acknowledging some aspects of postmodernism such as its critique of 
grand narratives, but rejecting its 'deconstructive' dimension (Ramazanoglu, 1993; 
South, 1997). The first of these bands reflects much of the work by feminist 
postmodernists, and will be discussed later in the chapter. Some feminist researchers and
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philosophers in this category are unwilling to give up the goal of universal equality but 
recognise that new ways of approaching traditional goals need to be found, and believe 
that postmodern theory can be incorporated into a modernist political framework (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1983).
The important questions throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and up until the present day, 
have been how to resolve this perceived impasse between modernist and postmodernist 
tendencies within feminist thought: first, how can feminist theory be based on specifically 
feminine experiences without using one particular paradigm of universal femaleness, and 
so circumvent the charge of essentialism, and second, whether an acknowledgement of 
difference and subjectivity per se is what feminists want, and if not, what the objective 
'ground' should be upon which particular models are based. Whilst some feminists have 
claimed the unitary subject is integral to feminist thought, others have insisted that there is 
an inherent danger in the feminist project assuming a unitary consciousness and a 
consensual truth about what women's oppression is about, and have questioned the 
validity of 'universal' tasks undertaken to remedy this oppression. Modernist principles 
may be useful in providing the basis for a general theory of equality and justice, but 
feminist epistemology based on an essential female identity is severely limited in that it 
draws on 'innate' female values, cannot give expression to all of women's experiences, 
and as such is normative and exclusionary. Therefore, a feminist politics based on such an 
epistemology cannot be in the interests of universal equality. Haraway (1990) has argued:
'There is nothing about 'female' that naturally binds women. There is not even 
such a state as 'being' female, itself a highly complex category constructed in 
contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices. Gender, race, 
or class consciousness is an achievement forced on us by the terrible historical 
experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, 
racism and capitalism.' (197)
Rather than disband modernity completely, many feminists have argued that it is 
important to acknowledge the social and political dimensions of modernity as a means of 
advancing democracy (Nicholson and Seidman, 1995), and the emphasis in much feminist 
research has shifted towards the possibility of redirecting rather than completely breaking
with Enlightenment principles in order to retain the possibility of the feminist political 
project of emancipation (Mouffe, 1988). It seems that since the 1990s this debate has 
intensified in response to the unresolved impasse between universalism and the 
recognition of difference, and the ongoing stalemate between white and black feminism. 
The work of black feminists will be discussed later in this section. The tension between 
modernism and postmodernism, and the reconciliation between equality and difference 
was confounded: where the self is unitary, it has the potential to be of equal value to all 
others; where it takes up different subject positions, it has no essential relational value to 
others. These questions are also relevant to debates around race, and have important 
implications for the study of mixed race identity especially around questions of self- 
definition as mixed race, perceptions of self in relation to others, and equality and 
discrimination.
The critique of the subject
The question of whether an essence of 'man' and 'woman' determines gender, or whether 
sex and gender are separate has framed the debate around biologism and sociologism 
outlined at the beginning of the chapter. This has initiated heated discussion within many 
disciplines, especially in feminist theory, developmental psychology, and sociology, as 
well as in popular discourse in the form of the nature versus nurture debate. The social 
psychologist Rom Harre (1994) has made a useful distinction between sex and gender, and 
argues that sex is a biological category, whereas gender has different structures. 
According to Harre (1994), the genitals, commonly understood as the principal markers of 
the distinction of sex (following Freud), are nominal complementary markers, and the 
primary marker of sex distinction is chromosomal difference. Secondary markers take on a 
symbolic role through which a person's sex is displayed, such as body form, and tertiary 
characteristics are the external denotations of one's sex through, for example, dress and 
hairstyle.
In feminism, the key question has been whether the body is socially constituted or 
invariant across culture and history, or a mixture of both. Two feminist theorists, Susan
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Bordo (1989) and Judith Butler (1990, 1993) have both used Foucault's (1979, 1981) 
concept of the body as cultural text, and both are concerned with showing how the body 
has a central place in feminist politics. However, although both have claimed there is no 
'natural' body, they have parted company on understandings around the materiality of the 
body, and have come to represent two distinct camps in feminist theory.
The work of Foucault (1979, 1981, 1984, 1986) has been especially influential for post- 
structuralist feminists such as Butler. Foucault (like Nietzsche before him) identified the 
central issue to be one of language in which the subject is constructed through linguistic 
practices. It is not the person as the knowing subject, he argued, who should be at the 
centre of the study of human sciences, but the discursive practices which construct the 
person: the self is thus abolished and replaced by subject positions which are not 
historically produced and self-reproduced, but are positioned within discursive practices 
which are reproduced by power/knowledge relations within particular discourses. For 
Foucault (1979), the body was the site, and not the agent in relations of power. In this 
thesis, language/discourse does not neutrally reflect reality or tell truths about the world, 
but rather constructs reality, where this construction is intimately linked to power. As 
such, truth itself is an effect of discourse, and is not objective, neutral or universal. The 
political effects of truths rather than whether something was true or false was the 
important issue, and he looked at the systems and rules which generated meaning rather 
than the people who make them.
Foucault rejected generalised histories, and the totalising theories and abstract 
idealisations produced by philosophers on how power works, and was concerned with 
how the production of knowledge is always historically bound up with specific regimes of 
power. Knowledge, for Foucault (1979, 1984) was suffused by power as a productive 
network which ran through the entire social body without being aware of its own power - 
power was neither a thing, nor was there anything outside power. Power was neither 
universal nor unitary, but diffuse and multiple, existing through historically specific 
discourses and practices. Foucault also rejected scientific classification and statistical 
measurements, as these resulted in the objectification of subjects with the aim of exerting
social control, and were ways in which norms were determined, and from which 
categories of the abnormal were created. In this way, argued Foucault, the world became 
knowable only in particular ways, simultaneously making other things unknowable. 
Foucault analysed power through a focus on institutions, linking this analysis to forms of 
discourse. He claimed there are three types of struggles: against forms of domination 
(ethnic, social, etc); against forms of exploitation which separated individuals from what 
they produced; and, especially in this age, against that which ties the individual to himself 
and submits him to others in this way (struggles against subjection), that is to say, the 
power of the state as both individualising and totalising. The main contention some 
feminists have with Foucault's concept of power as context-bound is that all universal 
accounts of oppression are therefore also automatically discounted, and as such the 
'patriarchy' is not recognised (McNay, 1992).
Butler (1991, 1993), drawing on Foucault's (1979, 1981) critique of the body which sees 
the body as entirely malleable over the course of history, has claimed that the materiality 
of the body is the effect of discourse, and that gender is the discursive means by which 
natural sex is created. For Butler (1990, 1993), the body has no 'natural' ground but is 
always already a cultural sign. She argues that grounding feminist theory on the 
materiality of the body is a false objective because matter itself has a history: the 
materiality of the body is the product of discourse and as such, materiality should be the 
object of, and not the ground for, feminist research (1993, 49). For Bordo (1989), the 
materiality of the body is a cultural construction which designates what is 'real' within 
culture. She insists that feminist politics should be about resisting cultural definitions as 
they are presented to us, and claims that the body must be the necessary locus of feminist 
politics, as the site of struggle which should be kept in the 'service of resistance to gender 
domination, not in the service of'docility' and gender normalisation' (1989, 28). Bordo 
(1989) has claimed that the discursive linguistic approach precludes a feminist politics 
because it lacks material analyses of the dual gendered body, and asserts that the study of 
the cultural representations of bodies, where these are divorced from their relation to the 
practical lives of bodies, obscures and misleads (1989, 27). Whilst Bordo rejects feminist 
postmodernism outright as 'stylish nihilism' for not having a body at all, Butler (1990)
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claims that we do not need a unitary concept of woman in which to ground feminist 
politics, as this reifies regulating gender relations and is conservative rather than 
revolutionary, and that rather the construction of a variable concept of identity should be 
our political goal (5).
In contrast to Harre (1994) then, Butler (1990) claims that a sex - gender distinction is 
untenable from the point of view that there is no body which can be 'discovered' prior to 
inscription and signification. She claims that sex is not a biological given around which 
gender is constructed, but is a regulatory ideal which is made manifest in the body through 
normative practices. The constructed subject, according to Butler, is the genuine agent: the 
subject requires neither a subject before the constitution of a subject, nor the foreclosure of 
agency by making the subject the product of societal and cultural processes, but rather that 
normative constraints determine the possibility for the process of performativity which 
allows the subject to emerge. The subject can be understood as a pure construct, 
constructed 'all the way down', so to speak. The subject is real, but only in so far as it is 
continuously constituted through citationality (O'Connell, 1999). Butler (1993) claims 
that the subject is constituted through the injunction to assume a sex, whereby sexual 
identity as permissible or abject is the condition for subjects which matter, or count as 
subjects, as opposed to those that do not. Butler does not discount the constructed subject 
as artificial, hiding an essential subject underneath, nor does she disclaim that the 
constructed subject is the genuine agent.
Whilst agreeing with Butler that there is no such thing as a 'pure' body, and that nature is 
never untouched by culture, critics of Butler have nevertheless suggested that she has 
perhaps gone too far in her radical rejection of the natural body, proclaiming that the 
notion of 'pure' culture prior to nature assumes the human condition exists in a culture- 
only zone rather than stemming from a natural-cultural relational field. The body is 
connatural with the world, not prior to culture, nor existing as a separate and passive 
observer, but participating with its environs as an experiential counterpart. Bigwood 
(1991) has argued that Merleau-Ponty's (1962) phenomenology could be a useful starting 
point for a feminist philosophy of the body in which nature is the codetermining force in
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the constitution of the body to the female incarnate situation she calls the 'mothering 
body'. Hekman (1998) has attempted to find possible overlaps between different feminist 
positions and has drawn attention to the similarities between Butler and Bordo. Both 
authors, she claims, are concerned with revealing the cultural construction of exclusion in 
an attempt to re-signify the symbolic of that construction: whilst Butler is concerned with 
showing how the abject body may be a site for the reconfiguration of a hegemonic 
symbolic, Bordo makes practice out of this theory, and in her work on anorexia and 
bulimia presents the abject body as a site of resistance of the hegemonic symbolic.
4 Western' feminism: essentialism, constructionism, and the political agenda
Frankenberg and Mani (1993) have usefully argued that feminism comprises at least four 
tendencies: first, the white feminist rearguard which argues for the primacy of gender 
domination; second, a white feminist neo-rearguard, which aims to incorporate plural 
subjectivities under the single 'mistress narrative' of gender domination; third, feminists, 
often black women and women of colour, who insist on a non-hierarchical analysis of how 
oppression works, placing race, gender and class alongside each other; and fourth, 
feminists who claim that domination and oppression may be experienced differently 
according to relationships which shift in tandem with different axes of domination. 
Although this is a useful model to illustrate different feminist positions, it is nevertheless 
limiting in that it simplifies some of the complexities and contradictions within feminism. 
I will examine the first two and fourth tendencies in depth through the work of western 
feminists working largely from a western perspective, whilst the third tendency will be 
explored under the sub-heading 'black feminism'.
The first tendency is a position adopted by standpoint or radical feminists. It is one which 
tends to view biology as foundational and declares that a common essential criteria based 
on the sexed body defines the categories 'woman' and 'man'. This modernist position 
(Assiter, 1996) asserts that womanhood must draw on a universal female subject, as this is 
fundamental to emancipatory politics. Standpoint feminism has been criticised for 
conflating politics and epistemology on two counts: one, that knowledge is understood as
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emancipatory and able to free women from power/ideology, and two, that the tension 
between the situatedness of the observer and the desire for objectivity in feminist 
scientific research is only overcome by positing an homogeneous entity 'woman' and 
valorising certain female values by claiming that women's access to reality provides the 
'better' form of truth (Ashenden, 1997). To assume that the category 'woman' is a stable 
and coherent entity, and to reject a universal oppressive structure (the 'patriarchy') is 
essentialist and enforces a rigid gender division which views heterosexuality as the norm. 
Moreover, in representing itself as a politics of authentic identity, and configuring its 
principles around the idea of a 'greater-than-male universal', it premises its own politics 
on a universal, which it assumes is attainable (Ashenden, 1997). This is reminiscent of 
Judith Butler's (1990) claim that feminist theorists who support essentialist views of 
gender are actually reinstating 'ideal orders' which create new relations of domination and 
oppression (20). The contention revolves around whether ethical universal abstractions 
should be rejected on the grounds that they are inevitably rooted in liberalist, 'masculinist' 
ways of thinking, or whether precisely such abstract forms of reasoning can give 
particularist projects a purpose in working towards greater equality.
The question of whether gender should be based on epistemological separatism such as 
that evoked by standpoint feminism is central to discussions in feminist theory. The 
separatist strategy challenges the so-called objectivity of knowledge as 'masculinist' and 
universalising, and suggests a production of knowledge and a mode of theorising which is 
both by women and for women, and uses women's experience as its basis. Harding (1986, 
1987, 1991) has drawn on Hegel's master/slave dialectic - in which the master, dominant 
in social relations, has a distorted sense of reality, whilst the slave's compromised position 
and need to survive means that he/she has greater access to reality - to argue that a 
feminist standpoint position provides greater objectivity of observation. Harding (1987, 
1991) attempts to retain the scientific element of research alongside the recognition that 
knowledge which acknowledges the 'situatedness' of the researcher, rather than the 
elimination of bias through research, provides a greater capacity for objectivity.
Hartsock (1983) too, draws on Hegel's dialectic. Hartsock's (1983) premise is that
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women's position is different from men's due to the sexual division of labour, a position 
she develops from Marx's theory of knowledge which states that social positioning 
structures a person's experience and ways of knowing. Hartsock expands Marx's ideas to 
encompass 'all human activity' (1983, 283) which produces new forms of knowledge seen 
from the point of view of women's lives. This would create new 'truth' narratives which 
are 'more' universal than the limited universal theories of Marx based on class and 
capitalism. The work of Harding and Hartsock may be considered controversial in that 
women are assumed to be the privileged bearers of knowledge because of their 
subordinate positions in social relations, and that the greatest truths emerge out of these 
positions. Flax (1990) has disputed the idea that the oppressed have a privileged position 
on the grounds that such a view relies on unexamined assumptions, which in turn depend 
upon an uncritical appropriation of Enlightenment ideas. It presupposes that there is a 
group of people who are fundamentally similar because of their sex, and as such, assigns 
the same kind of 'otherness' that men consign to women. Such a standpoint, she argues, 
assumes that women, unlike men, may be free of participation in relations of domination 
(1990, 55-56).
The second strand in feminism, known as feminist post-structuralism, evolved out of the 
perceived theoretical one-dimensionality of standpoint feminism and a disillusion with 
Marxist gender-blindness. Foucault and Derrida, and also Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
Levi-Strauss's kinship theory have influenced feminist post-structuralist thought (see 
section on Butler and Foucault above). The main argument against the post-structuralist 
position is that its epistemological status cannot sustain a unitary reform project and gives 
little guidance to feminist politics generally. If the idea of the self as a unitary identity is 
deconstructed, it undermines the possibility of access to universal truth and experience, 
and if meta-narratives are ruled out, then there is no language of struggle (Lovibond, 
1983; Cole and Hill, 1995), or at very least, results in ambivalence around emancipatory 
narratives. Apart from these charges, standpoint feminists have criticised post- 
structuralism for being androcentric (Soper, 1993), and politically reactionary in its 
attempt to debilitate feminism's goals (Hartsock, 1990). Hartsock (1990) claimed that 
postmodernism was a dangerous approach for marginalised groups to adopt: at best,
postmodernism is critical of standpoint theories without putting anything in their place, 
whilst at worst, 'postmodern theories can recapitulate the effects of Enlightenment 
theories which deny the right to participate in defining the terms of interaction' (1990, 
159-160).
During the 1990s, the fourth strand in feminism (the third strand which concerns issues 
around black feminism is discussed in the next section) became more dominant, and there 
was a gradual shift in focus away from the body per se to political sites of struggle. By 
that time, it was widely recognised that the denunciation of universal abstractions of 
equality and justice would be a self-defeating and an unnecessary move, especially in 
view of the fact that the alternative would be a 'difference' politics which must ultimately 
condone a particularist deregulated social policy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Benhabib and 
Cornell, 1987; Soper, 1990). In this vein, several feminist theorists have attempted to 
reconfigure or marry elements of the modernist and postmodernist positions in an attempt 
to show that a feminist project may be emancipatory and democratic without the category 
'woman' having a determinate meaning (Best and Kellner, 1991; Francis, 1999a). Davies 
(1990) did not want to discard the feminine/masculine distinction, but to dismantle the 
social processes by which this distinction was mapped onto biological determinations of 
persons as male or female. Harding (1993) has argued for a political way out of 
postmodernism's relativism, suggesting that elements of Enlightenment discourses may be 
amalgamated with aspects of postmodernism to enable feminists to overcome male- 
centred relations (Harding, 1991). Fragmentation of the subject, it has been argued, does 
not necessarily lead to paralysis, but on the contrary, can open up new possibilities for 
feminism in organising feminist politics around particular identities, and around specific 
issues and struggles which have a broader democratic project in mind (Mouffe, 1995). 
Some post-structuralist feminist writers, however, have pointed out that a combination of 
modernist and postmodernist principles is not only theoretically dubious but empirically 
impracticable (Jones, 1997; Francis, 1999a).
The point in these new ways of thinking was not to deny the category 'woman' per se but 
to reject its homogeneity and examine how notions of self were constituted in a set of
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social and political relations and practices, without need of a prior normative framework 
(Nicholson and Seidman, 1995). Rejecting the category 'woman' was not the same as 
saying that gender was not a category of oppression, and the foundational subject as the 
target of postmodernism's critique should not be confused with the importance of selfhood 
or subjectivity; feminist epistemology and its critique of foundationalism, therefore, did 
not necessarily entail a denial of feminist politics or human values (Ashenden, 1997). 
Ashenden (1997) argued that a shift towards political identification brought the 
constitution of communities to the fore, and that the dissolution of the meta-narrative in 
postmodern philosophy was the opportunity for 'identity', rather than 'truth', to become 
the focus for feminist politics. Nicholson and Seidman (1995) argued that the category 
'woman' should not possess a singular meaning but a series of meanings based on specific 
political motivations rather than on the perceived common needs of the universal 
'woman'. Similarly, Mouflfe (1995) claimed there was no 'woman' as a singular position, 
but women who occupy multiple social positions.
Some feminists also began to debate the question of how to approach the feminist political 
project where this recognised difference more generally. Soper (1990), a proponent of 
modernist feminist principles, called for an 'objective model of relating' which implies a 
commitment to the principle of justice as that which grounds the demand for an end to 
discrimination, not only against women but against any marginalised or oppressed 
grouping' (1990, 220), with the justification that this probably appeals to far more women 
than the idea of a Utopia of multiplying difference (1990, 221). Mouffe (1995) criticised 
Soper for creating an untenable opposition between the category 'woman' which was 
founded on the notion of a priori belonging and the unity of womanhood, and, in the 
absence of the unity of womanhood, an apolitical space in which no feminist politics is 
able to exist. Indeed, Mouffe and Laclau had as early as 1983 recognised the need for the 
centrality of political struggles and argued for what they called a 'chain of equivalence' 
among different democratic struggles, where this was an articulation between the demands 
of various subordinated groups of people as an ensemble of subject positions who made 
contemporary struggles appear as a 'totalising effect' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1983). The 
feminist political movement, argued Mouffe (1995), should not be limited to pursuing
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feminist goals which only had the idea of 'women as women' in mind, and whose 
objective was to realise the equality of a particular definable group with a common 
essence, nor should it be the quest to prove that one particular form of feminist discourse 
was the correct one. Instead, it should be seen as a struggle against the plural forms in 
which the category woman is constructed in subordination, that is to say, through class, 
ethnicity, race, etc. Any single truth narrative around feminist politics must therefore be 
abandoned, as there are infinite numbers of discourses within which a feminist politics 
could be framed.
Mouffe (1995) believed that postmodern theory had profound implications for the 
meaning of democracy, where democracy could no longer be based on the idea of a 
rational unitary agent as the holder of universal liberal rights, but should be understood as 
a concept which incorporated a plurality of perspectives and identities. In this view, 
postmodernism was not necessarily modernism's antithesis, but opened up new ways for 
understanding modernity. Because it denied the concept of a universalising 'whole', and 
kept the space of critical theory open, it effectively held the potential for becoming a 
politicised terrain of indeterminate and infinite struggle. In other words, where modernism 
offered a redemption from politics, postmodernism provided its opposite. From this 
perspective, feminism could be seen as a 'permanently shifting political coalition', 
whereby identification with feminist struggles was not based on epistemology but on the 
problematic of social practices (Ashenden, 1997, 56) in which the subject was constituted 
through political identifications. For Mouffe (1995), once the essential homogeneous 
subject 'woman' was discarded, the whole drama around the equality versus difference 
could be dissipated (319). If 'woman' no longer opposes 'man', and in place of this 
opposition we have a set of social relations within which sexual difference is constructed 
in a myriad of ways, and where struggles against subordination are both specific and 
varied, then the possibility of engaging with a radical democratic politics which can 
explode the equality versus difference dilemma is opened up.
The work of Laclau (1996) is useful in these debates in so far as he saw the 'universal' 
and the 'particular' as inextricably linked. Laclau's (1996) main thesis is that the
19
omnipresence of power means that the quest for universal emancipation, despite being an 
inevitable part of the human condition, is a fruitless task: political resistance can only 
function within a discourse of dominant/oppressive power relations which is both the 
reason for and the condition of its existence. When an identity asserts itself as a 
particularity in relation to other identities, it is also sanctioning the status quo of power 
relations between the groups because of the discursive framework within which it 
operates. The discourses of the oppressor and the discourses of the oppressed are therefore 
one and the same thing:
'I cannot assert a differential identity without distinguishing it from a context; 
and in the process of making the distinction, I am asserting the context at the 
same time. And the opposite is also true: I cannot destroy a context without 
destroying at the same time the identity of the particular subject who carries 
out the destruction. It is a very well known historical fact that an oppositionist 
force whose identity is constructed within a certain system of power is 
ambiguous with respect to that system, because the latter is what prevents the 
constitution of the identity and it is, at the same time, its condition of 
existence.' (Laclau, 1996, 51)
Democracy is therefore dependent on there being no concrete universal or content, a space 
in which different groups can compete amongst themselves in their attempt to fill the 
'missing fullness' which is the universal. Thus: 'the universal is the symbol of missing 
fullness, and the particular exists only in the contradictory movement of simultaneously 
asserting a differential identity and cancelling it through its subsumption into a non- 
differential medium' (Laclau, 1996, 52). The irregularity of the social determines which 
differential struggle assumes the dominant role and the universal function: in this scenario, 
particularist positions continuously vie with each other for dominance, and as such, 
emancipation is never complete or fixed, but always temporary and contingent.
This fourth strand in feminism also had implications for the ongoing tensions between 
white and black feminism, a subject discussed in the next section. In an attempt to resolve 
these tensions, universalist modernist principles of 'truth' were de-coupled from theories 
of the subject in an attempt to hold on to the emancipatory agenda, whilst simultaneously 
ditching the idea that any essential differences between black and white women were
tenable. Indeed, it has been widely acknowledged that similarities between class and 
ethnicity exist in that they are powerfully internalised, infused within body, language and 
thought, and that they are constantly played out in interactions with others (Frankenberg, 
1993; Kuhn, 1995; Mirza, 1997; Reay, 1997). In foregrounding political justice and 
equality, race and class were seen as intrinsically linked to the myriad of ways in which 
women were constructed as subordinated. The main difficulty with this view was, as 
Butler (1993) pointed out, that it was not simply a matter of relating race and sexuality 
and gender as if they were separable axes of power: the pluralist conception of these terms 
as categories or positions was founded on an exclusionary principle which attributed a 
false uniformity to them, and could potentially result in the endless multiplication of 
categories and positions, 'an ever-expanding list that effectively separates that which it 
purports to connect' (116-117). In general, however, it was recognised that it was 
necessary to distinguish between subjectivity and hierarchies of domination and 
subordination, and that the emphasis should be on the social structures - rather than the 
social facts of race/racism, gender/sexism, etc. - through which inequalities were created 
and perpetuated (Gilroy (1993). Amongst black and white feminists in the 1990s, this was, 
theoretically at least, expressed through black/white alliances which focussed on anti- 
racist struggles.
Black feminism
Amongst black feminists in the 1980s, physical difference as a primary marker of 
belonging was about the process of becoming racialised to share a common structural 
location which was a racial location (Mercer, 1990; Hall, 1992), and black women's sense 
of racialisation and objectification in Britain led to politicised collective action against 
dominant white authority. The homogenous construction of the 'black community', Hall 
(1992) argued, arose out of the struggle for recognition of black Britons in the face of 
white mainstream culture which continues to refute difference and relations of power. The 
tendency to homogenise the oppression of black people, whilst useful for invoking a 
'category of a new politics of resistance' (Hall, 1992, 252), also reinforced the 'ethnic 
absolutisms' used to categorise and define marginalised people. Lorde (1984) pointed out
that the desire for unity and connectedness was often rooted in common experiences of 
racism amongst black people, but that this was frequently misnamed homogeneity. The 
kinds of ideals forged around notions of essentialism and community, both in social 
relations generally and in feminist politics, were also viewed as problematic in that they 
could lead to exclusions which could reinforce homogeneity (Young, 1990, 301). Bell 
hooks (1983) insisted that there could not be a feminist science because feminism was 
fundamentally an antagonistic position which opposed dominant stories. Concurrently, 
there was an increasing demand amongst black feminists to be seen as culturally, and not 
as racially different (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). Mirza (1997) has argued that the 
desire for meaningful personal identifications amongst black women expresses the longing 
for a 'place called home'. In the context of black feminism as a political movement, Harris 
(cited in Persram, 1997) has usefully pointed out how the ideology of the nation as 'home' 
need not be a specific place, but can be a sense of movement or a process.
Most theorists who have written on hybridity and diaspora have generally done so in 
relation to migration and postcolonialism (Christian, 2004). The shift towards personal 
and political identifications enabled black women to break out of what Bhabha (1990) has 
referred to as a 'third space'. Bhabha (1990) has claimed that hybridity is the 'third space' 
which allows other positions to emerge, a space which 'displaces the histories that 
constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are 
inadequately understood through received wisdom' (221). It is a concept which enables a 
different way of understanding binaries and dichotomies, and introduces the notion that it 
is possible to challenge power and be free from the shackles of the past. Despite the 'third 
space' purportedly being a space of cultural progressiveness and strength, Mirza (1997) 
has argued that, because it 'overlaps the margins of the race, gender and class discourse 
and occupies the empty spaces in between, [it] exists in a vacuum of erasure and 
contradiction' (4). With reference to the work of Higginbotham (1992), Mirza (1997) has 
claimed that this space has been maintained by the polarisation of the world into black on 
one side and women on the other, where the subject of racial discourses are men, gendered 
discourses are (white) women, and class discourses deem race invisible.
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Christian (2004) has criticised Bhabha's concept of hybridity for being ahistorical, 
divorced for reality, and naive in its dismissal of the experiences of the once 'colonised' 
who have migrated to the metropoles (308-309). He has remarked that whilst this concept 
is useful, 'when put to the acid-test of the social world it fails....Of course history and 
culture is dynamic and ever-changing, but the pattern or framework of oppression and 
social exclusion can often remain a constant' (308). According to Christian (2004), 
Bhabha's theories do not hold for coloured people's experience of occupying the 'third 
space' under apartheid in South Africa; these people were intrinsically products of their 
'parent histories' (one Black of African descent, and one white of European descent), and 
did not create something new or separate from the histories they were connected to (309).
As we have seen above, the crucial question of how, and indeed, whether, it was possible 
to achieve equality within difference took on new importance, especially with respect to 
the dilemma facing feminism as a viable political movement in the 1990s. Whilst 
feminism in the 1980s focussed on the right to be equal, the focus in the 'postmodern' 
1990s was on the right to be different. This was in part due to the endeavour, on the part 
of white feminists, to 'compensate' for their exclusionist politics. The reaction of black 
feminists to the politics of white feminists, and the inability of white feminism - which 
made very specific claims around the family and the nature of patriarchy - to incorporate 
the experiences of black women, shifted the white feminist discourse from universalism to 
difference (Mirza, 1997). However, in an attempt to rectify the concerns which came from 
black feminists, the experience of being oppressed frequently became romanticised, and 
culture came to represent an either/or polarisation of those who were 'privileged' and 
those who were 'oppressed'; moreover, white feminists were unable to become fully 
engaged with what it meant to be part of the dominant group (Frankenberg, 1993; Razack, 
1998). White feminism was not able to resolve the problem of racial hegemony within 
gender relations, and as such, its epistemology which centred around notions of inclusion 
and equality remained exclusive and inequitable. Difference still privileged whiteness, and 
as difference was always perceived in relation to the white norm, white authority within 
the feminist movement was unavoidable. Within the academy, the question of the 
legitimacy of standpoint feminism and its universalistic humanism weighed heavy for
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many black feminists whose voices could only be legitimated through white feminism 
(Ware, 1991,-Mohanty, 1992).
The problem of exclusion and legitimacy, however, was not confined to white feminism, 
but was also inherent within black feminism itself (Anthias and Yuval- Davis, 1992; Brah, 
1994). The first difficulty was that difference depoliticised feminism and dissipated the 
possibility for black collective action. This issue mirrored the one in the debate on 
feminism explored above through the work of Bordo and Butler: the modernist discourse 
of blackness was a universalistic conception, and ultimately an exclusionary one which 
could not adequately account for differences within it; a relativistic conception on the 
other hand, which asserted the heterogeneity of identities, weakened the possibility of 
effective political action. Amongst black feminists the question of personal identification 
for political and personal purposes raised the question of who could or should be called 
'black'. This is an issue I will return to later in the context of mixed race identity. It has 
implications for the study of mixed race women whose self-identifications may challenge 
these homogeneous constructions of race.
It had also become increasingly clear that any attempt to democratise the 'grand' theories 
simply served to produce monolithic meta-categories which were frequently positioned 
against each other, and as such were exclusionary: the notion of the 'black (middle-class) 
superwoman' who 'has it all', for example, may be juxtaposed with the 'marginalised 
black working class male' (Reynolds, 1997). In the bid to find their place within feminist 
politics, black feminists have been criticised for trying to 'milk' their triple oppression of 
race, class and gender (Mirza, 1997, 9). As Carby (1982) has pointed out, the main danger 
with universalist feminist articulations is the assumption that all women are oppressed by 
patriarchy, whilst all black women are oppressed simultaneously by patriarchy, racial 
subordination, and the stigma of class (213). The danger of relativist feminism, on the 
other hand, is that it 'de-relativises' experiences of oppression and tries to make them 
comparable. Childers and hooks (1990) have asserted that it is important not to assume 
that all black women experience oppression in exactly the same way, and that there is a 
need 'to make a distinction between what it means to be from an oppressed group and yet
be privileged - while still sharing in the collective reality of black women' (75). As Gilroy 
(1993) has pointed out, 'gender, class, culture and locality may become more significant 
determinants of identity than either biological phenotype or the supposed cultural essences 
of what are now known as ethnic groups' (109).
Like some other black feminists (Trinh, 1989; Collins, 1990), Razack (1998) focuses on 
capitalism, patriarchy and white supremacy in an attempt to uncover the essentialist 
constructs which mask relations of power. Razack (1998) is concerned with the 
relationship between domination and subordination. Through her study of classrooms and 
courtrooms, she researches 'hegemonic ways of seeing through which subjects make 
themselves dominant' (11), that is to say, how white people, and specifically white 
women, secure their power. Rejecting the idea of an additive model of oppression, 
claiming that this merely multiplies 'essences', Razack (1998) argues that it is necessary 
to theorise the simultaneity and complexity of systems of domination and how they 
mutually constitute one another, invoking a dialectical approach in which women exist 
simultaneously in symbiotic and hierarchical relations to each other in 'interlocking 
systems' of mutual domination and dependency (12-14). She is particularly interested in 
bringing the issue of complicity within the relationships between white and black women 
to the fore, arguing that white women frequently deny their dominance by withdrawing 
into a position of subordination when confronted with white racial superiority. Razack 
(1998) claims that it is important to move beyond essences, but just as importantly, not 
just to replace this with the assertion that we are all human beings. This position resounds 
with that of several researchers working on mixed race issues who are grappling with the 
problem of finding a model of personhood which resorts neither to essentialism nor to 
individualism (Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Mahtani and Moreno, 2001). This issue will be 
discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Six.
The 'self and education
Debates around the self, as we have seen, have centred around the tension between 
biologism and sociologism, or the fixity and fluidity of the self. I now turn to the issue of
selfhood and education, and in particular to the tensions which exist between agency and 
structure within educational debates. In the late 1970s, ethnographic work began to focus 
on agency and cultural re/production (Willis, 1977; Macleod, 1987) rather than on the 
straightforward internalisation of structural effects such as that espoused by Bowles and 
Gintis (1976) who explained social inequality in economic terms, and in terms of the 
correlate between the organisation of work and schooling. These studies introduced 
cultural elements into deterministic macro-theories, where culture was not merely a 
reflection of structural forces but a system of meaning which mediated social structure and 
human agency. The focus in such studies was on revealing the complex mechanisms 
behind education as a tool for reproducing identities: children were no longer understood 
to be mere empty vessels who are 'filled' with education, but were subject to other
external forces, such as class, race and gender, which played a significant part in the 
construction of their identities. Willis's (1977) study of working-class 'lad' culture in 
schools was seminal in that it emphasised both resistance and reproduction in the 
formation of identities. The 'cultures of resistance' amongst working-class boys as 
contestation served to reproduce rather than change the social order; resisting the 
dominant ethos of achievement and identifying manual labour with masculinity meant that 
the boys perpetuated the class structure and thereby compromised their economic position 
in society. Agency existed in so far as individual working-class children could succeed in 
education, but never the whole class.
More recent theories of education have been largely concerned with explaining 
discrepancies between intention and outcome by revealing their underlying political, 
economic and cultural causes, and by suggesting that self and processes are both dynamic 
and interrelated. Drawing on post-structuralist concepts, some educationalists and 
researchers have suggested that in the same way that identities are neither consistent nor 
follow predictable patterns, there can be no correlation between the intended effects of 
education and its actual effects. The key idea here is that control is never absolute but 
always contingent on account of agency (Clegg, 1989), and that the cultural realm may be 
significantly autonomous from structural constraints. Such studies have shown that people 
are not simply subject to and shaped by external forces beyond their control, but that they
are 'active sense makers' in that they make choices from alternatives in often 
contradictory circumstances (Mehan, 2000 [1992], 507). In one study of school children 
and their parents, for example, Lareau (1989) showed that although dominant middle-class 
values were adopted by the school in which she did her research, both working-class and 
middle-class people took on purposeful forms of cultural capital and utilised different 
strategies as a means for achieving success for their children.
One of the main questions preoccupying educationalists and policy makers today is why, 
despite extensive government initiatives to widen participation, etc., students from 
working-class backgrounds are not as successful in school as middle-class students, and 
why they still predominantly go into working-class jobs. Whilst acknowledging that 
agents are not simply passive players within dominant discourses and are actively engaged 
in 'individual and collective self-making and sense-making' (Delhi, 1996 cited in Reay, 
2000), Reay (2000) - drawing on Bourdieu's theories - has argued that the discourses 
within which working-class people position themselves are the middle-class discourses of 
the 'market and individual reliance; primarily middle-class versions of social life' (994).
Several researchers have also attempted to uncover some of the possible constraints facing 
young people in making post-16 choices in terms of access and aspirations. Du Bois- 
Reymond (1998) has pointed out that the recognition of 'choice biographies' does not 
imply a discounting of long-standing structural constraints like class, gender and ethnicity 
on many young people's choices. Reay et al. (2001) have suggested that the educational 
choices young people make parallel their unequal access to cultural, social and economic 
capital, and that different positions in relation to risk or privilege may impact upon the 
kinds of choices which people feel are available to them. Moreover, as Reay (2000) has 
pointed out, working-class people position themselves within middle-class discourses 
which are seldom chosen by working-class people themselves. As such, working-class 
people have limited choice and can either accept a 'spoilt identity' (Reay and Ball, 1997), 
or, as increasingly appears to be the case, reject the label 'working-class' (Skeggs, 1997). 
Central to these ideas is Bourdieu's (1977) concept of 'habitus' (see Chapter One) 
whereby certain dominant ways of thinking, concepts and categories have been
internalised and hard-wired into certain self-beliefs and ways of behaving. Using this 
theory of 'habitus', and the 'sense of limits' it engenders, it would seem that particular 
policy objectives, such as those which propose increased participation in education, do not 
necessarily result in an immediate transformation of a person's self-beliefs and/or 
educational aspirations. Arguably, the government's education policy objective to create a 
'culture of learning', and the agenda of'instant gratification' which maintains that (under- 
represented) people will unhesitatingly reap the rewards of their investment in learning, 
seems rather short-sighted.
The work of Bourdieu (1977) has been especially useful for understanding the continuing 
discrepancies between the achievements of people form working-class and middle-class 
backgrounds. Bourdieu's work is mainly concerned with the relationship between the 
socio-cultural realm and structure. Central to Bourdieu's theories is the concept of 
'habitus', in which the biological is linked to the social. The 'habitus' is built up from 
early experiences which are prior or simultaneous to the emergence of our subjective 
sense of self, and as such is the basis of self-knowledge, thoughts and feelings. This initial 
sense of self is reinforced throughout life and is considerably resistant to change; thus, the 
'habitus' has a great ability to reproduce social forces without initiating social change.
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) view cultural capital in the same way as economic capital, 
and explain inequality by drawing on the notion of a cultural element which reconciles 
economic structures, schooling and people's lives. According to this theory, cultural 
knowledge is transmitted by the families of each social class and absorbed through 
successive generations to create the 'habitus', a hard-wired norm which arises out of 
cultural socialisation. The meaning of culture, according to Bourdieu, is constructed 
through the power dimension of symbolic practice. The dominant culture transmits to the 
marginal but not the other way round, and where the marginal culture does transfer 
meaning this is usually superficial (an example of this may be seen in the case of the 
celebration of multiculturalism - see section 'The celebration of mixed race identity' in 
Part Three). Different social classes inherit different levels of linguistic and cultural 
competences, an inheritance perpetuated by a 'sense of limits' in which people are
confined to their 'habitus', and (degrees of) success and failure are dependent on how a 
person's structural position is perceived.
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) have argued that the education system is one of the 
fundamental agencies for the reproduction of the system of class relations: an homology 
exists between the structure of class relations and the structure of achievement within 
schools whereby the correlation between objective and internalised classes are intuitively 
perceived and educational choices made accordingly (1977, 164). The education system 
works as a reproduction strategy for the dominant group, structured to favour those who 
have cultural capital and acting as a filter in the cultural reproduction of a hierarchical 
society. Success and underachievement is therefore not something which is inherent in 
cultural difference, but rather, schools take on the 'habitus' of the dominant class, and this 
sets the standards for academic success.
Although the theories of Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) and Bourdieu and Boltanski 
(1981) overcome the problem of economic determinism (see Bowles and Gintis, 1976), 
the authors have been criticised for being culturally deterministic in the sense that cultural 
practices are considered to be a mere reflection of structural forces, and that the culture 
transmitted by schools, for example, sustains the culture of the dominant groups whilst 
marginalising the cultures of subordinate groups (Apple, 1983; Macleod, 1987). Bourdieu, 
however, sees 'habitus' as incorporated possibilities, not as socialisation, as the source 
rather than the prescription of choice. As Hoy (1999) has pointed out, the 'habitus' may 
actually explain agency in that it attempts to elucidate how people perceive possibilities 
for action and choice within structures which they do not themselves consciously create.
PART TWO: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CULTURE 
Theories of ethnicity and race
'Ethnicity' and 'ethnic group' were terms first used in the late 1960s. The work of both 
Max Weber (1968) and Frederick Barth (1969) was important for anthropological and
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sociological theory because it shifted the focus away from essentialist notions of race, or 
primordialism (often disguised as socio-biology) which questioned whether ethnic 
relations were 'innate' extensions of kinship (Geertz, 1963; Van den Berghe, 1981), 
towards the idea of ethnicity as social organisation and the relational quality of ethnic 
groups. Weber (1968) claimed that ethnic membership did not create a group in itself, but 
that collective political action and collective interests facilitate ethnic identification and 
group formation, especially in the political sphere. His description of the ethnic group is as 
one of 'those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent 
because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of the memories 
of colonisation or migration: conversely it does not matter whether an objective blood 
relationship exists' (Weber, 1968, 389).
Barth (1969) maintained that culture itself did not constitute ethnic identification, and the 
stasis of the boundaries between groups was contrasted with the fluidity of'cultural stuff, 
such as the flow of information and people, across these boundaries. His theory 
incorporates the idea of ascription and self-ascription, giving it the dual-dimension of 
social organisation and consciousness. Similarly, Anthony Cohen (1985) asserted that the 
concept of 'community' described both similarity and difference, '[expressing] a 
relational idea: the opposition of one community to others....It seems appropriate, 
therefore, to focus our examination of the nature of community on the element which 
embodies this sense of discrimination, namely the boundary' (12, original italics). 
Ethnicity here may be described as socially constructed or instrumentalist, in the sense 
that ethnic affiliations are subject to change, and political or economic motives usually lie 
behind new affiliations. Thus there is no necessary essential identity around which 
political affiliations are constructed, but rather, common interests make particular 
identities possible. The Rushdie affair, which began in 1989 when multiculturalism was at 
its height in Britain, illustrates how 'culture' was prioritised over 'boundary'. British 
institutions and Islamic organisations from diverse political backgrounds all agreed on 
what it is to be a 'Muslim' in an 'Islamic community', where Muslimness hinged on being 
'for' or 'against' freedom of speech, and freedom of speech was the marker of western 
liberalism and tolerance (see Asad, 1993).
Banton (1988) asserted that race was distinguishable from ethnicity in much the same way 
that physical and cultural differences could be contrasted. Jenkins (1996) has claimed that 
the ethnic group is voluntarily entered into, whilst the racial group is not; in this way 
ethnicity is about group identification, or 'us', and race is about social categorisation, or 
'them'. Some writers have argued for a convergence between race and ethnicity. Both 
Wallman (1986) and Eriksen (1993) have claimed that race incorporates only one aspect 
of ethnic relations, and is in itself not a decisive factor. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) 
have focussed on ethnic disadvantage, and shown how ethnic differences may be 
constructed around ideas of race. Although 'ethnicity', as opposed to 'race', has become 
the favoured concept in both academic and public policy fields when referring to groups 
and individuals from 'ethnic minority' backgrounds, largely because of the race 
essentialist connotations of the term 'race', the term 'race' is still used in the context of 
discrimination and racism.
Weber and Barth were forerunners in understanding ethnic/racial identities as socially 
constructed rather than reified. In the last 15 years or so, proponents of constructionism, 
mainly those working in a postmodernist, poststructuralist or feminist vein, have argued 
that people are not stable and unitary entities who can be neatly categorised and analysed 
according to the essentialist criteria associated with such classifications, but rather that 
identities are constructed through language. Post-structuralists see identity as arising out 
of a myriad of discourses which are culturally available to individuals, and which are 
drawn upon in people's communications with each other. Vivien Burr (1995) has 
articulated it thus:
'For each of us, then, a multitude of discourses is constantly at work 
constructing and producing our identity. Our identity therefore originates not 
from inside the person, but from the social realm, where people swim in a sea 
of language and other signs, a sea that is invisible to us because it is the very 
medium of our existence as social beings.' (53)
As postmodernism has heralded a move away from binary notions of black/white and 
confounded the idea that universals can be produced, reified ideas round race have also 
changed. The increase in the number of people who define and demand recognition as
mixed race - where this is not necessarily based on the traditional black/white definition of 
mixed race - is one example of this. The work of Stuart Hall (1992), and in particular his 
depiction of 'new ethnicities', has been considerably influential in promoting ways of 
thinking about identity as culturally dynamic and hybrid, rather than reified and 
homogeneous. Hall (1996) viewed identity as both a common experience and individually 
specific, in which a 'multiplicity of identities' described the potential character of the 
black British subject. He drew attention to the importance of locatedness, stating: 'we all 
speak from a particular place, out of a particular history, out of a particular experience, a 
particular culture....We are all in a sense ethnically located' (Hall, 1992, 258). The 
intersection between race, culture and other subjectivities such as class and gender was 
also recognised (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Reay, 1998), and it was acknowledged 
that a more nuanced notion of racism/s was required (Goldberg, 1990; Miles, 1993).
Despite the emphasis on the socially constructed evanescent and multiple nature of 
identities, it has been generally recognised that identity is materially configured and that 
asymmetric relations of power continue to constitute hegemony, racial hierarchies, and 
inequalities along black/white lines (Mac an Ghaill 1988, 1999). Kymlicka (1995) has 
argued that multicultural policy, in which cultural and ethnic identifications are celebrated 
as a backdrop for national identity, has obscured forms of institutional racism, whilst the 
focus on identity has detracted from racial ideologies and the problem of racism. Charles 
Mills (1998) has usefully pointed out that historical processes have made race a social 
reality and that, despite not having any natural basis, ontological status is arrived at 
through processes of intersubjectivity (47). Whereas the former legitimates the concept of 
race as 'a valid scientific typology' (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992, 11), the latter can be 
described as a 'dialectical process by which meaning is attributed to particular biological 
features of human beings as a result of which individuals may be assigned to a general 
category of persons which reproduces itself biologically' (Miles, 1989, 76, my italics).
In recent years, the recognition that 'whiteness' as an ethnicity is fundamentally 
implicated in social relations and processes of racialisation has come to the fore in the 
academic literature, mainly in the US (see Roediger, 1991; Ware, 1991; Frankenberg,
1993, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Fine et al., 1997; Nakayama, 1998; Razack, 1998; Ware and 
Back, 2002). White ethnicity is no different to black ethnicity in that it is historically 
produced, contingent and processual (Frankenberg, 1993). Whiteness, according to 
Frankenberg, displaces blackness and brown-ness, constructing identity through 
producing, labelling, and marginalizing others (193). Frankenberg (1993) has argued that 
culture can be understood in two main ways - one, as bounded and classified, in which 
culture is separated from material life, and two, as a normative space which can be viewed 
more broadly as 'constructing daily practices and world views in complex relations with 
material life', a space which she refers to as 'white culture' (228); whiteness, then, is 'not 
so much void or formlessness as norm' (198). In this view, whiteness in itself has no 
meaning, and is constructed and defined only in relation to marginal cultures 
(Frankenberg, 1993), an 'immutable' social construction in that it is 'an unmarked marker 
of others' 'differentness" (231). Razack (1998) has argued that white is the colour of 
domination (11), where the boundary is a (racial) category defined by colour. This notion 
reflects the ideas expressed by Earth (1969) and Cohen (1985) referred to above, in which 
relationality is defined by the boundary rather than the content of culture. Because of the 
dominant discourse on culture, which is only given through the materiality of its history 
and which is impossible to undo, it is easier to focus on the way in which culture is 
categorised and named, than on how dominant (white) culture permeates all of life 
(Frankenberg, 1993).
One of the major dilemmas facing theorists and researchers who have attempted to 
deconstruct social categories and 'move beyond' race, gender, sexuality and class 
altogether (Butler, 1993; Gilroy, 2000a), is that in so doing, there are no tools with which 
to combat oppression. In other words, if we disband 'race', 'sex', 'class' altogether, then 
we cannot also claim that race/sex/class discrimination exist, and challenge such 
inequality. AH (2003) has argued that whilst the deconstruction of race may be understood 
as a-political, it is nevertheless important to try and understand how visual signs work in 
order to recognise race, and so to undermine race. Like Gilroy, she claims that people 
need to free themselves from the 'bonds of raciology' and 'compulsory raciality' (Gilroy 
cited in Ali, 2003, 18), and has stated that the 'only way to move beyond racialised
constraints is to begin a process of deconstruction....and to engage with the possibility of 
post-race futures' (Ali, 2003, 18). The consensus amongst many authors is that race 
should not be glorified but that there is a need to acknowledge the prevalence of 
racialisation (Ifekwunigwe, 1987; Gilroy, 1993). Race as a discourse has real effects even 
though race as a thing does not exist. As Parker has put it: 'A strong form of the argument 
would be that discourses allow us to see things that are not 'really' there, and that once an 
object has been elaborated in discourse it is difficult not to refer to it as if it were real' 
(1992, 5). Within this framework, the distinction between race as a biological concept and 
race as a social category is necessary, where the latter should be retained as a potential 
means for combating racism.
Public discourse in Britain: The multiciilturalist agenda and 'race thinking'
Although racial classification has always been culturological (Feuchtwang, 1990), in 
recent years there has been increasing recognition that race is not unequivocally the same 
as culture. Indeed, Weber (1968), as mentioned above, recognised that objective blood 
relations do not determine affiliations, but rather that common causes and collective 
interests facilitate the construction of particular identities (389). In Britain, as second and 
third generation children of immigrants grow up, culture has featured more prominently in 
the way people from ethnic minority groups, including mixed race people, define 
themselves, and the postmodern idea that British identities are in a 'process of transition' 
(see Parekh Report, 2000) has become commonplace. Whilst this shift has been reflected 
in both public discourse and postmodern literature, it appears that much education policy 
has circumvented pluralistic concepts of personhood completely, and leapt from a 
'multiculturalist' stance on personhood, evident in policy of the 1980s (e.g. DES, 1981; 
DES, 1985), to a non-relativistic universalist position (The Learning Age, 1998; Learning 
to Succeed, 1999). The multiculturalist ethos around personhood tended to assume that 
people belonged to specific cultural groups which all had equal value to one another, 
whilst the universalist ethos of personhood is one which effectively de-categorises, and so 
too 'de-culturalises' and 'de-races', the individual (this issue is also discussed in Chapter 
Three). In the context of education, there is debate around the inter-relationship between
the discourses of economic efficiency and social justice, and whether the universalist 
economic discourse can incorporate, or simply silences, difference (see Avis, 1997).
The tensions within education are reflected in the broader politico-philosophical debates 
around citizenship and difference in western societies. Two main camps of thought can be 
identified: one camp advocates a relativist position in claiming the differentiated rights of 
particular cultural groups (e.g. Young, 1990; Kymlicka, 1995), whilst the other camp 
promotes a predominantly neutralist or universalist position (eg. Barry, 2000). In order to 
maintain political authority, a balance must be seen to be struck between integration and 
the right to cultural difference. Thus, multiculturalism speaks two languages: its 
ideological language is expressed in the language of civic universal rights, whilst its 
practical language is expressed through the dominant state discourse which aims to 
maintain difference. Evidence of the latter is revealed in education policy (DES 1981; 
DES 1985; DfEE, 1997; DfEE, 1998: see Chapter Three) where cultural groups are 
represented as their reified ethnic equivalents, in which these reifications are based on 
homogenised versions of'innate' meta-cultures drawing on objective similarities such as 
family background, language, religion. It is interesting to note that the discourse of 
multiculturalism encompasses the entire political field from far-right to far-left. A third 
camp which combines elements from both liberalist and post-structuralist thought and 
attempts to move beyond the universalist/particularist impasse (for a discussion of this see 
Laclau, 1996) is useful in the context of the problem of how to reconcile a universal 
education with identity-specific needs.
In recent years, the debate has centred around the politics of representation and 
categorisation to show how the authority of state discourse marginalises ethnic groups. 
Multiculturalism has extended this view of majority/minority relations to incorporate the 
idea of'diversity within unity'. Bikhu Parekh (2000), in his vision of the future of'multi- 
ethnic Britain', has asserted that both equality and difference have to be taken into account 
in any attempt to create an equitable society: universalism is not enough, he has claimed, 
particularism must be part of it. Parekh (2000) has drawn attention to the difference 
between agency and structure, and has argued that recognising that everyone has equal
worth and equal claims to opportunities is something quite different from the ways in 
which these opportunities are compromised by structural inequalities. He has also 
importantly highlighted the issue of racism (although it seems that his analysis of this 
problem focuses on structural inequality rather than on people's attitudes).
Most recently, within the postmodern context, multiculturalism has been discussed as a 
benign aspect of British culture, as something to be celebrated rather than tolerated. 
Underpinning this benevolent view of 'culture' is one of 'race thinking'. Such 'race 
thinking' exposes the paradox of liberalism as this is articulated by David Goldberg
(1993): race is irrelevant but all is race. This issue is discussed in greater depth in Part 
Three, with reference to the celebration of mixed race identity, and in Chapter Six. Despite 
scientific research which has shown that there is more variation within 'races' than 
between them (Gist and Dworkin, 1972), the association between race, biology and 
phenotype remains a popular and pervasive one (Small, 1994; Ifekwunigwe, 1999). 
Indeed, theories of race have always reflected beliefs about the sanctity of racial 'purity', 
where these social constructions have become integral to social relations, and political and 
economic structures (Omi and Winant, 1994). In recent years there has been a rise in 
genetic and genomic constructions of race, and the ways in which race is understood 
corresponds with the ways in which the relationship between human beings and nature is 
being constructed under the influence of the DNA revolution (Gilroy, 2000a; Skinner, 
2004). Gilroy (2000a) has argued that it is incumbent upon us to 'take possession of that 
profound transformation and somehow set it to work against the tainted logic that 
produced it', where this crisis of'race' is precisely the cue we need to 'free ourselves from 
the bonds of all raciology' (150). He also asserts, however, that raciology is trenchant 'and 
to imagine that its dangerous meanings can be easily rearticulated into benign, democratic 
forms would be to exaggerate the power of critical and oppositional interests' (Gilroy, 
2000a, 12).
Race essentialism, it seems, is no less evident in public discourse in Britain today than 
during the halcyon days of multiculturalism in the 1980s, appearing in the sanitised form 
of cultural essentialism. In this view, culture simply replaces race, and culture is
categorised as homogeneous and reified, and becomes the dominant feature of identity 
(Gilroy, 1987; Gilroy, 2000a; Rattansi, 1992). This view of 'race as culture' turns the 
theories of Weber (1968) and Barth (1969) upside down, in that it emphasises the 
perennial nature of identity and affiliations. In contemporary Britain, one example of this 
can be seen in the way in which Caribbean culture, and Jamaican working-class culture in 
particular, has come to represent the culture and tastes of all black people in Britain 
(Bakare-Yusuf, 1997). Some of Gilroy's (2000b) more recent work has emphasised the 
stake that minority people have in the creation of such essentialist notions of culture and 
race. The terminology used to describe such essentialism has, in both academic and policy 
literature, and in public discourse, become increasingly culturally pluralistic over the 
years, variously re-vamped as 'multiculturalism', '(cultural) diversity', '(cultural) 
hybridity' and most recently 'cosmopolitanism'. One of the dangers of such a titivation of 
the term culture is that in purportedly serving to de-essentialise the subject, it creates a 
semblance of egalitarian pluralism. Razack (1998) has described this situation in the 
context of education in the US. She claims that whilst the popularity of the cultural 
differences model remains trenchant, education about cultural differences remains 
fundamentally flawed in so far as it involves surface understandings of cultural practices. 
It is not so much diversity itself which is the problem, but as Razack (1998) has pointed 
out, that the
'emphasis on cultural diversity too often descends, in a multicultural spiral, to 
a superficial reading of differences that makes power relations invisible and 
keeps dominant cultural norms in place. The strategy becomes inclusion and 
all too often what Chandra Mohanty has described as 'harmonious, empty 
pluralism' (9).
Gilroy (1987) has argued that reifications have been used as political tools to bolster 
existing inequalities between ethnic 'communities' in Britain. Indeed, Rothschild has 
claimed that culture has become a form of 'ethnopolitics' which is used to '[mobilise] 
ethnicity from a psychological or cultural or social datum into political leverage for the 
purpose of altering or reinforcing......systems of structured inequality between and among
ethnic categories' (Rothschild, 1981, 1-2). Aziz (1997) has argued that the black/white 
binary is intentionally upheld in order to maintain differences between supposedly
'bounded' groups, which also has had the effect of keeping women in distinct camps. She 
states:
'The energetic assertion of black/white (or any other) difference tends to 
create fixed and oppositional categories which can result in another version of 
the suppression of difference. Differences within categories - here black and 
white -are underplayed in order to establish it between them. Consequently, 
each category takes on a deceptive air of internal coherence, and similarities 
between women in the different categories are thus suppressed....the 
heterogeneity of white women as a group, on the other hand, goes almost 
unacknowledged.' (72)
The political reification of culture is one result of the recent transition from a focus on 
immigration to a culturalist notion of ethnic diversity, in which the interaction between 
social segregation and an ideology of differential culturalism has created false constructs 
of community (Al-Azmeh cited in Ranger, 1996). Turner (1993) has stated that 
'' multiculturalism tends to become a form of identity politics, in which the concept of 
culture becomes merged with that of ethnic identity.....It risks essentialising the idea of 
culture as the property of an ethnic group or race; it risks reifying cultures as separate 
entities by overemphasising their boundedness and mutual distinctness' (411-12, original 
italics; see also Rattansi, 1992; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). This notion is reflected 
in what Al-Azmeh has called the 'over-Islamicisation of Muslims, over-Hinduisation of 
Hindus and over-Africanisation of Blacks' (Al-Azmeh, 1994 in Ranger). Since 9:11 and 
the war in Iraq, such reification has been amplified, especially in the context of Muslims.
The key point here is that 'common sense' notions of liberalism and pluralism have 
merely sustained racial division by finding new 'acceptable' forms within which to 
disguise it. An example of this can be seen in the recent media attention shift away from 
black and ethnic minority people to a focus on asylum seekers in Britain. Indeed, one 
effect of this media focus on asylum seekers has been, according to Tina Attoh (2004), the 
displacement of the fact that mixed race is the fastest growing ethnic group in Britain. 
(Mixed race people are either pathologised or 'celebrated' in public discourse for their 
culture and diversity. This issue is discussed more fully in Part Three). Arguably, the race 
distinction has to be maintained within the discourse of liberalism as a marker and
constant reminder of what is outside the realm of universal normativity in any given 
moment. Because of the 'common sense' notion inherent in liberal discourse, premised on 
freedom, equality and liberty, Razack (1998) has pointed out, 'finding a way out of 
liberalism is difficult' (27). Pateman (1998) has argued that the principle of the social 
contract at the core of liberalism has foreclosed any discussion about domination in so far 
as it is premised on political freedom. People's 'common sense' judgements are justified 
when the political freedom and values of the dominant group are seen to be compromised. 
From this perspective, Lefort's assertion that a symbolic process of social division has to 
be created in order for the image of the unity of the state - in this case Britain - to be 
secured and sustained, appears irrefutable (Lefort cited in Norval, 1996).
PART THREE: THE STUDY OF MIXED RACE 
Early studies of identity formation
Research on racial attitudes and marginality from the 1930s through to the 1980s focused 
on doll studies. Early studies by Clark and Clark (1939, 1947) concluded that because the 
majority of black children preferred white dolls, they misidentified as white; as such, these 
children had internalized society's rejection of them as black, and had therefore rejected 
their own blackness. These studies have been criticized for their fallibility on several 
counts - for example, that the dolls were presupposed to represent real people, that black 
dolls were unfamiliar to most children, and that choices were limited to two options. Even 
if the choice of doll were to say something about mis/identification, it is still difficult to 
draw any conclusions about racial identity formation from such identifications, especially 
in the case of mixed race children, whose choice of either a white or a black doll could be 
understood as an identification with the family member or culture which is dominant in 
their lives.
The work of Robert Park (1928, 1952, 1964) has been very influential in attempts to 
understand the identities of marginalized groups in society. Park (1964) argued against the 
idea that people of different races inherently possessed different personalities, yet he also
viewed mixed race people as pathologically unstable because of their marginalized and 
contradictory position in society. The stimulus to which they were subjected as a result of 
this position however, made them 'more enterprising than the Negroes, more restless, 
aggressive, and ambitious . The mulatto and the mixed blood are often sensitive and self- 
conscious to an extraordinary degree' (Park, 1964, 387). Stonequist (1937), too, developed 
this notion of the marginal condition amongst mixed race people. His thesis was that this 
condition had three stages: First, mixed race children identify with and attempt to integrate 
into the dominant white culture, yet soon understand that they are not accepted by white 
society. Second, they identify with the minority group, whilst still desiring to belong to the 
dominant group; this results in a state of ambivalence in which the white party is 
alternately idealized and denigrated, and the black party is varyingly seen as a safe haven 
which shares their experiences of oppression, and a prison from which they cannot escape 
(see Katz, 1996, 22). Third, the mixed race person assimilates either into the dominant 
group, or into the subordinate group, or finds accommodation between the two groups. 
Stonequist's theory is useful in the context of this study because it emphasizes 
psychological processes, as opposed to philosophical and sociological processes discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter.
Statistics on mixed race
Few official statistics on the mixed race population in Britain have been published. In the 
1991 census, of the ethnic minority population that lived with a partner, 16 per cent of 
men and 13 per cent of women were living with a white partner. Mixed relationships were 
more usual amongst people under 35, and amongst black and Chinese people than people 
of South Asian descent. Figures from the Fourth National Survey claimed that 50 per cent 
of African Caribbean men and 30 per cent of African Caribbean women under the age of 
30 who were partnered had white partners (Modood et al., 1997). In 1991 it was estimated 
that there were 230,000 people of mixed race descent, whilst the Labour Force Survey 
estimated this as closer to 290,000. A new estimate following the 2001 census puts the 
figure at 674,000.
The significance of age amongst the mixed race population cannot be under-estimated. 
Data gathered by the Labour Force Survey between 1995 and 1997 from 60,000 
households shows that whilst the percentage of ethnic minority people who are mixed race 
remains fairly constant at around 7 per cent amongst the 20-44 age group (and steadily 
declines to 0 per cent for the 44-75 age group) the mixed race population is dominated by 
far by people under the age of 15 (54 per cent, compared to 20 per cent of the total 
population). Of the total population in Britain of 7 per cent of children aged 0-4, 25 per 
cent were black/mixed and 20 per cent were other/mixed (Schuman, cited in Owen, 2001). 
Schuman (cited in Owen, 2001) estimates that 0.7 per cent of all children under 15, and 10 
per cent of all ethnic minority children are of mixed race parentage. Owen has pointed out 
that figures may be skewed because single white mothers especially may emphasize their 
child's mixed or minority heritage, and that at 18 that child, now adult, may choose not to 
identify as mixed race. Conversely, an aspect which has been omitted in these discussions, 
is that a white parent may choose to rebuff their child's minority heritage, which that child 
may choose to reclaim as an adult. Moreover, whilst there is no reason to doubt Phoenix 
and Owen's (1996) assumption that 'many of these children will be living with a white 
parent, often a lone white mother' (111-135), by neglecting to suggest that some children 
will be living with a single black mother, the implicit statement is that black men are more 
likely to leave mixed race partnerships than white men.
It has recently been asserted that the mixed race population is growing so fast in the UK 
that there are more mixed race people than people from any other ethnic background 
(apart from white) under the age of 16 (Owen, 2004). A recent estimate claims that 50% 
of mixed race people in Britain are under the age of 15, and less than 3% are over 65 
(Aspinall, 2004). The age profile of mixed race people in London especially has been 
highlighted. Rob Lewis (2004) in a recent public seminar made the point that 'London is 
different', in that the percentage of mixed race people in London was far higher - around 
3% in Greater London, and around 4% in Inner London - than the national average of 1%, 
and that 20% of all children under the age of 15 were mixed race. Recent data from the 
Labour Force Survey shows that there is a similarity in the percentages of mixed race
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people and white people who have higher qualifications or no qualifications. An 
observation of the age aggregate, however, reveals that there is a relatively high 
percentage of mixed race people aged 16-24 who have no qualifications, and a 
comparatively high rate of unemployment (similar to that of Pakistani, Black-Caribbean 
and Black-African). It also shows that mixed race people tend to be in occupations which 
are of lower status than those of white British people.
Although a multiracial movement did not arise in Britain as it did in the US, possibly 
because there was no official policy of hypodescent nor a significant black consciousness 
movement, the rapid rise in the numbers of mixed race children born and the increase in 
interracial partnerships in the last decade especially, has brought about a gradual change in 
understanding/s around mixed race. One response to this has been an increase in mixed 
race organisations, pressure groups and interest groups which provide information or 
advice, and places where mixed race people can come together to share experiences, or 
can participate in common struggles for racial and social justice (for example, People in 
Harmony, UK). In the run-up to the 2001 census, such forums frequently focussed on the 
question of 'rights' for mixed race people, and focus groups and cognitive tests showed 
that mixed race people were in favour of a 'mixed race' category, which alongside support 
from government departments and the Commission for Racial Equality, led to the 
introduction of the mixed race category in the 2001 census in Britain.
The 2001 census to some extent then, saw the convergence between the British 
government's conceptualization of race and mixed race people's self-identifications, and 
included mixed race options for the first time - 'White and Black Caribbean', 'White and 
Black African', 'White and Asian' or 'Any other mixed background'. Statistics published 
by the Office for National Statistics in 2001 indicated that the mixed race population had 
increased by more than 75% in the 1990s to 415,000; that is to say, England and Wales 
had a 'mixed' population of 1.27%, Scotland 0.25%, and Northern Ireland 0.20%. 
Consequently, the Commission for Racial Equality, in their submission to the Office for 
National Statistics, recommended that ethnic monitoring should be based on self- 
identification, something which was echoed by many mixed race people generally.
Phoenix and lizard's (1993) study in secondary schools had also already indicated that 
mixed race adolescents identified positively with their mixed race identity. Moreover, it 
brought the specific needs of mixed race children to the forefront of discussion, especially 
concerning their over-representation in care and the potential failings of social services.
The different meanings which are attached to the category mixed race can be seen in the 
results of the Fourth National Survey (Modood et al., 1997). Of those who described their 
family origin as mixed, only 40% said their ethnic group membership was mixed - 13% 
selected the 'white' option; 14% the 'black' option, and 15% defined themselves as 
'Black-British' (Modood et al., 1997). This suggests that these mixed race people did not 
necessarily have singular views of their identity, but rather, amalgamated mixed race and 
mono-racial/cultural identities, or shifted between the two according to context. In so 
doing, they may have been distinguishing between race and culture in their self- 
identifications, that is to say, whereas race or descent may have been defined in mixed 
(dual or multiple) terms, cultural identification was with a mono-racial group. This is in 
keeping with the post-modern notion of identity as fluid and dynamic, and also with the 
findings of my research. Aspinall (2003) has argued that the 2001 census categories have 
mistakenly focussed on 'race' and not on ethnic and cultural identifications, thereby 
reinforcing rather than challenging the rigidity of racial boundaries, and fortifying 
dominant racial norms (289). This is further invoked by the emphasis on dual-racial 
heritage, and not multiple heritages and cultural diversity. Aspinall (2003) asserts that 
because the category 'White' dominates as a co-identity, it remains the principle group 
maintaining the historically entrenched asymmetries of race relations.
Research on mixed race identity
In contrast to the US, virtually no official data exists on mixed race in the UK, apart from 
the use of 'mixed race' in the Labour Force and General House Surveys, and preliminary 
research leading up to the 2001 census. The experiences of mixed race people were 
assumed to correlate with those of black or ethnic minority people, and as such were 
effectively kept out of the mainstream literature. Consequently, very few early studies of
mixed race people exist, and those that do are US based and subsumed within studies of 
black identity. However, in the last decade there has been a growing body of work on 
critical mixed race theory, most particularly in the US (Root, 1992, 1996; Zack, 1995; 
Daniel, 1996; Rockquemore, 2002; Mahtani, 2002; Winters, 2003), but also in the UK 
(Ifekwunigwe, 1999; lizard and Phoenix, 2001[1993]; Alibhai-Brown, 2001; Parker and 
Song, 2001; Olumide, 2002; Ali, 2003).
In the 1960s and 1970s, studies of mixed race focussed on how people of mixed race 
heritage developed black identities, and concentrated largely on experiences of 
marginality of black people and related identity problems. They drew largely on the work 
of psychologists such as Erikson (1968) who claimed that many adolescents experienced 
an identity crisis in their bid to become 'integrated' adults. Erikson's developmental 
framework was used by Gibbs (1997) in her work with biracial adolescents. Gibbs (1997) 
and other US researchers using a developmental model believed that an integrated biracial 
as opposed to a black identity was the desirable goal for mixed race people. The challenge 
for the young people in Gibbs' study was twofold: one, to successfully integrate dual 
racial/ cultural identifications whilst simultaneously learning how to develop a positive 
self-concept and sense of their own ability; and two, to develop a stable sense of personal 
identity alongside a positive racial identity. Gibbs (1997) reported that developmental 
problems could arise when mixed race adolescents experienced conflicts in their attempts 
to resolve basic psychosocial tasks. These problems included feelings of anxiety about 
social acceptance, shame about physical appearance, rejection by peer groups, rejection by 
one parental culture completely, anxiety over career options, and difficulty in partnerships.
Since the 1990s in the US (Root, 1992, 1996; Zack, 1995) and the late 1970s in the UK 
(Bagley and Young, 1979; Wilson, 1987), studies of mixed race have been less problem- 
focussed and have attempted to expel the idea that mixed race people suffer more than 
mono-racial people from identity problems which are rooted in psychopathology or as a 
result of dysfunctional families. Rather, the focus has been on how racism and 
racialisation impacts on mixed race people's lives (Tizard and Phoenix, 2001 [1993]; 
Olumide, 2002), an observation which is also echoed in this piece of research. Moreover,
there is increasing recognition that discrimination can occur within families and that 
mixed race people may experience ostracisation from one cultural group. In a study by 
Gibbs and Hines (1992), the researchers found a positive sense of self-esteem amongst a 
small sample of biracial adolescents. Similarly, Bagley and Young (1979) found high 
levels of self-esteem amongst a sample of 4-7 year olds, and Wilson (1987) reported little 
evidence of identity confusion in her study with 9 year-olds. Self-identifying as mixed 
race appears to be one indicator of a 'positive identity' by some researchers (see Wilson, 
1987 and Tizard and Phoenix, 2001 [1993]), a gauge which in itself does not, in my 
opinion, shed much light on the actual experience of being mixed race as either positive or 
negative. Similarly, Wilson's conclusion that most of the children in her study felt 
comfortable with an 'intermediate' identity, a finding based largely on the children in her 
sample choosing a photograph of a child that looked most like them from a variety of 
photographs of white, black and mixed-parentage children, and identifying as neither 
black nor white, seems somewhat dubious.
In the last decade or so, studies of mixed race people have relied more on mixed race 
people's own accounts and opened up a theoretical space which draws on the lived 
experience of mixed race people. Several British studies have focussed on children and 
young people of black-white parentage. These studies have shown how the boundaries of 
rigid black-white essentialism may be disrupted, and that mixed race people refer to 'in- 
between' categories. Wilson's (1987) study showed that 59% of 6-9 year olds saw 
themselves as neither black or white but as 'brown', or 'half-and half, 'coloured' or 'half- 
caste'. Later studies have tended to support the 2001 census findings on distinctions and 
co-usages of race and culture in self-definition. Fatimilehin (1999) found that whilst many 
respondents identified as mixed race, even more identified as mono-racially black. Tizard 
and Phoenix's (2001 [1993]) study showed that 39% of the respondents identified as black, 
and 49% of respondents identified as 'mixed', 'brown', 'half-and half, 'coloured' or 
'half-caste'. Moreover, around 10% of the respondents said their identifications changed 
in different situations. My research supports these findings. A significant body of research 
has also shown the discrepancies between mixed race self-perceptions of identity and their 
perceptions of how they believe they are seen by others as black.
In the recent literature on mixed race, constructionist theories have created a space for the 
boundaries of mixed race to not only incorporate the binary black/white framework (see 
Tizard and Phoenix, 2001 [1993]; Wilson, 1987), but also more recently, dual/diverse 
ethnic minority heritage (Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Alibhai-Brown, 2001; Mahtani and Moreno, 
2001; Olumide, 2002). Recent studies have shown that mixed race people identified as 
mixed race - for example, as black and white, rather than black or white, etc. - and that 
they had positive self-conceptions (Tizard and Phoenix, 2001 [1993]; Rockquemore, 
2002). Anzaldua (1987), in a US context, has described mixed race identity as a 'border 
identity', one which 'lies in-between' two predefined social categories. In her 
conceptualisation, mixed race people do not consider themselves to be either black or 
white but incorporate both blackness and whiteness into a unique hybrid category of self- 
reference.
In Britain, postmodern notions of hybridity and the fluidity have been attractive to many 
researchers in the context of mixed race identity in that they de-emphasise race, biology, 
and the 'ethnic absolutisms' referred to by Gilroy (1987), and can encapsulate the 
diversity of mixed race people's experiences. In the context of Britain, 'anything goes' 
understandings of mixed race based on self-definition draw on postmodernist ideas. With 
reference to the work of Stuart Hall, Tizard and Phoenix (2001 [1993]) have argued in the 
context of mixed race identity, 'it is generally accepted that people have several identities 
at the same time' (Tizard and Phoenix, 2001[1993], 5). This notion of hybridity also 
debunks the idea of racial purity (Ifekwunigwe, 1997). Thus, whilst mixed race is viewed 
by some people as a fixed social category, others see it as a potential anti-racist strategy 
and as possibly leading the way towards a 'raceless' future (Gordon, 1995).
The discrimination of mixed race people: who counts?
As we have seen above, the question of individual rights for mixed race people and the 
discovery of new forms of identification has recently spawned a mixed race political 
'movement' in Britain in so far as this has been the impetus behind the official recognition 
of a mixed race people through the introduction of a mixed race category in the 2001
census. One of the key questions this has opened up in critical mixed race theory has been 
'who counts as mixed race?' This parallels the debate within the black feminist movement 
about 'who counts as black?' and is intrinsic to this debate in so far as whoever counts as 
mixed race cannot also count as black.
Despite the accreditation of mixed race as a self-identification, one of the problems facing 
mixed race people in Britain today, argues Alibhai-Brown (2001), is the legacy of 
hypodescent in the US, or the 'one-drop rule' which, forces people of mixed race heritage 
to choose one identity, usually the minority identity (see also Root, 1996). The degree of 
agency which is given a 'mixed race' person is therefore partly contingent upon readings 
of phenotype in relation to systems of categorisation and classification, which may in turn 
reinforce 'race' science fiction (Ifekwunigwe, 2001). Ifekwunigwe (1999) has pointed out 
that the inaccurate conflation between biology and culture, and the specific social 
meanings assigned to physical characteristics, 'create politically charged, manufactured 
hierarchically ranked conceptions of Blackness and Whiteness, which in turn govern inter- 
group relationships' (13). Not only do biological features signify group membership, but 
also the social meaning such membership has in society at large. Bi-racialisation, a term 
referred to in the US but not in the UK, refers to the specific structural and oppositional 
relationship forged between people socially designated as Black and those regarded as 
White (Frankenburg, 1997). Mahtani (2001) has argued that mixed race people have been 
made intelligible in ways that maintain racial hierarchies, in that they have been 
categorised as either black or white. The mere presence of 'mixed race' people, as such, 
challenges mainstream racial categories constructed precisely to police boundaries that are 
already heavy with classed and gendered meanings. Thus, researchers have floundered 
over definitions around mixed race, where this has centred around the tension between 
'race' as a discredited concept, and the language which is used to maintain this concept. 
This has been discussed elsewhere (see also Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Aspinall, 2003; Ali, 
2003).
A further problem is that of political validity. Researchers, mainly in the US, have argued 
that the political salience of the black movement would be compromised if mixed race
people did not define as black. The main challenge against a mixed race category has been 
that to accept such a category would weaken rather than create the possibility for struggle 
against racism (Gordon, 1995) because many of those who previously defined as black 
would 'defect' to a mixed race grouping. In the UK, up until the 1990s, the British 
government's concern with counting and categorising only the main racialised and ethnic 
groups in Britain excluded mixed race as an official identity, and mixed race people were 
in official terms categorised as 'black' or 'other'. The black political movement, however, 
was never particularly strong in the UK, which perhaps accounts for the fact that the 
notion of 'black consciousness' in both public discourse and academic literature has 
always been minimal. In the UK today, any misgivings about a mixed race category have 
been expressed primarily by individual public figures via the media. Two of these 
commentators, discussed below, have claimed that a mixed race category is indefensible, 
and that it is imperative that mixed race people self-define as black for political reasons. 
The late Bernie Grant (cited in Owen, 2001), a black Labour MP, for example, claimed 
that mixed race people who have one black parent should regard themselves as black as 
they encounter the same racism and discrimination as black people. In the Guardian 
newspaper he stated: 'Society sees mixed race people as black, and they are treated as 
black. They are never accepted as white, so they have no choice' (Young, 1997, 2).
Claire Gorham (2003), a mixed race TV presenter, recently argued that black and mixed 
race people are united by virtue of being a minority who are discriminated against, and 
that mixed race people would remain 'in limbo' until British society puts an end to race 
discrimination (Guardian Weekend, 35). Gorham's justification for this position was that 
she believed that some white people simply see the colour 'black' as the defining physical 
characteristic of a person, regardless of features, skin tone, and sometimes gender. After 
all, she claimed, 'if we were to stand in front of a crowd of National Front supporters, 
their hatred would hardly be curbed by the fact that we're a 'lighter' tone of non-white' 
(35). However, she raises the crucial issue of discrimination against mixed race people by 
black people: 'black people see degrees of blackness - and in some cases, the wrong shade 
of black' and suggests that black people are no better than white people when it comes to 
discriminating against mixed race people. According to Gorham, first black discrimination
against mixed race people has to be overcome so that together they can form a solid 
community and become a force to be reckoned with in combating white race 
discrimination.
Fundamentally, one of the main difficulties with defining mixed race people as black is 
that it inevitably excludes vast numbers of mixed race people who do not define as black. 
Others have argued that the fact of mixed race itself de-stabilises the homogeneity of fixed 
racial categorisations and as such may be useful for supporting anti-racist strategies. In 
Britain, most academics writing on the subject of mixed race have argued that mixed race 
people do not want to define themselves as black. Indeed, some researchers have asserted 
that mixed race people are producing their own cartographies of identity and that there is a 
fundamental desire for a category 'mixed race' (Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Mahtani and Moreno, 
2001). Ifekwunigwe (2001), for example, has claimed that mixed race people seek a clear 
term which is both non-essentialist and encompasses the specificity of their (common) 
experience (17). These claims are supported by recent research in the US. In a survey 
carried out by Rockquemore (2002), 58 per cent of biracial people defined themselves as 
neither black or white but as part of 'a third and separate category that draws from both of 
these group characteristics and has some additional uniqueness in its combination' (43); of 
these respondents, however, over half expressed a lack of coherence between self- 
understanding and how they socially experienced their race as black.
The dilemma centres around the question of whether a separate category of mixed race 
should exist, in which identity claims are specific to mixed race people, but experiences of 
discrimination are common to both mixed race and black people, or whether the 'dilution' 
of common experiences into separate claims merely serves to undermine the political 
agenda which challenges universal racial discrimination. This dilemma is further 
complicated by the 'woman' issue and implications for feminism as a universal political 
project, and the debate within the black feminist movement about who counts as black, 
discussed earlier.
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Aspinall (2003), arguing against the category of mixed race, has stated: 'The challenge is 
to find ways of allowing for hybridised identities that represent allegiances to multiple 
groups rather than an outcome from two putatively 'pure' categories' (292). However, 
Mahtani and Moreno (2001) have pointed out that for race to possess power as a social 
category and to be an effective political force, not only is such a category of (mixed) race 
prerequisite, but that there must also be a clear notion of who is 'in' and 'out' of this 
category. This parallels the key debate, and indeed the fundamental question facing black 
feminism and western feminism generally - must it be exclusive (and so too, essentialist) 
to have political power? The authors have argued for a pluralist understanding of mixed 
race identity on the grounds that the discrimination experienced by people of mono-racial, 
black/white, or dual minority parentage may not be dissimilar. However, they recognize 
the danger of this 'ironic impasse' in which we try to be inclusive and hold on to a mixed 
race category, yet are justly threatened by the emergence of a majority mixed race group 
within that category which silences minority voices. Moreover, Aziz (1997) has argued 
that black women are represented as 'homogeneously oppressed in almost every politically 
significant way ', that is to say, by racial oppression, sexual domination, and class, but also 
that racism does not affect all black women equally, and nor does the assumption that they 
are all working-class hold (73). By extension, one could argue that mixed race people do 
not experience discrimination equally, and that their classed identities are influenced by a 
myriad of factors related to their gendered and racialised positions in society. Drawing on 
my data with mixed race women, the relationship between mixed race identity and 
political action will be discussed further in Chapter Six: Discussion.
The celebration of mixed race identity
Mixed race people have always had to serve some broader purpose in society to justify 
their existence. Traditionally, this has been in terms of pathology, as the racial scapegoat, 
as marginal, 'out of place', and confused about racial identity (Root, 1996; Ifekwunigwe, 
1999). More recently, as mixed race people have become increasingly visible, the 
attention has been focussed on them as harbingers of a more egalitarian and progressive 
society. As possessors of two cultures at least - and having the 'best of both worlds' - they
are celebrated as cultural bridge-builders who have the potential to cure society of its 
racial ills. Mahtani (2002) has described this celebration thus:
'It has also been assumed that the 'mixed race' individual has the solution for 
the world's racist problems in a vacant celebration of sanitised cultural 
hybridity, where the mixed race person is seen as a 'rainbow child' 
glimmering with hope for a colour-blind future.' (470-471)
This celebration of mixed race identity is tied in with the discourse of 'race thinking' 
discussed in Part Two, in which the concept of race (and race difference) is substituted by 
the more benign concept of culture (and cultural difference). Culture, in this rhetoric, is 
the inoffensive and superficial overlay to the real individual underneath who is 'equal' to 
the next person. Razack (1998) has referred to white celebration of black women in 
contemporary America as the 'commodification of otherness' (5). Bell hooks' (1992) has 
developed Fanon's ideas to incorporate the gendered dimension of the colonial encounter, 
and although hooks' refers to white men's engagement in sex with non-white women, her 
idea may be applied to the celebration of mixed race women. She argued:
'To make oneself vulnerable to the seduction of difference, to seek an 
encounter with the other, does not require that one relinquish one's 
mainstream positionality. When race and ethnicity become commodified as 
resources for pleasure, the culture of specific groups, as well as the bodies of 
individuals, can be seen as constituting an alternative playground where 
members of dominating races genders, sexual practices affirm their power in 
intimate relations with the other.' (hooks, 1992, 23)
The established BBC internet site gives an insight into popular assumptions around mixed 
race people in Britain. The opening article of'Race UK', entitled 'The changing face of 
Britain. Britain's blurring ethnic mix', is a good example of what Parker and Song (2001) 
have called the 'celebration' discourse of mixed race people as 'embodiments of the 
progressive and harmonious intermingling of cultures and people' and 'exemplars of 
contemporary cultural creativity' (2001, 4). The leading caption, flanked by a photo of 
Dawn French and Lenny Henry, triumphantly claims: 'The united Kingdom has one of the 
fastest growing mixed race populations in the world, fuelled by the continuing rise of 
inter-ethnic relationships'. The article goes on to claim that 'Britons of all shades are 
embracing each other more than ever before', and informs us that celebrities such as
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Michael Caine and Trevor Macdonald, Sade and Salman Rushdie 'are, or have been, in 
mixed race relationships'. Shirley Bassey, Oona King MP and Hanif Kureshi moreover, 
are 'high-profile examples of Britain's burgeoning mixed race population'. Inter-racial 
liaisons are described as a thriving industry - 'inter-racial relationships are flourishing 
with a fifth of Asian men and 10% of Asian women opting for a white partner'. The article 
therefore suggests that mixed race identity is no more than 'skin deep', and that the 
primary indicator of a progressive non-racist society is inter-racial marriage. The danger 
of such celebration is that it can lead to a kind of fetishism in which mixed race people are 
seen as exotic. One might also argue that the 'mixed race celebration' can be seen in the 
advent of the 'mixed race celebrity'; some famous men are Lenny Kravitz, Prince, Tiger 
Woods and Keanu Reeves, and women are Alicia Keys, Nora Jones, Mariah Carey, 
Jennifer Lopez and Halle Berry.
As Mahtani (2002) has noted, this cultural celebration effectively de-races racial power 
dynamics (or to use her term 'e-races'). At the same time, however, the discourse of'race 
thinking' remains dominant. In Britain, the discourses of individualism and universalism 
have marked a gradual rhetorical shift towards the 'de-racing' of British society and the 
notion that we are 'all just human beings'. In this sense, the 'celebration' of mixed race 
people, and the wider celebration of diversity, deflects the focus away from categorisation 
onto individualism, and in so doing, de-institutionalises racism and renders people 'free' 
from the effects of discrimination and differentiation. The main tenet is that race is not an 
issue. Thus, 'race thinking', discrimination, racism may all still exist, but this becomes the 
individual responsibility of the persons affected.
In the previous section I explored some of the issues around the salience of race and the 
difficulties involved in holding on to the concept of race for political purposes; in this 
section I have discussed some concerns about the individualist discourse of personhood 
which attempts to construct mixed race people as 'celebrated' for their culture, and in 
which 'race' has done a spurious vanishing act. This, I argue, has deflected the attention 
away from the race-related problems which affect many mixed race people. It is therefore 
imperative to continue analytical work on mixed race identity to show how race as a
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concept and mixed race identities are constructed in a variety of ways through 
language/discourse. 'Race' is experienced as real in many people's lives, but without a 
process of deconstruction it would be hard not to refer to 'race' (as an object which has 
been elaborated in discourse, see Parker, 1992, 5, cited above) as something which is 
actually real, which may have problematic consequences. This deconstructive approach to 
discourse enables researchers to understand how race is socially constructed and how 
mixed race people construct their identities and experiences - whether these are articulated 
in pluralist, essentialist or individualist terms - and potentially provides a starting point for 
the reconstruction of counter-discourses. The tension between essentialist, universalist and 
pluralist concepts of personhood discussed in this chapter will be explored with reference 
to the interview findings in Chapter Six: Discussion.
The next chapter examines the research methodology. Part One sets the context for the 
study and explores different approaches to educational research, especially key issues 
around qualitative research in education, and why the investigation focussed on mixed 
race women and Further Education. Part Two examines the different approaches to 
analysing the policy documents and fieldwork data, and Part Three considers the issues 
involved in the research process itself.
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I examine the research methodology. The empirical investigation involved 
identifying discourses of personhood and equity in a selection of British post compulsory 
education policy texts, and analysing data collected from mixed race women in semi- 
structured interviews on their constructions of self, their experiences of education, and on 
their opinions around prevailing government discourses on education. My sample 
consisted of 40 mixed race women, including five women with whom I piloted the 
questions. The three main criteria for selection were that the respondent had to be female, 
identify herself as mixed race, and currently be studying, or recently (in the last five years) 
have been studying, at a Further Education college in London. I adopted a mainly 
qualitative and interpretive approach to data collection and analysis: this involved 
conducting semi-structured interviews, identifying and analysing discourses in a selection 
of post compulsory education policy texts and in the interview texts, and some numerical 
counting. Instead of formulating a hypothesis prior to investigation and testing it in a 
linear fashion, my research design evolved cyclically as data were collected. The results of 
the research are interpretations of meanings based on natural groups as opposed to 
statistical sampling and quantification based on taxonomic groups. This type of approach 
is appropriate for investigating normative discourses around identity and post compulsory 
education, and for collecting data in the form of personal accounts of mixed race women's 
perceptions of identity and experiences of education. I draw largely on poststructuralist 
and feminist approaches to educational research.
Chapter Three focuses on dominant discourses in education and examines how these are 
reflected in the selected policy texts. Chapter Four examines respondents' discourses 
around selfhood in relation to theories of personhood. Chapter Five discusses respondents' 
articulations on their educational experiences and their opinions on education policy 
discourses, and examines these in relation to the policy discourses examined in Chapter 
Three. Chapter Six looks at the 'fit' between the two sets of data, and attempts to bring the
discussions on identity and education together. In so doing, I follow Ozga's view that it is 
crucial to 'bring together structural, macro-level analysis of education systems and 
education policies and micro level investigation, especially that which takes account of 
people's perception and experiences' (Ozga, 1990, 359). Ultimately, the research asks 
whether universalist policy formulations are compatible with the experiences of mixed 
race respondents. Some examples of questions posed in the analysis were:
1) Did the respondents' perceptions of themselves correspond with normative 
concepts of personhood, as these were represented in the theory and policy 
documents?
2) Was there a correlate between the policy concepts around education and 
the respondents' views on education discourse and experiences of 
education? How have we as a population been taught to think about what a 
'good' education is?
3) Did the respondents experience discrimination in their daily lives and in 
education? Are these experiences paralleled in the literature and do they 
reflect what we know about contemporary British society today?
PART ONE: SETTING THE CONTEXT 
Positivist and interpretive approaches
There are two main methodological paradigms, or approaches to research, which are 
determined by philosophical assumptions about the way in which the world works and 
ways in which knowledge about the social world can be produced. These methodologies 
are methods of investigation in relation to theories, problems, processes and procedures 
(Burgess, 1984). They may be described as positivist and qualitative/interpretive 
(Hitchcock and Hughes, 1995). Positivists claim that the social world, like the natural 
world, works in measurable ways. The purpose of the positivist model is to demonstrate 
objective knowledge about the world by using hypotheses which are tested rigorously in 
controlled environments, and utilises mainly quantitative principles and methods to try
and establish patterns and regularities in human behaviour. Positivists believe that the 
basis of good research/science is its falsifiability: a theory or hypothesis must exist prior to 
observation, and refutation of this theory must be possible (Popper, 1959).
Kuhn (1970), a critic of Popper, believed that there is an interpretive dimension to all 
science: knowledge is not cumulative and linear in the modernist sense of the world being 
an objectively knowable place, and that we get progressively closer to knowing the truth 
about it, but rather, that objective and subjective worlds interlink in the sense that facts 
and phenomena are interpreted and 'truths' defined by researchers according to their 
paradigmatic frameworks. He asserted that even when a theory is proven falsifiable, 
replacing one set of ideas with another takes a long time. He believed that science works 
in paradigm shifts which are developed through normative consensus derived from 'the 
entire constellation of beliefs, values and techniques shared by members of a given 
scientific community' (Kuhn, 1970, 75). Kuhn's theory is useful in showing how 
normative ethnic categories are both invoked and maintained by specific dominant 
communities.
The development of the interpretive approach draws on several criticisms of positivism. 
Whilst positivism uses a scientific model of rationality in an attempt to address the 
problem of how to create universal statements about the world in which we live, focussing 
on variables within specific contexts which constitute particular outcomes and correlations 
per se, the interpretive model concentrates on discovering how meaning is made and 
social practices are constituted within historical and cultural contexts. This approach is 
concerned with multiple realities which are in constant flux, as opposed to the study of 
parts making up a finite whole. Moreover, the positivist research model, which requires an 
assumption of a determinate world in which closure is imposed, raises questions around 
the objectivity of knowledge claims, and the relationship between the observer and the 
observed (Usher, 1996). Interpretivists have argued that our understandings of the world 
are subjectively constructed, and that participation in the research process is the only way 
of interpreting these constructions (Manis and Meltzer (1967). The type of data, however, 
whether quantifiable or comparative qualitative, should not make any difference as to
whether the falsifiability criterion should be applied; the point is whether the theory or 
hypothesis under investigation can be disconfirmed, regardless of how results are obtained 
(Kingetal., 1994).
Research in education
In educational research, although positivist research is still widely used, some researchers 
have argued that it has been unsatisfactory in making predictions and generalisations 
about education (Usher, 1996): education policy intentions rarely correlate directly with 
policy outcomes (Whitty et al., 1997) and qualitative research has been important in 
examining which variables might contribute to discrepancies. Hitchcock and Hughes 
(1995) claim that the complexity of education demands the use of different research 
techniques, and have found the distinction between positivism and interpretivism a useful 
one in advocating a qualitative orientation to educational research: qualitative 
methodology, they claim, allows for a focus on the processes of education, teaching and 
learning, as opposed to quantitative methods which stress the importance of 'cause and 
effect, products, outcomes or correlations in research on schools', which they maintain is 
of limited value (1995, 25). The main preoccupations within these debates around 
positivism and interpretivism have been about how to achieve validity and reliability in 
educational research, and the appropriateness of using different methods in different 
settings.
Qualitative methods have been especially useful in comparative studies which have tested 
the validity and reliability of traditional studies of white schooling, and have been widely 
used to explore how class, gender and ethnicity impact upon educational outcomes 
(Spender, 1982; Verma, 1987; Smith and Tomlinson, 1989; Walkerdine, 1990; Mac an 
Ghaill, 1993; Reay, 1998). Such studies have shown how the education system is part of 
the wider system of societal constraints which maintains the subordination of marginalized 
groups of people. Qualitative data can therefore generate problems for macro theories of 
social reproduction which frequently ignore or over-simplify the intricacy of social 
settings. Paul Willis's (1977) ethnographic study of working-class boys in a secondary
school is one study which uses qualitative methods to reveal the complex mechanisms 
behind education as a tool for reproducing identities.
Validity and reliability in qualitative research
Since the interpretive model has found wider usage, it has become generally accepted that 
there are different ways of attaining and analysing information about the world. The 
notion of validity in research has taken on more varied forms, encompassing quantitative 
and qualitative research methods. Hammersley (1993) has claimed that validity in 
qualitative research has replaced confidence in the certainty of results, and that accounts 
of the social world can only ever be representations, not reproductions. Harre and Secord 
(1972) have shown the link between both methodologies, pointing out that research would 
have no purpose if enquiries into subjectivity and truth had no validity. It must therefore 
be possible, they say, to accept people's commentaries as authentic, albeit revisable, 
reports of phenomena and experiences, which are then subject to empirical criticism. Most 
qualitative research uses some kind of comparison to achieve validity, and in that sense is 
not dissimilar to quantitative research. A high level of description can achieve similar 
results. In ethnography, for example, validity is achieved through a wide sample, the 
length of time spent in a place, and the use of a variety of techniques which ensures that 
the phenomenon are understood from a variety of angles. Although open-ended responses 
- such as in ethnography or in unstructured/ semi-structured interviews - can give 
important and valuable insights into personal experiences and opinions, responses cannot 
be compared, coded and categorised as they can with structured methods. Such data 
cannot form the basis for broader statistical generalisations in the way that quantitative 
research can, as there is no norm or standard against which results can be measured, and 
the transferability of such data to a wider population is therefore also limited.
Within positivist paradigms, the researcher and the researched are understood to be 
separate entities: the positivist aims to stand outside this world, so to speak, and pass as a 
passive entity who is capable of rational objective thought. The interpretivist, on the other 
hand, locates the researcher directly within the research process and interpretive
framework (Gadamer, 1975). This location, claims the interpretivist, is crucial in depicting 
social reality, and the researcher/respondent interaction has an impact on the kind of data 
elicited: 'The nature, limitations, and possibilities of data can be fully appreciated only 
when we begin to know how the actors' perceptions of the researcher have influenced 
what they have and have not said and done' (Ball, 1993a, 36). The researcher/respondent 
relationship is premised on the symbolic-interactionist model. In this model, behaviour is 
intentional and premeditated: human beings are not passive agents, reacting to each other 
in a stimulus-response way, but are constantly involved in defining and interpreting each 
other's actions (Blumer, 1986). The process of interaction takes the actor's self- 
perception, as well as the view others have of him or her, into account (Mead, 1934).
The lack of objective bias means that there must be more subjective bias on behalf of the 
researcher, as qualitative analysis relies on interpretation rather than statistics. The value 
and quality of qualitative analysis therefore, hinges to a large extent on the experience and 
sensitivity of the researcher (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), and appropriate categories being 
created and assigned. Cohen et al. (2000) have argued that word-based data cannot be 
converted to numerical data and that open-ended responses should therefore only be 
treated and analysed as qualitative, not quantitative data. One argument against this is that 
even qualitative analysis (other than ethnography) has to be comparative and therefore 
quantifiable to some extent for it to have validity. A problem of qualitative analysis is that 
respondents may be selective in the information they give and omit relevant detail, and 
analysis may be hampered by differentiated levels of articulation of thought in words or 
on paper.
Researchers have pointed out that power relations and ideological suppositions inherent in 
cross-categorical research can hinder impartial research relations (Ball, 1993a; Hornsby- 
Smith, 1993). Some feminist researchers grappling with this problem have sought to 
destabilise power relations within the interpretive paradigm, and to strive for a more 
reciprocal relationship with the researched (Stacey, 1988). One of the main 
methodological problems with this approach is that it is open to the charge of 
subjectivism, in which the accounts of actors are relativised and power relations are
59
perceived not to exist. This contextual distancing, argue some critics, diminishes the 
ability of the researcher to interpret critically and leads to interview bias (Schwandt, 
1998). Amongst some feminist researchers, interview bias, rather than being seen as a 
problem, has come to be understood as a resource. This has led to debates around whether 
'background knowledge' is necessary for competent understanding, whether only women 
can research women (Olesen, 1998), and how ethnic differences can impact upon 
researcher/researched relationships (Song and Parker, 1995).
Why mixed race women?
Whilst there has been a burgeoning of sociological and educational literature on the 
complexity of contemporary British ethnic identities (e.g. Hall, 1992, 1996; Gilroy, 1993; 
Baumann, 1996), and a vast array of feminist, sociological and anthropological literature 
exists on the experiences of women who identify with mono-cultural or mono-ethnic 
groups, relatively few British studies exist on mixed race or mixed parentage identity, and 
those which do have been published in the last few years (see Wilson, 1987; Tizard and 
Phoenix, 2001[1993]; Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Alibhai-Brown, 2001; Song and Parker, 2001; 
Ali, 2003), and no empirical or theoretical research appears to have been done in relation 
to the experiences of mixed race people in the Further Education sector. This is despite the 
prevalence of mixed race people in Britain and in further education. By bringing mixed 
race to the forefront of discussion I endeavour to open up a space for interrogating 
normative constructions of personhood in post compulsory education policy, and to 
provide a source for future policy recommendations which take the experiences of mixed 
race people into account.
Researchers have struggled with finding the 'correct' term for mixed race people. Not 
only has the concept of race long been discredited in official discourse, but the term 
'mixed race' has been criticised for presuming the existence of distinct and bi-polar races, 
and for assuming that people automatically identify with two races which are 
differentiated from each other. Other contemporary variations of mixed race such as 
mixed-parentage, dual-heritage, mixed-heritage, biracial, etc. I would argue, are as much
dual constructions as is the term mixed race, and premised on the idea that two 
races/cultures are inherited (for discussions on this see Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Aspinall, 
2003). I have chosen to stay with the term 'mixed race' because it is widely understood, 
but also because the use of established terms simplifies analysis of how respondents' 
perceptions of self might differ from or reflect socially ascribed categories.
In the analysis, I refer to the term 'mixed race' to describe all the women in the study, as 
this is how they described themselves in the sample selection. (How they defined 
themselves, and what was important in their notions of self during the interviews was a 
separate issue). Continuous reference to the respondents' specific racial mixes, however, 
was problematic in so far as it was not possible to list the mixed racial heritage of each 
respondent when referring to several women at the same time - largely for reasons of 
space and time. There is no generic term which is able to encompass the identities and 
experiences of all women who are not white. I will therefore refer to respondents' 
heritages as white and black, where they have parents or grandparents from Africa, the 
Caribbean, South America, South Asia, South-East Asia, or Arab countries. 
Discrimination on account of race, culture or colour was an experience many of these 
women shared. The term black has frequently been used in the theoretical literature to 
connote women with one or both parents who descend from Africa, the Caribbean, and in 
many cases Asia, and is usually used as a political category. On the term 'black', Stuart 
Hall (1992) has written: '[it was] coined as away of referencing the common experience of 
racism and marginalisation in Britain... [and] came to provide the organising category of a 
new politics of resistance amongst groups and communities with, in fact, very different 
histories, traditions and ethnic identities' (Hall, 1992, 252). I am, however, fully aware 
that the term is completely inadequate as a generic description for all people who are not 
white, and especially in view of the fact that this study is primarily about self-definition.
The FE Context
The FE context was chosen for study partly because no empirical research could be found 
on mixed race women in relation to this sector, but also because very few publications
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appear to exist on the experiences of FE users per se. Only a small amount of empirical 
work was found to be dedicated to issues around student social identity in relation to the 
FE sector (eg. Leathwood, 1998; Colley et al., 2003). Given that the FE sector has seen a 
significant expansion - driven largely by widening participation initiatives - in terms of 
marketing, student numbers and courses on offer, etc., this gap in the literature is 
surprising. However, FE as an under-researched area is perhaps not surprising from the 
point of view that FE remains the 'poor relation' of the education system, and as such 
does not generate the same academic interest as HE. Indeed, one of the main problems of 
defining FE in terms of 'everything that does not happen in schools and universities' 
(Kennedy, 1997, 1) is that there is no clear vision of what the purpose of FE should be 
(Hyland and Merrill, 2003). This is one of the factors which, despite its size, has resulted 
in the sector remaining 'in the shadows' (Lucas cited in Hyland and Merrill, 2003, 1) not 
only in terms of strategic national planning (Hyland and Merrill, 2003, 1), but perhaps in 
every other sense as well. Indeed, although the government has declared its intention to 
improve the status of vocational education (Stanton and Bailey, 2004), this has not 
happened in reality, as can be seen in the recently rejected Tomlinson proposals.
In 1997, New Labour introduced initiatives aimed at increasing participation in post-16 
education amongst those under-represented in education, such as some ethnic groups, 
adults in unskilled occupations, and people with a background of failure in their schooling 
(Zera and Jupp, 2000). Since 1997, the agenda of lifelong learning has lain at the heart of 
programmes of educational reform which aim to engage educationally disenfranchised 
people in learning, and FE colleges have been seen to be the most important part in the 
implementation of the strategies of widened opportunities, increased participation and 
social inclusion (see Kennedy, 1997) which underpin this agenda. The government's idea 
was that lifelong learning as a key theme within its view of the 'learning society' should 
be advanced through the principles of individual responsibility and self-investment. 
Underscoring this view was the idea that British people would achieve social, educational 
and occupational mobility chiefly through individual application and merit. Kennedy's 
report on education states:
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'Colleges are vital in tackling inequalities within their local communities. 
They are proving their success in attracting women students and those from 
ethnic minority backgrounds....Equality of opportunity must be central to 
everything colleges do.' (Kennedy, 1997, para. 66)
However, as some educationalists have pointed out, the expansion of participation in post- 
compulsory education has coincided with the deregulation of education systems in favour 
of market-led principles (Avis et al., 1996; Maguire et al, 1999). Maguire et al. (1999) 
have argued that the way in which FE colleges are now funded has generated increased 
competition, and that consequently marketing and promotional expenditure by many 
college providers aims to ensure an 'across the board' appeal (ie. from pre-vocational 
through to A levels). This type of marketing, the authors argue, intentionally and 
unintentionally contributes to the reproduction of social differentiation within post-16 
education and the 'racing' and 'classing' of institutions (Maguire et al., 1999):
'In all of this social class and ethnicity are strong sub-textual features - both as 
'intended' in the construction of marketing portfolio and 'unintended' in the 
identification of institutional habituses with certain social groups - Black, 
White middle-class colleges, etc.' (306)
Although the philosophy of equality of opportunity is hard to sustain within the current 
government's economic agenda and its associated effects of marketisation, individualism 
and social differentiation along 'race' and 'class' lines, the Further Education sector still 
manages to be the most genuinely inclusive education sector. In the last decade, it has 
seen the expansion of provision for 16-19, vocational education and training (VET), as 
well as adult and higher education. FE colleges are the largest providers of VET, and they 
also offer more academic 'A' levels than do secondary schools. In the last decade there 
has been an unprecedented increase in student numbers, and in the academic year 
2002/2003 there were more than three times as many full-time and part-time students in 
FE colleges as in universities (Brown et al., 2004). Moreover, 70% of 16 year olds (with 
fewer than 5 GCSEs at Grade A*-C) are in FE colleges (Brown et al., 2004), whilst their 
higher achieving counterparts are in Sixth Forms and Sixth Form Colleges, and 80% of 
the FE student cohort are adults over 19 years of age.
Recent research has shown that young people often view FE college as a better option than 
being in low-paid work or at school, and that being treated as an adult is an important 
reason for studying in further education (Hyland and Merrill, 2003, 90-92). With regard to 
gender differentiation, disproportionately more young women than men are educated post- 
16 in colleges than in schools. In terms of ethnic differentiation, Sixth Form and FE 
colleges provide for 57% of black 16 year olds, whilst schools only provide for 22% 
(Brown et al., 2004). This research also shows that the less well educated the parents, the 
more likely their children are to be in FE colleges as opposed to schools or higher 
education. This supports the prevalent view that FE colleges occupy a lower status than 
universities.
Phoenix (1997a) has argued that black people and white people occupy different 
structural positions in society, and that in a public sphere (such as education), white 
working-class women are privileged over black working-class men and women (Phoenix, 
1997a). The difficulty with this view is that people do not fit neatly into homogenous 
categories in the way that Phoenix might suggest, and privilege or marginalisation does 
not affect members of 'groups' or 'categories' in exactly the same way. Whilst Hall's 
assertion that '[....] the black subject cannot be represented without reference to the 
dimensions of class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity' (1992, 255), race, class and gender 
are not additive, and nor can they be compared cross-culturally (Mirza, 1992). Reay 
(1996) has pointed out that configurations of power are complex and mean that the 
reproduction of power and privilege can never be absolute. The 'category' of mixed race 
is a case in point here in that it 'falls between' traditional race - and therefore also class - 
categories. New discourses around race, youth and education enable people to define 
themselves as mixed race, and enable working-class people, who would perhaps 
previously not have done so, to define themselves as students. Moreover, the increasing 
numbers of working-class people who take on 'student' identities within FE contexts, 
inevitably also shifts the discursive parameters of who (can) call/s themselves 'educated'. 
However, with regard to mixed race women, the environment in which they grow up - 
for example, whether in mixed, or predominantly white or black households, or whether 
in working-class or middle-class households - impacts on their 'race', class and gender
positions, the discourses they draw on, the kinds of educational resources and 
opportunities available to them, and the degrees of marginalisation/privilege they 
experience.
This study was conducted in ethnically mixed FE colleges in predominantly working- 
class ethnically mixed areas of London. These locations were chosen because it seemed 
likely that a significant proportion of the student cohort would self-identify as mixed 
race, and would have grown-up in working-class households. Most of the women in this 
study were the first in their families to access any form of post-compulsory education, 
testament in part at least to the success of widening participation initiatives. Very few 
respondents referred to themselves as working-class; nor did they refer to themselves as 
middle-class. Skeggs (1997) found that whilst the working-class women in her study 
recognised their position within the class hierarchy, they simulated lower middle-class 
positions in their narratives about who they were. It seems likely that most respondents 
saw themselves as neither 'better educated and affluent' nor as 'poorer and less educated' 
(Beck et al., 2001, 38) but as somewhere in between.
Whilst important research has investigated non-participation in HE by traditionally 
under-represented groups in HE (Archer et al., 2003; David et al, 2003), my study with 
FE students suggests a need for similar investigations to be applied to post-16 education 
more broadly. One of the factors to be borne in mind, for example, is that the mixed race 
respondents in this study all attended (or had recently attended) FE colleges. Yet there are 
of course many mixed race people who have never participated, and do not intend to 
participate, in any form of post-compulsory education.
PART TWO: ANALYTICAL APPROACHES 
Documentary analysis
A conventional approach to policy analysis in education, that is to say, comparing policy 
intentions with policy outcomes through an examination of implementation in practice, is
not adopted here. Rather, I take a text and discourse analytical approach, identifying 
discourses in the selected policy texts and investigating how these are framed within wider 
discourses around education (see Burman and Parker, 1993). The documents analysed are 
Learning for the Twenty-First Century (Fryer Report), 1997; The Learning Age, 1998 
(green paper); and Learning to Succeed, 1999 (white paper). Green papers are discussion 
papers which are published by the government on a specific policy area and are open to 
public debate. They are usually addressed to interested parties who are invited to 
participate in a process of consultation and debate, which forms the basis for subsequent 
legislation. White papers may follow a green paper, and contain official proposals and 
recommendations for specific policy areas.
The policy reports are briefly contextualised and examined for their broad intentions and 
rationale. They have been analysed using content and discourse analysis (see Scott, 1990; 
Burman and Parker, 1993). In large-scale content analysis, the researcher establishes a set 
of categories and then counts the number of examples in each category; the validity and 
reliability of methods used are particularly important in this type of analysis to ensure that 
the same texts examined by different coders would yield comparable results. Content 
analysis can also be used in small-scale qualitative research to identify participants' 
categories and to examine how these are used in specific activities (see Gubrium, 1992). 
In this study, content analysis is used to systematically scan the policy documents for their 
references to personhood and equality. This involved some numerical counting, and an 
analysis of how notions of personhood and equality were conceptualised and categorised. 
Content analysis is useful in the context of this study for identifying how policy concepts 
of personhood have changed over a short period of time; numerical counting can show 
proportions, and give a measure of the orientation of a policy argument or intention.
The discourse analytical approach is founded on the premise that 'all the world is text', 
and is discursively produced. Derrida (1976) proposed a radical 'de-centring of the 
subject' in which both the subject and text were merely linguistic products; as such, no 
authentic, privileged or universal meaning could be reached and common understanding 
could only be achieved within particular 'interpretative communities'. Thus, it was not the
'knowing' subject who should be at the centre of the study of human sciences, but the 
discursive practices which construct this subject. Foucault (1972) claimed that discourses 
are practices which 'systematically form the objects of which they speak.....they do not 
identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own 
invention' (49). Discourse signifies an array of statements which represent the emergence 
of particular cultural and political practices, perceptions, and power relationships; 
discourse constitutes the social relationships of human individuals and their actions as 
social agents in so far as these are relationships in which positions of knowledge, 
authority, and subjectivity are formed (Feuchtwang, 1990).
Discourse analysis is useful for showing how policy discourses are produced and 
perpetuated by dominant discourses which structure the way we think about things and 
appear to be a reflection of reality. Stephen Ball (2000 [1993b]), drawing on the work of 
Foucault, has claimed that it is important to remember that all policies are 'ideologically 
abstract', that is to say, policy as text is never a complete 'thing' but is always in the 
process of'becoming':
'we are the subjectivities, the voices, the knowledge, the power relations that a 
discourse constructs and allows....In these terms we are spoken by policies, we 
take up the positions constructed for us within policies....There is little 
opportunity for obvious adversial responses to this process of subjugation. 
And we have to note the de-centring of the state in this, discourse is non- 
reductionist. The state is here the product of discourse, a point in the diagram 
of power.' (Ball, 2000 [1993b], 1836)
The transformative process from the 'crude, abstract simplicities of policy texts into 
interactive and sustainable practices' Ball (2000 [1993b] argues, is subject to limitations at 
various discursive and legislative stages of that translatory process; therefore, policies do 
not tell you what to do, but rather, they 'create circumstances in which the range of 
options in deciding what to do are narrowed or changed' (1834). Moreover, policy texts 
never exist within social or institutional vacuums; they build on and are affected by prior 
social and institutional practices such as existing patterns of inequality and the structure of 
class relations. Ball has pointed out that the meaning of policy therefore changes as
intentions are re-worked in accordance with the changing interests of the state, and that we 
'need to recognise and analyse the existence of 'dominant' discourses - like neo- 
liberalism and management theory - in social policy' (1837). Ball's distinction between 
'first order' effects, which are about changes in structure or practice, and 'second order' 
effects which are the influence of such changes on social justice, access and opportunity is 
useful for understanding the distributional implications or outcomes of social policies 
(1839). A thorough Foucauldian analysis of institutions and relations of power and how 
these may be inaugurated within policy developments, however, is beyond the remit of 
this research. In this study, the relevant text is any meaning which is symbolically 
significant for the reader (Parker, 1999).
Ozga (2000) has disagreed with what she regards as Ball's two different 
conceptualisations of policy (see Ball, 2000 [1993b]), on the count that text and discourse, 
like structure and agency, operate in a relational sense: 'Policy as text is the element of 
policy that can be worked on, interpreted and contextualised, and stands in contradiction 
to assumptions that policy works in a straight line from formulation to implementation. 
Policy as discourse understands policy as part of the dominant system of social relations; 
policy as discourse frames what can be said or thought. Policy as text addresses agency, 
policy as discourse addresses structure' (Ozga, 2000, 94). Ozga (2000) makes an 
important distinction between research for policy and research on policy and claims it is 
just as important to critique policy as it is to analyse it. Research for policy assumes the 
inalienability of globalisation within the policy agenda, in which not only national 
interests and global competitiveness are deemed synonymous and provide the unequivocal 
remit of policy, but also private partnership and economisation as solutions to the problem 
of social exclusion are taken for granted. Research on policy, on the other hand, 'is 
necessary in order to take a critical view of policy in response to globalisation and the 
economising of education as potential contributors to exclusion' (2000, 97, my italics). In 
the case of research on social exclusion and educational governance, there may be areas of 
overlap between research for and research on policy (2000, 97). Research on policy is also 
more likely to be concerned with the future of national state systems generally, and for 
enquiry into their contributions to the formations of identity and 
Whilst acknowledging the inherent discursive and temporal nature of policy, and that its 
constitution involves a combination of various statutory and social actors, analysts such as 
Ball and Ozga have pointed out that we still need to recognise and analyse the existence of 
'dominant' discourses such as neo-liberalism in social policy, and the fact that interests 
operate on restricted terrain. Policy provides the location and 'rules of the game' which 
empower or disempower specific social groups. Moreover, the effects of social policy 
result from the outcome of conflict and struggle between different interests, resulting in 
different degrees of'utility' value of policy for particular groups (Offe, 1984, 106). At the 
same time we have to take account of the fact that the state is de-centred and is itself a 
product of discourse, 'a point in the diagram of power' (Ball, 2000 [1993b], 1836). Thus, 
policy as discourse is policy as part of the dominant system of social relations in which 
discourse frames what can be said.
Ozga's view is that policy is highly centralist and managerial: she discusses policy texts as 
a resource for analysis in terms of the messages they convey, or attempt to convey, about 
the source of policy in terms of whose interests are served and its relationship to global, 
national and local imperatives, and in terms of what the policy is assumed to be able to do. 
The re-iteration of phrases and key words, she claims, reveals policy-makers assumptions, 
whilst the tone of policy indicates how things should happen: an imperative or assured 
tone may have the effect of leaving little room for debate, whilst omissions may say far 
more about exclusion and inclusion than what is actually said. Her critique of the policy 
document 'Excellence in Schools' provides useful guidelines on how to approach my 
policy analysis. I have selected and adapted a number of questions Ozga (2000) asks in 
her documentary analysis, and applied them to my investigation of the selected policy 
texts. The idea behind these questions is to bring out the discourses around personhood 
and equity in education. These are the questions I posed in relation to the policy analysis:
1) What is the story being presented? (How is it different to what went 
before?) What is the logic/discursive construction of the argument in the text? 
What assumptions are made, what is the tone of the policy?
2) What ideas and categories are presented regarding social 
exclusion/inclusion? (If comparative: Are these new? In what ways?) What is 
absent, excluded, silent? How is my own thinking affected by knowledge that 
lies outside the text, i.e. the tendency to produce or reproduce disaffected 
groups and individuals?
3) How does the text construct its subjects? How are learners constructed? 
Who is excluded by these constructions? What do these texts imply about the 
relationship between their subjects and the world society/globalisation? (If 
comparative: Is this new?)
Fieldvvork analysis
The discourse analytical approach is usefully applied to the fieldwork because it can show 
how power and inequality operate, and can reveal how discourse constrains or prioritises 
what is held as 'true'. Discourses prescribe what is normal or natural; they are actively 
working practices which position people in particular ways and represent particular 
relationships as self-evident. Within a dominant discourse, therefore, only certain things 
can be said. Power within this methodological approach is understood as multi-faceted, 
contingent and subject to change. It does not 'belong' to oppressors at the expense of the 
'oppressed': therefore a person may be positioned as powerful within a gender discourse 
and powerless within a class discourse in consecutive moments. This approach enables us 
to identify many taken for granted assumptions, reveal the causes and connections that are 
hidden, and construct alternative discourses. Therefore subjugated knowledges may 
determine alternative discourses of subjectivity (albeit some post-structuralists doubt the 
epistemological bases of such hopes; see for instance the debate between Jones (1997) and 
Davies(1997).
Semi-structured interviews composed of set questions and open-ended responses allowed 
me to probe respondents on precise meanings around self-definitions of identity, whilst 
retaining a structure to the interview questions. Moreover, semi-structured interviews
generated data which enabled me to identify discourses and key themes, as well as do 
some numerical counting. Whilst similar discourses may have been identified using 
questionnaires or surveys as methods, the data may have lacked information and depth. In- 
depth interviews, on the other hand, would possibly have allowed me to gain deeper 
insight into the experiences of mixed race women, but would have involved a smaller 
sample and may have been at the expense of data validity. Conversely, one might also 
argue that semi-structured interviews can, generally speaking, only 'scratch the surface' in 
comparison to in-depth interviews which may produce different or additional categories, 
and so yield a higher level of validity.
As mentioned earlier, the objective of the empirical investigation was to examine the 'fit', 
or lack of 'fit', between respondents' perceptions of self and theories and discourses 
around personhood, and between respondents' educational experiences and opinions on 
education policy, and policy/government constructions of personhood and equity. In the 
context of education, discourses which formed part of the dominant ideology around 
education were identified in the policy and interview texts. This involved examining 
policy constructions, and comparing these with the praxis of language. Francis (1999b) 
provides an example of a similar approach in which she used semi-structured interviews 
(and participant observation) in educational research to show how students' constructions 
of education and the discourses identified in education policy may be linked. In the 
remainder of this section, I discuss some of the issues around the use of normative 
categories of identity in relation to my fieldwork.
Tizard and Phoenix (2001 [1993]) used semi-structured interviews (and participant 
observation) to investigate the experiences of mixed race children in one secondary 
school. They argued that the way the mixed race children in their sample saw themselves 
was not the way other people believed they saw themselves. The authors used normative 
categories of ethnicity as standards against which to measure self-definitions of identity. 
This study is certainly useful in that it reveals how dominant discourses and categories of 
race, culture and ethnicity are imbued within, or absent from, the self-definitions of mixed 
race young people. However, in their study, 'positive' racial identities were constructed in
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relation to racial norms, whereas 'problematic' identities were described as ones in which 
people felt different, unhappy, confused about their identity, or as not 'belonging' (2001, 
108-109). Despite the advantages of pre-set classifications, no categories in Tizard and 
Phoenix's (2001 [1993]) study would have yielded different results, and possibly allowed 
for definitions of identity to go beyond the limitations of normative categories.
Many researchers would agree with Tizard and Phoenix (2001 [1993]) that pre-defmed 
categories are necessary for comparative analysis, as it can show where certain tendencies 
lie. Indeed, Tizard and Phoenix (2001 [1993]) maintain that the more diverse or 
unorthodox the findings, the greater the need for a normative framework to 'contain' and 
analyse the data (Tizard and Phoenix, 2001[1993]). Atkinson (1983), on the other hand, 
has pointed out that, although content analysis is a useful method of coding in terms of 
organising and analysing data, it is limiting in that it cannot account for activities and 
experiences which do not fit neatly into established categories. I would argue that the use 
of standard categories restricts any 'new' understandings of mixed race identity which are 
not rooted in the normative realm or understood in terms of homogeneous constructs of 
race or community (such as 'black', or the bi-polar definition of'mixed race'). Moreover, 
the use of pre-set categories underpins the idea that a person's psychological health 
depends on affiliation to an ethnic community.
My aim in the fieldwork therefore, was to attempt to go beyond the normative limitations 
described above in Tizard and Phoenix's (2001 [1993]) study, and respondents were asked 
to ascribe themselves, so to speak. The procedures adopted to identify my sample are 
described in detail in Part Three. Although many respondents defined themselves in 
accordance with established categories, many others represented themselves in terms of 
what might be seen as 'conflicting' categories of self. Moreover, the degree to which 
respondents actually did ascribe themselves was difficult to ascertain, because 'mixed 
race' as the main criteria of selection, and the normative manner in which questions were 
phrased, meant that respondents were aware of the main objective of the interviews. This 
undoubtedly influenced responses and the subsequent identification of discourses and the 
analysis of the data. Because normative categories were not used, decisions about the
appropriateness and accurate assignment of categories' of personhood was therefore one 
of the main challenges of the research. Whether working within a positivistic or an 
interpretivist framework, I would argue, the researcher ultimately has to make the decision 
about how to define 'categories' and themes.
The interview data were summarised, and major discourses and themes were identified 
(Dey, 1993; Silverman, 1993). Awareness of the degree to which responses may have 
been influenced by the way in which questions were asked, and normative categories 
assumed, was taken into account (Sacks cited in Silverman, 1993). One of the main 
challenges of my research was to ascertain where discourses were being mirrored or 
reproduced in the data, and where the data 'stood on its own', separate from discourse. 
This meant not only taking into account how 'discursive practices' positioned 
respondents, but also how these may have impacted upon respondents' views of 
themselves and their roles within their community, and how these views influenced their 
responses and how they defined themselves publicly. Important too, was to look at the 
ways in which respondents gave alternative meaning to dominant discourses, and the way 
in which people pushed at the limits of what was socially constructed and actively tried to 
construct something different (see Nightingale and Cromby, 1999). Ball's (2000 [1993b]) 
assertion, however, that everything is discourse, and discourse 'speaks us' is profoundly 
problematic as a mode of analysis in that it limits, and perhaps even cancels out any 
possibility of a demotic discourse. From Ball's perspective, the space which the individual 
has to act outside the normative remit of discourse is severely restricted.
PART THREE: THE RESEARCH PROCESS
Routes of access
Access to four Further Education colleges in the Inner and Outer London areas was 
negotiated in January 2001. Whereas physical access to the Further Education colleges 
was relatively unproblematic, social access was much more difficult. This was my first 
experience of attempting to access a group of people for whom there was no statistical
aggregate, who were not easily identifiable, and who would have to identify themselves. 
At four of the colleges I was given a contact person, either college administrators or 
student support officers, with whom I liaised during the initial phase of attempting to 
access my sample. The initial procedure involved a lot of circuitous e-mailing and phone- 
calling. Contact persons e-mailed HODs and lecturers in various departments with a 
synopsis of my proposed research in the anticipation that they would identify mixed race 
students and provide the contact person with names and contact details of potential 
interviewees. A response time limit of between two and three weeks, depending on the 
college, was given; there was no response to the emails from any of the HODs or lecturers 
at any of the colleges within that time limit, second e-mails were sent out with another two 
week time limit, but again the same lack of response. After a four to five week period an 
alternative approach was tried, which again involved sending e-mails to HODs and 
teaching staff, but this time asking for permission for direct access to classrooms at the 
beginning or end of lessons. This would enable me to personally introduce my intended 
research, and allow potential interviewees to come forward and arrange an interview. 
There was no response to these e-mails either. One interview was arranged through my 
contact with a 'personal tutor' at Newham College, but the interviewee failed to turn up. 
In retrospect this lack of response was predictable: staff get inundated with e-mails as this 
is the main form of intra-college communication, and matters which are not marked 
priority inevitably get relegated or deleted. It was no surprise to me that staff I 
subsequently spoke with in person had never heard of me or my proposed fieldwork.
After two months and not a single interview under my belt, I got permission from the 
colleges to introduce my topic directly to students during their lessons. I did this in about 
twenty classes which were either chosen randomly, or upon invitation or recommendation 
by lecturers who assured me they had mixed race women in their class. Despite this, I only 
secured one interview. Whilst continuing to ask lecturers for permission to introduce my 
project in their lessons, I also embarked on a 'direct approach' strategy in which I 
approached students directly in various college locations such as foyers and corridors, IT 
labs, libraries, canteens, and hairdressing and beauty salons. This direct approach 
overcame many of the problems I had previously encountered, and was the route to finally
accessing my sample. First, by cutting out the gatekeepers, I had more control over access 
to potential interviewees, and was less dependent on other people to get the ball rolling. 
Second, this approach allowed me to discuss my proposed fieldwork with students and 
staff in person and at their convenience. It gave me the opportunity to clarify any 
questions on the spot, and to allay any fears or doubts students had about being 
interviewed. Third, the direct approach allowed me to access the 'correct' sample more 
quickly than the initial more structured approach would have done. As previously 
mentioned, it involved women who were not 'easily identifiable', and lecturers often 
simply did not know whether they had mixed race women in their class. Indeed, some 
women themselves were concerned that they fitted my definition of the category 'mixed 
race', and the direct strategy meant that any questions around this could be clarified on the 
spot. Fourth, whereas in the public space of a classroom, self-identification may be 
tantamount to an announcement, the direct approach allowed a degree of privacy. Thus, it 
enabled me to access women who may not have volunteered in a classroom setting. Here 
is an example of this: I recently entered a classroom in which I knew there were two 
mixed race women because I had spoken to their class-mates earlier; when the lecturer 
asked whether there were any mixed race women in the class, neither of the women 
volunteered, even though they smiled and all their classmates looked at them. This 
illustrates the significance of the kind of setting and the manner in which potential 
respondents are approached - the two women in question, if indeed mixed race, would 
perhaps have volunteered if I had approached them directly in an informal setting.
Finally, the direct approach and style of gathering data suited me: I felt comfortable with 
the flexibility and freedom I had to manoeuvre within the college, to pace myself, to make 
contact with staff and students personally, and to negotiate meeting times and places. I 
could move speedily between places, talk to lots of people, and could follow my own 
feeling about being in the right place at the right time. The disadvantage of this lack of 
structure and ad hoc approach meant that, although I set time limits for gathering data, 
there was no guarantee that my goals would be achieved, and this was unnerving but also 
motivating. Success in accessing and interviewing my sample was dependent to some 
extent on luck, but also on taking quick action and perseverance.
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The college setting
I spent a considerable amount of time in one college (College A). Informal conversations 
with lecturers there revealed that many of them considered 'race' to be a sensitive issue 
(see Skeggs, 1994). Although these discussions were not framed within a formal context, 
and the information received should not in any way be considered authoritative data, they 
did enable me to gain some insight into some of the ideas and opinions of some staff on 
the subject of race. From these discussions, I gleaned that the college space, and those 
who worked and studied within it, had become 'neutralised' in ethnic or racial terms in 
some way. This was perhaps simply a reflection of Britain's public climate which 
demands a high degree of neutrality and 'political correctness', not least in social and 
educational fields. There must certainly also have been an awareness that the 
repercussions of stepping outside the accepted norms within such public institutions could 
carry high costs. It is hard to know whether this dominant ethos of universality and 
neutrality was one of the reasons why lecturers seemed to find concepts such as 
'ethnicity', 'race' and even 'culture' both confusing and interesting. I felt, and this was 
perhaps precisely because of the public silence around race issues, that some lecturers 
wanted to draw these issues out from under the carpet, but weren't sure of how to do it 
'properly'. Other than the standard equal opportunities policies, there seemed to be no 
guidelines on how staff should manage the issues of race, ethnicity and culture, and as 
such, these issues were not 'issues' at all in the official sense.
In my conversations with staff, I observed an unofficial discourse of personhood which 
looked beyond colour (and possibly culture), and was concerned with the person per se. It 
was a discourse which was purported to be non-judgmental, non-assuming, and which did 
not categorise. Although many of the lecturers I spoke with claimed that they saw their 
students as 'equal', there was simultaneously a kind of abstract awareness of racial and 
cultural difference, but a lack of understanding of what that actually meant. It is 
interesting to note that the dilemma which exists at ground level, that is to say, how 
universal equality can co-exist with difference, is the same one preoccupying many 
sociologists, educationalists and political philosophers today.
In some sense, I was confronting lecturers on a subject they normally were not expected to 
have to think about. Many lecturers simply did not know whether there were mixed race 
women in their lessons, and those who did hazard guesses were often totally off the mark. 
Here is an account of a phenomenon observed time and time again in conversations with 
lecturers about mixed race women in their classes. Initially, the lecturer would say "yes, 
there are several" mixed race students in their classes; then, after a minute or so of 
mentally trying to locate these women, they would say, "well actually, there are only a 
few"; another minute and they would admit there were "perhaps only one or two"; and 
finally, I would be told, "well actually, come to think of it, no, there aren't any." I soon 
learnt not to raise my expectations, and rather cynically began to predict the outcome of 
any conversation with a lecturer which began "Yes, I've got several mixed race women in 
my class....." This suggests that these lecturers had either possibly never given mixed race 
identity much thought, or that they really did believe they had mixed race women in their 
classes, or for some reason thought they had. This, as I have argued in Chapter One, may 
be indicative of a general trend towards the celebration of cultural diversity, where mixed 
race is emblematic of such diversity, without having a real understanding of what being 
mixed race actually means.
Whilst some lecturers were over-confident, others were far more cautious and non- 
committal about whether they had mixed race women in their classes. Here are some 
comments made by white lecturers: "I really don't know what they are, it's not the sort of 
thing we ask"; and: "It's not the sort of thing we normally know"; and: "We treat 
everyone the same, race doesn't really come into it." In situations where lecturers were 
introducing me and my topic to classes, some white lecturers were concerned about "how 
to put it." Although I was frank in my use of the term 'mixed race', I could appreciate that 
people unfamiliar with racial terms and concepts might be concerned about 'sticking their 
foot in it', and appearing too race conscious and therefore politically />/correct. In contrast 
to white lecturers, black and mixed race lecturers, and there were only a few, were 
generally less anxious in talking about race issues. One mixed race lecturer, following my 
explanation of my project to her, strode into the classroom and asked the students straight 
up: "Is there anybody here who is mixed race, from mixed parentage? No? Okay then.
Thanks." It would seem that the less race conscious a lecturer wanted to appear, the more 
race conscious s/he might have actually been.
Here is an example of the way in which one college tried to demonstrate its commitment 
to religious tolerance in an area of London which had a comparatively large number of 
Muslims. In this college, there was a prayer room for Muslims, but not for Christians or 
any other faiths. According to one administrator this prayer room was mere tokenism: the 
directors and governors of the college had deemed these facilities essential, but ultimately 
very few people used the prayer room because "without parents looking over their 
shoulders" many students simply did not pray. As she put it: "It's a lot to do with 
appearances - ignorantly people think they can pick a Muslim from the street or a Sikh, 
because they just assume that most Asian-looking people are Muslims." Also, at this 
college a GCSE in Islamic Studies was offered, but not a GCSE in Religious Studies or 
Christian Studies.
The respondents
The research involved purposive sampling even though women were rarely approached on 
the absolute knowledge that they were mixed race, and I did not know until I had spoken 
to them that their self-definition as mixed race made them relevant to my purpose. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the 'snowball' approach, where the researcher is led to potential respondents 
through existing respondents, did not work. Only one respondent led me to another 
respondent, and she made a point of putting considerable effort into attempting to find 
respondents who might want to be interviewed.
All of the women interviewed identified themselves as mixed race. Eight of the 
interviewees were second generation mixed race, and the rest were first generation mixed 
race. At the time of interview all the women were studying or had recently (in the last five 
years) studied on either a vocational or an academic course, their ages ranged from 16-44, 
many had dependants, many were in part-time or full-time work, and none had a 
disability. These details were all recorded.
An important aspect of my investigation was to question the stability of group identities 
generally, and to identify differences between social ascription and subjective 
consciousness. Although I used the term 'mixed race' as a distinct category in 
approaching my sample, my aim was to gain an insight into how women defined 
themselves as mixed race. It was therefore important to keep the definition of mixed race 
open and to let the women identify themselves as mixed race rather than impose 
normative categories, and the sample in terms of racial identity was hence broad ranging 
and did not discern between different types of racial mixes. Self-ascription as mixed race 
as a sample criterion, however, presented me with some dilemmas in terms of issues 
around self-selection and the impact this had on the voices represented. Whilst most of the 
women I approached were gathered in mixed ethnic groups, many women who defined 
themselves as mixed race were approached individually on the basis of my assumption 
that they were mixed race. This is an important point which merits some discussion.
Two main problems presented themselves: one, this 'hunch-based' type of selection 
crucially challenged the very principle of self-selection on which the research was based 
(moreover, although there was no guarantee that approaching all women would have 
yielded more representative results, my sample may have been different); and two, in 
taking this approach, I resorted to assumptions which challenged my own principles about 
categorising people according to appearance. Whilst personal perceptions about 
phenotype, skin colour and hair may give a correct reading of a person's self-defined 
racial heritage, this approach is problematic from the social constructionist theoretical 
position I maintain in this thesis.
It was however important to be pragmatic, and to bear the overall purpose of my research 
in mind in negotiating the ethical difficulties around the identification of mixed race 
women - in other words, to weigh up the pros and cons of this approach. First of all there 
were time constraints. Second, and linked to this, accessing the respondents had been 
impossible via procedural methods. Yet the research could not 'happen' without mixed 
race respondents, and so a compromise had to be made. Ultimately, if the women I
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communicated with had given negative responses to my approaching and asking them if 
they were mixed race, I may have abandoned the project. However, my experiences of 
talking with the women I approached to a large extent alleviated the doubts I had in that 
many women appeared to be happy, and even relieved, to have a platform from which to 
speak about their experiences as mixed race women. As the data in Chapter Four shows, 
many of the respondents wanted to be recognised as mixed race precisely because they 
had had a lifetime of mis-recognition.
In my hunch-based selection of potential respondents I approached women who 'looked' 
African/Caribbean and white, and brown people who I thought might be Asian and white, 
or where I was unsure of what their racial heritage might be. In so doing, I spoke to some 
women who were not mixed race but who had two parents from, say, the Caribbean, 
Pakistan, Turkey, Brazil or Algeria. Although College A had a large number of Asian 
Muslims attending, and I talked with many women who I thought may be Asian- 
European, there were no mixed race respondents amongst the women I approached. This 
may in part be explained by the relatively low percentage of South Asian-European 
partnerships, in comparison to Black African/white and Black-Caribbean/white 
partnerships (Tizard and Phoenix, 2001 [1993]).
I encountered the fuzzy boundaries of mixed race time and time again. In my search I met 
women who did not fit the traditional definition of mixed race but who self-identified as 
mixed race because they had two European, two African, or two Asian parents (for 
example, Turkish-English, Egyptian-Eritrean and Burmese-Mauritian). It is also probable 
that I spoke with women who were mixed race by standard definitions, but who did not 
identify themselves as such. Also, some second and third generation mixed race women 
identified themselves as mixed race, whereas most did not. I was initially tempted to 
discourage women who did not fit into clearly defined categories of mixed race from 
being interviewed, such as one woman who was Greek-Rumanian. However, their self- 
identification as mixed race was a stark reminder to me that self-selection was an 
important criterion in terms of enabling me to gain access to data on self-ascription, as 
opposed to data which reflected normative categories.
In allowing self-definition of mixed race as opposed to imposing select categories, I 
introduced a comparative element between women who were first generation and second 
generation mixed race, and between those who fitted the normative black/white definition 
of mixed race (lizard and Phoenix, 2001 [1993]) and those who fell outside that norm. In 
my analysis some comparison was made between the significant number of first 
generation black/white women and all other respondents, between first and second 
generation respondents, and between intra-continental respondents and all other 
respondents. The differences between first, second and intra-continental respondents, 
however, did not merit an analysis on the basis of distinct categories. The findings were 
analysed in the context of the theoretical concepts of personhood discussed in the 
literature review, recent literature on mixed race identity, and the review of education 
policy.
The interviews
Because of the dearth in academic literature on mixed race at the time that I began the 
fieldwork in 2001 (since then, there have been several publications on mixed race identity) 
there was little opportunity for direct comparison with other research on mixed race 
identity. The interview questions were therefore based on issues which had arisen out of 
my preliminary study of theories of personhood which focussed on feminist and post 
structuralist critiques of the subject and some general theories around race, culture and 
ethnicity (see Chapter One), and on themes which related to the discourses around 
personhood and equity in education identified in the policy documents. The interviews 
consisted of introductory questions, around ten questions on perceptions of identity and 
ten questions on experiences of education. The interviews were between 30 minutes and 
100 minutes long and all of them were recorded on tapes. The data were subsequently 
summarised.
Although the original intention had been to draw the same number of respondents from 
each of the four colleges, around half the respondents were drawn from College A. It was 
important to keep the overall project in mind when making decisions about how best to
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gain access to my sample: given time limitations, obtaining access per se overrode the 
desirability of getting a sample which was drawn equally from the four colleges. Spending 
a considerable amount of time in this college, I became acquainted with several students 
and members of staff. The informal set-up and the ease with which I could move around 
College A meant that I was able to access my sample relatively quickly.
I introduced myself to the women I approached on site as a researcher in the college, and 
briefly explained my research topic and that I was looking to interview mixed race 
women. Most women responded positively to being approached, and provided they did 
not have other commitments, those who identified as mixed race were usually willing to 
be interviewed there and then. I tried to make alternative arrangements, and where 
possible took contact details from those who had other commitments. Arranging an 
interview for a future time, however, rarely worked in practice: respondents invariably 
forgot arranged meeting times, or did not inform me that they could not make it, and I 
ended up feeling like I was hounding them. Although I did not experience any overtly 
negative reactions from women who were not mixed race, I did occasionally feel 
uncomfortable about the implicit assumption on my part that they were mixed race, and 
the possible effect this might have on them. However, I had no intention of bluffing it, and 
I followed a personal policy of maximum honesty and integrity.
The interviews, with three exceptions, took place in FE colleges. They were conducted in 
public places such as canteens, libraries, computer rooms and hair salons, or in empty 
classrooms. In College A, I had regular access to a small room at the back of the library. 
The unstructured approach meant that the interviews were invariably influenced by 
external forces - respondents were often interviewed during lunchtimes, or before or after 
classes, and may have had little time available. This inevitably had an impact on the length 
and depth of the interview. The effect the type of location had on the interviews is difficult 
to assess: noisy public environments, for example, rather than being distracting, often set 
the scene for stimulating interviews. In the interview setting, I stressed that there were no 
'right' answers to the questions. However, the education context within which the 
interviews were held may have affected responses (see Francis, 1999b). I also guaranteed
confidentiality and anonymity, and at the end of each interview gave the respondent the 
option to contact me if she wanted anything in the interview retracted.
For my part, the ethical issue around anonymity was paramount. However, in view of the 
fact that the outcome of my research would be to effectively parade people's lifestyles and 
opinions in front of an audience - and that the work may at some point appear in book 
form - I was surprised that only two respondents chose a pseudonym. Was this an 
indication that they wanted their individual voices to be heard, and if so, did this arise out 
of a sense of marginalisation in public discourse, or was it a bid for individuality, or even 
celebrity? Or was it simply a reflection of our times in which privacy and anonymity are 
less and less important, and everything is everyone's business?
One difficulty I encountered concerned the question of how much I should steer situations 
or let myself be guided by respondents in the interview situation, that is to say, how to 
strike the balance between letting the women 'talk' and simultaneously remain focused on 
the information I required. The opposite problem was getting some women to talk. With 
some women I had to be wary not to fall into the role of teacher or 'therapist'; thus it was 
also a matter of striking a balance between my privileged position as listener, and the 
responsibility I had as the 'caretaker' of information. Reflecting on the interview 
recordings, I noted how my voice changed in different settings and with different 
respondents. This was a stark reminder to me that neutrality is impossible, and that 
everyone (I think), has their own personal irritations and prejudices, whether these are 
voiced or not. It also caused me to reflect on the fine balancing act of being 'who you are' 
and showing your feelings - both positive and negative - and keeping those feelings under 
wraps. Although rare, I was sometimes intensely frustrated by respondents from whom 
getting responses was like 'drawing blood from a stone'. On the other hand, some 
conversations were intensely dynamic and exciting. In contrast to researchers who 
advocate striking a conscious balance between the sublimation and assertion of one's own 
position, how much I should say about myself was never a major dilemma.
My role as researcher
Ascribed characteristics based on presumed or essentialist ideas may limit or enhance 
research possibilities, and the impact my role as a mixed race researcher had on the 
research process was an important area of scrutiny. Although standpoint theory contradicts 
the notion of multi-dimensional identities, it is also important in that it reflects 
categorisation and prevalent discourses around racialisation which need to be 
acknowledged. Ethical issues around 'self and 'other', which were to a small extent 
problematised by early ethnographers such as Malinowski (1935) and Radcliffe-Brown 
(1922), have become important issues for researchers generally in recent years. Ball 
(1993a) has observed that ethnographers endeavour to 'be all things to all people and 
sublimate their own personalities, commitments and beliefs as far as is humanly and 
ethically possible' (42). For Ball, researchers should 'make themselves acceptable to all 
parties in the field, [and] if possible, to take on a research role that allows maximum 
flexibility in forms of social relations and social interaction' (Ball, 1993a, 40). Klatch 
(1987) has referred to a similar condition, but is less self-effacing and argues that finding 
'common threads' is important to the research process. She describes the 
researcher/respondent relationship as a 'delicate balancing act between building trust and 
gaining acceptance while not misrepresenting my own position' (77-82). Although 
ultimately the value and quality of qualitative analysis hinges on the experience of the 
researcher, interview data is also determined by the selection and omission of specific 
information by the respondents. As Woods has pointed out (cited in Ball, 1993a) students 
. are not one-dimensional people, and show themselves differently in different settings.
In my research, although commonality on the basis of mixed race was perhaps not 
palpable, gender was an immediate marker of commonality with respondents, as was 
colour. What was said and how much was withheld was inevitably weighed up by each 
respondent in accordance with how they saw me over the course of our interaction. 
Indeed, as a reflexive analyst, Ball (1993a) has pointed out, the researcher must 'weigh the 
impact and effects of their presence, their personae and the respondents' perception of 
them, for the status, usefulness and limitations of the data recorded' (43). There were
advantages and disadvantages in presenting myself as either a student or a professional to 
potential respondents. Introducing myself as a teacher or researcher, the veneer of 
professionalism seemed to carry with it a degree of trust. I noted this especially where 
lecturers played a mediatory role between myself and respondents, and the trust students 
conferred onto them was automatically transferred onto me. The students' perceptions of 
the 'professional/student' relationship could have had an impact on how students 
answered questions, i.e. giving responses they believed the interviewer wanted to hear.
For me, it was a case of finding a 'workable self within the various research contexts, one 
in which, like Klatch (1987), I tried to find common links with the respondents without 
compromising myself. I attempted to establish 'rapport' with the respondents as quickly as 
possible, aware that respondents' participation was essential to my research. Often 
similarities based on our perceived common experiences - such as being mixed race, 
experiencing racism, or being a student, a parent, or a single parent - were fundamental to 
creating a comfortable interview situation. At other times, barely any effort was required 
to generate common links or create 'rapport' with respondents, and the interview just 
flowed. Whilst superficial commonalities such as gender and colour, I believe, gave me 
some advantage in accessing my sample, the kind of rapport which existed between 
myself and each respondent certainly influenced the type and quality of data gathered. 
One of the reasons I chose not to do a comparative study between mixed race women and 
mixed race men was because I did not feel equipped to deal with gendered power relations 
in which my 'unthreatening role' - in terms of gender and ethnicity - may work against me 
in gaining access to the sample and 'good' data. With members of staff, I was aware of the 
instrumentalist motivations underlying the research, especially in the initial process of 
attempting to secure my sample. I therefore sought 'common threads' here too, and 
depending on the situation, presented myself either as an impartial, politically neutral 
research student, secondary school teacher and ex-FE lecturer, or as a politically 
motivated research student and teacher, for whom issues around race and education were 
integral to my research.
In Chapter Three I analyse the selected policy documents (Learning for the Twenty-first 
Century (Fryer, 1997), The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998), and Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 
1999)). This chapter aims to identify policy discourses on equity in education and how the 
policies construct personhood, and to show how these discourses are produced and 
perpetuated by the wider discourses around education, the economy and social justice 
which prevail in British society today. The chapter examines how minority ethnic groups 
- including mixed race women - are positioned in these discourses. The findings from 
Chapter Three will be discussed in relation to the interview findings on education in 
Chapter Five.
CHAPTER THREE; POLICY ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION
In Part One of this chapter, I examine some major government discourses in education and 
some critiques of these discourses. First, a background to the concept of the 'liberal' 
individual, and how this is used in the context of contemporary discourse, is given. 
Second, the major post-1997 discourses of economic efficiency and social 
justice/inclusion are examined, in which lifelong learning is a dominant theme; these 
discourses are discussed with reference to the related discourses of individual 
responsibility, equality of opportunity and the value of education. Third, I explore some of 
the main criticisms of the government's position on education since 1997, referring in 
particular to the 'myth' that enhanced levels of education and qualifications lead to greater 
economic efficiency and social inclusion.
Part Two of this chapter focuses on a selection of three further education policy 
documents published in the UK since 1997; namely, Learning for the Twenty-first Century 
(Fryer, 1997), The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998), and Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 1999). 
As previously mentioned in the methodology chapter, I have selected and adapted a 
number of questions asked by Ozga (2000) in the context of her documentary analysis, 
and applied these to the selected policy texts. The policy investigation will identify key 
themes relating to the 'stories' being presented, the tone of the policies, how people and 
categories are presented with regard to social exclusion/inclusion, and how the texts 
construct their subjects (see Ozga, 2000); the policies will also be examined for their 
concepts of personhood. These policy themes and concepts will be revisited in the context 
of the interview data around education in Chapter Five.
PART ONE: MAJOR CONCEPTS, DISCOURSES AND CRITIQUES OF 
EDUCATION POLICY
Theories of liberalism and the concept of the individual
There are two types of liberalism, political (e.g. Kant, Mill) and economic (eg. Smith, 
Bentham). Both are committed to an ideology of individualism which privileges the 
individual in universalist and ahistorical terms as the ultimate unit of analysis. It assumes a 
society made up of the aggregate of individuals, in which no social force exists beyond 
that. The individual is a socially and culturally decontextualised self, a coherent unitary 
ego capable of rational choice. Both types of liberalism have an emphasis on rationality as 
the exclusive predicate of individual actors. However, whereas political liberalism focuses 
on Kant's concept of autonomy and the idea of the imperative of formal rights, economic 
liberalism draws on Homo economicus, claiming that people should be treated as rational 
utility-maximisers in all their behaviour. In constructing individuals as equal and 
autonomous before the law, universal equality is theoretically possible.
Political liberalism can be understood as a critique of state reason, a political doctrine 
which is concerned with the limits of the state (Gordon, 1991). It assumes the freedom of 
the individual as it presumes the ability of the individual to act and make choices 
independently. Liberty is both the means to secure the rights of the individual as well as 
the primary element in governmental rationality itself; in this way, liberty ensures the 
participation of the governed in the creation of a system of law which is the necessary 
prerequisite for a governed economy (Gordon, 1991). Economic liberalism, as such, is 
based on the political obligation of the individual to the state in a possessive market 
society, where everyone is subject to the market and sees the inherent 'Tightness' of 
political authority (Macpherson, 1962). The rights of the individual are framed within the 
contract between state and individual, and can be understood as normative expectations 
which specify the relationship between the state and its individual members, and a set of 
practices which fulfils these expectations. Classical liberal theory has been criticised by 
communitarian liberals for being too individualistic and a-historical, and ethnocentric in
that its universal laws use only one particular culturally-bound normative principle of 
equality. Communitarians privilege the idea of community over the individual, where 
rights should not be treated as transcendent principles, but the person is who he or she is 
because of the shared values of a particular community.
John Rawls (1971) has claimed that the universe is inhabited and regulated by agents 
capable of choice where the subject is prior to its ends, free from the contingencies of 
society; in this view, identity is not tied to attachments but to rational pursuit of the moral 
good. Rawlsian equality is based on two principles of justice, termed 'primary social 
goods', which are things which every rational being is supposed to want, including 'rights, 
liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect' (1971, 
60-65). Basic liberties have priority over other primary goods, and priority is given to 
advancing the interests of the most marginal, and where there can be no trade-off between 
basic liberties and social and economic gain. Rawls's conception of justice is based on an 
'original position' which assumes that people would not maximise the utility sum in a 
condition of as if ignorance. One of the main criticisms of this argument is that such a 
position cannot be truly original as it involves choice which is always biased; moreover, it 
is questionable whether prudential choice can form an adequate basis for moral judgement 
in real-life situations (Nagel, 1973).
The concept of liberalism has shifted historically in relation to dominant discourses 
prevalent in particular political and economic fields at different times. Rather than being 
understood as a 'natural' entity which requires monitoring by the state from a distance, as 
classic liberalism was, neo-liberalism has been actively constructed and protected by the 
state through political, legal and bureaucratic conditions (Burchell, 1993). Whereas in 
early political liberalism, the limits of government were linked to the rationality of free 
agents operating within a governmental framework, in neo-liberalism, 'the rational 
principle for regulating and limiting governmental activity must be determined by 
reference to artificially arranged or contrived forms of the free, entrepreneurial and 
competitive conduct of economic-rational individuals' (Burchell, 1993, original italics, 
271). The focus of the state is therefore no longer on the individual as an autonomous
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rational being per se, as in political liberalism, but on his or her role in the global market- 
place. This new economic discourse may be understood as a new meta-narrative (Lyotard, 
1984) which justifies economic development, founded on the interrelation between 
science, technology and education.
Within the discourse of neo/new liberalism, the contract between individual and state is 
based on the idea that both parties are unequivocal beneficiaries: self-interest and the 
interests of the state are synonymous. Individuals are therefore seen as self-interested 
rational utility-maximisers who turn themselves into market individuals (Peters, 1996). 
Using Foucault's analysis of governmentality, Peter's (1996) has argued that neo- 
liberalism employs a new interpretative strategy in restyling basic principles of liberalism 
to accommodate new requirements, in which optimising market relations can serve as a 
principle for both limiting state intervention, and for rationalising government. The system 
of education is based on market principles in which learning is geared towards 'feeding' 
the demands of an enterprise culture, resulting in 'commodified' knowledge. Thus, in the 
'new liberalism' of New Labour, the emphasis is on a) the right and capability of the 
individual to secure a future of his or her own choosing, and b) the discourse of 
competitiveness in which each individual is supposed to serve a function based on state 
logic (Peters, 1996).
One strand of recent social theory has focussed on the processes and pressures of 
individualisation within neo/new liberal discourse. Gordon (1991, 44) has argued that neo- 
liberalism institutionalises enterprise as a general organising principle for society - a 
'global re-description of the social as a form of the economic' - which involves an 
individualism where the individual becomes the 'enterpreneur of himself or herself. Rose 
(1992) has made a similar argument:
'Become whole, become what you want, become yourself: The individual is to 
become, as it were, an entrepreneur of itself, seeking to maximise its own 
powers, its own happiness, its own quality of life, through enhancing its 
autonomy and then instrumentalising its autonomous choices in the service of 
its lifestyle.'(150-151)
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Ulrich Beck (2001) has argued that class has been superseded by 'lifestyle'. The central 
notion here is that race, class, community, family and nation, hitherto defined as 
'traditional' identities, have been replaced by what Beck (2001) has termed 'self-culture', 
a society in which identities are fluid, and individuals are self-consciously concerned with 
securing a 'life of one's own' (Beck, 2001). Beck has argued that modern society relies on 
the fact that 'individuals are not integrated but only partly and temporarily involved as 
they wander between different functional worlds' (2001, 23). The breakdown in traditional 
lifestyles has initiated a fundamental probing around who we actually are; [people] 'pull 
themselves up by the roots, to see whether the roots are really healthy' (Beck, 2001, 38). 
Thus, individualisation is symptomatic of a pluralized and fragmented society, in which 
people refer to themselves in terms of different versions of themselves existing or 
operating in different contexts. Condemned to activity, the person seeks 'self- 
enlightenment and self-liberation', a life of one's own, in the name of a new ethics which 
Beck has called 'duty to oneself (2001,38). In contemporary Britain, pro-activity in the 
field of education is a necessary component of this process of self-discovery, which 
enables us to tap into and fulfil our potential as individuals. In de-traditionalising and 
individualising personhood, collective action around old forms of identity such as race and 
class also becomes theoretically impossible.
Discourses of economic competitiveness and social justice
In this section, some of the main discourses around education are examined in the context 
of New Labour. The two dominant discourses are economic efficiency and social 
justice/inclusion, and implicit within these are the discourses of equality of opportunity, 
individual responsibility, and the value of education (in terms of instrumentalism and 
personal development).
Since the Education Act of 1988, education policies in Britain have been concerned 
mainly with reforming UK education systems to conform more closely to the 
government's perceived need to modernise the traditional structures of British society in 
order to keep pace with globalisation. Comparative studies between Britain and other
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European countries on economic development and the application of new technologies to 
production have had important implications for understanding links between economic 
performance and educational development (Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Green and 
Steedman, 1993). Studies in the last two decades have shown that educational standards 
in Britain are lower than those of their European counterparts (Sexton, 1987; Green and 
Steedman, 1993). In comparison to France, Germany, Singapore and the US, countries 
identified as 'world class standard' (DfEE, 1998, 34), Britain's strengths lie in university 
education, and its weaknesses lie at basic and intermediary level: 7 million adults have no 
formal qualification at all, 21 million adults have not reached level 3 (equivalent of 2 A 
levels) (DfEE, 1998); 1/3 of the British population have had no formal education or 
training since leaving school (Fryer, 1997) and 40% of 18 year-olds are not in any kind of 
education or training (NACETT cited in Fryer, 1997). The European Union has explicitly 
declared its fear of a 'dual society' in which 18 million are unemployed and 52 million 
live below the poverty line. The European Commission's White Paper on a new Learning 
Society has stated that 'social exclusion has reached such intolerable proportions that the 
rift between those who have knowledge and those who do not has to be narrowed' (1995, 
30). Giving priority to quality in education and training, therefore, has become vital to 
Europe's competitiveness and its preservation as a social model, and indeed, its very 
identity (1995, 30).
The fundamental problem in western democracies such as Britain in recent years has been 
how best to reconcile an inclusive society based on egalitarian principles and a 'learner- 
centred' approach which utilises human capital theory and stresses individual rights, with 
capital accumulation and economic efficiency (Whitty et al., 1997). The New Labour 
government accepted that justice and equity were inextricably linked to the new economic 
discourse as there could be no compromise on investment in human capital to ensure the 
quality of goods and services (Commission on Social Justice, 1994). This move 
recognised that in the present climate of economic marketisation, alienating those at the 
bottom end of the market was not the way forward for global competition (Brown and 
Lauder, 2000).
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The ideological and philosophical context in which New Labour's education polices were 
to be established was already well developed by the mid 1990s: Education and training 
were to be the primary ways in which Britain would be transformed from a low-skill, low- 
wage economy to a high-skill, high-wage technological economy (Tomlinson, 2001). The 
New Labour government made education its main priority, represented by the now well- 
known mantra 'education, education, education'. Equality and how to ensure that those 
who are 'disadvantaged' are not excluded from basic rights through market-driven 
mechanisms has become one of the primary goals in public sector areas such as health and 
education (Ozga, 2000). The emphasis on post compulsory education and training was 
central to a vision of a competitive and just society in which education not only 
contributes to a high value-added economy, but also works towards solving the problem of 
unemployment. A rhetoric of lifelong learning now underpins programmes of educational 
reform aimed at supporting marginalised groups and individuals in society, and 
encouraging them to partake in education to enhance their chances of success in the labour 
market. These programmes encompassed development strategies designed to bring about 
widened opportunities and increased participation, and were aimed at overcoming barriers 
which exclude people from the benefits and pleasures of learning (see Shackleton, 1992; 
Murphy, 1993; Keep and Mayhew, 1998, 2000 for critiques). The shift in focus from 
markets per se to lifelong learning has been reflected in Further Education policy 
documents discussed later in this chapter.
Lifelong learning as a major theme within post-16 education and training policies 
underpinned the government's view that a learning society should be promoted on the 
principles of individual responsibility, investment in persons themselves, and a 
progressive learning market (Tomlinson, 2001). Related to this view was the belief that 
British society was classless, and that individual effort and merit would result in 
educational, occupational and social mobility. The DfEE consultation document on 
Lifetime Learning, for example, claimed that 'the balance of responsibility for investment 
in skills will shift more towards individuals' (DfEE, 1995). Sir Christopher Ball, the 
Chairman of the National Campaign for Learning, explained his vision of a Learning 
Society for the UK as follows: '....the key principle governing provision for and pursuit of
learning in the future must be the primacy of personal responsibility for learning, 
encouraged and enabled by the support of the whole community....The focus of the 
campaign will be on individuals rather than on the providers of education and training' 
(Ball, 1996 cited in Fryer, 1997).
The term 'lifelong learning' can be traced back to the early twentieth century in the work 
of Dewey, Lindeman and Yeaxlee. Lifelong learning was first implemented as a 'master 
concept' by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) in 1970 and was premised on the notion that learning is not limited to 
childhood and early adulthood but is a process which continues throughout life (Lengrand, 
1989). Cropley (1980) has identified the following key elements of lifelong education: it 
lasts the whole lifetime of an individual; it is cumulative in the sense that it involves a 
systematic acquisition and upgrading of knowledge in response to a continuously 
changing society, where the self-fulfilment of each individual is the ultimate goal; its 
success is dependent on people's ability to engage in self-directed learning; and all 
educational influences, not only formal, are acknowledged. Tight (1998a) has concluded 
that three important features may be derived from Cropley's identifications: one, that 
lifelong learning is seen as both building upon and affecting all existing educational 
providers; two, that it does not confine itself to formal education alone, but extends to any 
form of learning; and three, that it is founded on the belief that individuals are, or can be, 
self-directing, and that the value of lifelong learning is apparent to everyone (474).
Lifelong learning has been described by the European Commission as 'all learning activity 
undertaken throughout life, with the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competences, 
within a personal, civic, social and/or employment-related perspective' (European 
Commission, 2001, 9). The central idea here is that lifelong learning is a long-term 
investment in people, as expressed in the following quote: 'When planning for a year, 
plant corn. When planning for a decade, plant trees. When planning for life, train and 
educate people' (Chinese proverb: Guanzi, c. 645 B.C, cited in European Commission, 
2001). Because of the uncertain economic climate, not only should investment in human 
capital be central, as 'knowledge and competences are [therefore, also] a powerful engine
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for economic growth', but people should also take advantage of the 'vast new 
opportunities' on offer and actively participate in society (6).
In the next two sections, I examine some critiques of New Labour's education policy and 
the dominant discourses on education discussed in the previous section. Questions have 
been raised about the evidence base of policy claims about the contribution of learning to 
economic competitiveness and social inclusion, and indeed, whether lifelong learning 
constitutes a form of social exclusion rather than inclusion (Field, 2000).
The seductive myth of education
Education policy assumes an unequivocal relationship between greater economic 
competitiveness and a more highly educated workforce, an assumption which, according 
to some authors, is fundamentally flawed (Swift, 1995; Ainley, 1998; Ball, 1999). Swift 
(1995) has criticised 'the seductive myth of salvation through ever more training' (131), 
and has argued that investment in education and training is not a sufficient condition for 
sustained economic prosperity. He has asserted that the problems facing western 
countries are not simply a result of the mismatch between skills and jobs, that high, 
structural unemployment is likely to continue even with a high tech, high investment 
economy, and that a variety of other interconnecting factors contribute to lack of 
economic growth. The paradox of modern industry, Swift has claimed, is that on the one 
hand economic success requires a workforce with high level skills, alongside new 
patterns of production and management strategies, and on the other hand long-term 
economic growth necessitates a strong manufacturing base, which does not create many 
jobs. Whilst there is a decreasing number of'core' workers, which will eventually result 
in a highly skilled elite, there is an increase in 'peripheral' or casualised workers for most 
new jobs which tend to require minimum or semi-skills and are in the low-wage, 
temporary, part-time service sector.
The government has made the assumption that via its drive towards lifelong learning, the 
level of'absolute achievement' can be raised for disadvantaged students. In a well-known
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interview between PM Tony Blair and Jeremy Paxman, Blair refused to comment on the 
acceptability of the widening gap between rich and poor and instead claimed that the main 
objective of government was to 'level up, not level down' (Newsnight, BBC2, 5 June, 
2001). There have been several criticisms made of this position, for example, that the 
economy, education and the prevailing class structure cannot add up to a highly skilled 
workforce (Brown and Lauder, 1997). Moreover, evidence in both the US and Britain has 
shown that whilst some companies recognise that human capital investment is crucial to 
their medium-term success, many others follow the line that extensive profits can be made 
off the backs of low-waged semi-skilled workers (Brown and Lauder, 1997). The quest to 
redress power imbalances and socio-economic inequalities have necessarily receded under 
the new economic discourse of national economic competitiveness (Peters, 1996; Maguire 
et al., 1999). Avis (1996) has suggested that the social inclusion discourse can only 
function within a hegemonic discourse of national competitiveness, and that the dictum of 
equality is unrealistic within a capitalist system.
Fevre et al. (1999) have argued that many of the education and training policies developed 
in the UK are based on human capital theory, and because they take no account of the real 
orientations people have, they cannot be successful. The authors have claimed that there 
are three ideal-type orientations amongst the working population - those who hold the first 
orientation undertake only the minimum amount of training which their employers insist 
upon; those with the second approach acquire education and training credentials with the 
main aim of improving their employment prospects; whilst those who follow the third 
tendency value knowledge and skill because they value the connection between 
continuously improving their own performance, that of their company, and national 
economic prosperity. Fevre et al. (1999) have asserted that policies designed to encourage 
individuals to invest more in human capital may simply reinforce the first two orientations 
(which are the predominant ones in the UK) at the expense of the third orientation which 
is the prerequisite of economic success: thus, higher participation rates may simply lead to 
increased credentials without greater understanding, or a transference of knowledge and 
skills into a broader spectrum.
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The creation of flexible labour markets in Britain, and especially the expansion of the 
service sector, has led to a growth in low skilled, low waged service sector jobs, which, 
although reducing unemployment, have contributed to income inequality, and what 
Finegold and Soskice (1988) have referred to as 'a self-reinforcing network of societal and 
state institutions which interact to stifle the demand for improvements in skill levels' (22). 
The liberal dictate of economic globalisation not only makes New Labour (and other 
western governments) unaccountable for a polarisation of incomes, but it also 'obscures 
the social and political choices which are currently being made by nation states in the 
trade off between high unemployment (exclusion) and lousy jobs (exploitation)' (Brown 
and Lauder, 2000, 1761). Ainley (1998) has claimed that increased participation in 
education will inevitably lead to a case of 'qualification inflation', in which the 
meritocratic link between qualifications gained and employment opportunities will 
become increasingly untenable. Indeed, a vicious circle of'certification inflation' may be 
created through the obligation on individuals to seek more and more education to 'keep 
up' with the next person and increase their 'marketability'. Thus paradigms of learning 
such as lifelong learning do not guarantee the desired jobs, and many people will continue 
to fail within the system (Ainley, 1994). As Beck (1992) has argued, it is incumbent upon 
individuals to incorporate the anticipation of risk and potential threat to personal security 
into their lives, and in so doing, entropy is converted into 'useful' experience.
The responsibility to succeed, autonomy, and the denial of inequality
There is growing concern that the pre-occupation with the market principle, 
competitiveness and the 'culture of self-interest' has confused the social and moral 
purposes of education, a culture which is overriding the requisite moral underpinnings of 
an efficient and successful economy (Ball, 1994, 144). As Ball (1994) has argued: 'The 
majesty of the market is so stridently trumpeted by its advocates that all else is in danger of 
being drowned out' (144). Individuals are expected to continuously up-date their skills, 
where lack of skills qualifications are regarded as the primary cause for unemployment 
(SEU, 1999). Although lifelong learning should undoubtedly be seen as positive, it has 
been argued that policy is predisposed towards the idea of non-participants as responsible
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for changing their own behaviour, and that economic and social exclusion are the 
inevitable consequences of non-participation (Colley and Hodkinson, 2001).
Critics of New Labour philosophy and policy have argued that the shift in focus from a 
concern with equality per se to equality of opportunity and social inclusion places greater 
emphasis on individual responsibility (Lister, 2001; Colley and Hodkinson, 2001). This 
notion of responsibility is linked to the wider discourse in the government policy on 
promoting a 'balance' between rights and responsibilities within the lifelong learning 
agenda: in so far as the government makes opportunities available, individuals have a 
responsibility to take them up. Rose (1992) has pointed out that liberal governments have 
always been concerned with 'internalising their authority in citizens through inspiring, 
encouraging and augmenting programmes and techniques that will simultaneously 
'autonomize' and 'responsibilize' subjects' (162).
Colley and Hodkinson (2001), in their analysis of the Social Exclusion Unit's report 
Bridging the Gap (1999), have argued that this report 'locates the causes of social 
exclusion in the deficits of individuals, and aggregates those individuals as generalised, 
and pathologised, social groupings' (342). Mizen (2003) has claimed that New Labour's 
'progressive competitiveness' in policy is likely to exacerbate the problems young people 
face, whereby 'responsibility for poor educational outcomes, unemployment, low-quality 
work, meagre earnings, marginality to the social security system, and so on, is further 
shifted on to the young themselves' (472). Not only is the pay-off for equality of 
opportunity personal responsibility, but self-responsibility means that the government need 
not acknowledge trenchant structural inequalities (Lister, 2001). Thus, the issue of how to 
deal with structural change in society is being transformed into the personal troubles of 
those individuals without skills. Non-participation in learning becomes located within the 
individual, where the choice is to learn or be excluded, and where exclusion will be your 
own fault (Field, 2000). Lister has argued:
'The goal remains the more limited one of raising the social floor and 
promoting equality of opportunity rather than addressing wider 
inequalities.....On the one hand the privileged can continue to buy their
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children a preferential start in the meritocratic race; on the other hand the 
poverty of those who fail to succeed, despite the opportunities opened up, is 
likely to be legitimated by a culture of meritocracy.' (Lister, 2001, 438)
Another main criticism of the government's position is that the market appears to give 
greater autonomy whilst in fact reinforcing inequalities and advantaging some people over 
others, reproducing a social and technical division of labour along class lines (Ball, 1994). 
The new market economy and the middle-class policing of class boundaries has not only 
exacerbated the distinctions of class but has reinforced educational segregation based on 
class and ethnic divisions (Gewirtz et al. 1995). Hutton (1995) has argued that rather than 
offering opportunities for all, education exacerbates rather than eliminates class divisions, 
and that in the 1990s, inequalities had risen in Britain faster than in any other western 
state. Tomlinson (2001) has argued that whilst the results of market competition benefited 
the middle-class and aspiring groups, it perpetuated a divided and divisive education 
system, despite the rhetoric of inclusion. In both secondary and tertiary education, for 
example, the disparity between the policy rhetoric around access to education and 
individual choice, and how access and choice actually manifest themselves in practice, 
continues to grow. Black people, for example, who have proportionally lower socio- 
economic standing than white people, are much more likely to follow a vocational path, 
and enter government training and work experience programmes in disproportionate 
numbers (Mizen, 2003, 471). Moreover, it has been shown that class mobility and status 
determined by merit are limited and that people from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
have to demonstrate greater 'merit' to enter desirable class positions (Goldthorpe, 1997). 
Despite this, the higher achievements of those from higher socio-economic groups and the 
ensuing rewards are - to some extent at least - rationalised and validated by the 'myth of 
meritocracy'. It would seem therefore, that universalistic education policies which have as 
their unreserved objective equality of opportunity, sit uncomfortably alongside the 
continued 'segregated' take-up of education along class and ethnic lines.
The increasing polarisation between middle-class and working-class schools, 'elite' and 
new universities, and academic and vocational education, is in tandem with the 
introduction of markets in education which increasingly place an emphasis on wealth -
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again implicating class and race differentiation - as opposed to a person's abilities and 
motivations. This has been further exacerbated by the expectation that institutions function 
according to a competitive market logic within a state system which utilises national 
performance criteria, and distributes funding according to the merit and status of 
institutions, and on a per capita basis. This has created a financial relationship between 
user and provider and a vying for potential students; as such, the survival of educational 
establishments depends largely on their ability to attract enough and the right kind of 
students (Burchell, 1993).
PART TWO: POLICY FINDINGS 
Background to the Selected Policy Documents
The Kennedy Report (June 1997) - not a report scrutinised here - was important in that it 
was the first in a series of reports providing recommendations for further education in the 
UK. It was set up to consider widening participation in further education and emphasised 
the importance of post-16 education in creating a 'self-perpetuating learning society' 
(FEFC, 1997, 25). This report was followed in September by a report of the National 
Advisory Group for Continuing Education and Lifelong Learning (NAGfCELL), set up by 
the Labour government in 1997 and chaired by Bob Fryer, entitled Learning for the 
Twenty-First Century (Fryer, 1997). The report's main aim was to make the case for the 
transformation of culture and the development of a culture of lifelong learning to achieve 
a 'Learning Age' in Britain. It also asserted that proposals for lifelong learning should be 
in tandem with the new proposals for learning in schools, as set out in the White Paper 
Excellence in Schools (1997). Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) was an 
advisory report for a Green Paper called The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998) which built on 
the idea of creating a 'culture of learning' and focused largely on future policy strategies 
for lifelong learning and education. Four main policy drivers which aim to promote the 
UK as a viable economic competitor may be identified within these documents - standards 
and qualifications, relevance and curricula, efficiency and quality, and participation and 
inclusion (Ainley and Bailey, 2000). These have been incorporated into four major
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government lifelong learning initiatives - the New Deal for young people, the University 
for Industry (later to be taken up in the White Paper Learning to Succeed, DfEE, 1999), 
pilots for Individual Learning Accounts, and the proposals for the National Grid for 
Learning. Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) and The Learning Age 
(DfEE, 1998) are similar in that they are both concerned with revealing the extent of the 
problems of inequity and disadvantage in British society. Whilst these are documents 
which are idealistic in tone, and reveal the myriad of problems of inequity and 
disadvantages in British society, Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 1999) is a policy primarily 
concerned with pushing for reform; its aim is to drive up standards and qualifications, and 
emphasise the link between qualifications, the workplace and the broader economy. I turn 
now to the various preoccupations of these policy documents, and the various discourses 
underlying these.
Instilling a culture of learning
As mentioned above, the Labour Government has put forward economic competitiveness 
and social inclusion as central to education policy goals. The policy documents support 
these general discourses by focussing on economic competitiveness, social inclusion and 
personal development as the core and organisatory principles around which lifelong 
learning should be built. The main assumption of all the three policy documents is that 
education and learning are markers of a 'good' society in so far as they give the dual 
benefits of greater potential for economic competitiveness and of creating happier, self- 
fulfilled individuals (see Shackleton 1992, Murphy, 1993, Keep and Mayhew, 1998 for 
critiques of this position). Lifelong learning is presented in the policy documents as being 
about developing one's own potential as a social citizen in both economic and personal 
terms, and developing the skills, knowledge and understanding that are essential for 
employability and fulfilment. Indeed, in the words of Tony Blair MP, 'education is the 
best economic policy we have' (DfEE, 1998, 9). The modernist imperative of education 
extends outwards from the individual to the nation, and indeed, spans all of life: learning 
serves the nation in terms of its position in the global market and in ensuring social 
cohesion, and is also the exclusive gateway to achieving individual potential, sovereignty,
self-empowerment and success. As such, the function of education is built around the 
liberal assumption that it can compensate for all of society (Brown et al. 1997).
The main focus of the policy documents involves creating a 'culture of learning' which 
should be instilled into the population: 'Our vision is to build a new culture of learning 
which will underpin national competitiveness and personal prosperity, encourage 
creativity and innovation and help build a cohesive society' (DfEE, 1999, 6). This vision 
is built on the following principles:
  investing in learning to benefit everyone
  lifting barriers to learning
  putting people first
  sharing responsibility with employers, employees and the community
  achieving world class standards and value for money
  working together as the key to success (DfEE, 1999, 6).
The most important task is for the Government to set out a strategic framework for the 
promotion of lifelong learning and to win widespread support for it. Learning for the 
Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) refers to this as a 'revolution of attitudes' which should 
signal the beginning of a shift towards a greater sharing of the responsibility for lifelong 
learning between individuals, employers and the state. The main prerequisite to a 
successful lifelong learning strategy, claim the reports, is the development of a positive 
attitude to learning.
'The biggest change of all will be required in the attitudes of individuals and 
groups, particularly amongst those who are not currently engaged in lifelong 
learning activities, who demonstrate no inclination to become involved, or 
enjoy few opportunities to develop their abilities, interests or capacities 
through learning.' (Fryer, 1997, 4)
To this end, the focus should be on 'people before structures' (Fryer, 1997, 29), on the 
learners themselves, rather than on the requirements of institutions and organisations, and 
on ways to make it easier for them to take up and continue lifelong learning: 'A culture of
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lifelong learning can act as a resource in the midst of change, helping people both to cope 
with change and in their strivings to shape it to their own devices, as active citizens' 
(Fryer, 1997, 3).
Learning as an investment for reward
The notion of learning as an investment for reward is produced and perpetuated by the 
discourses of economic competitiveness, social inclusion, and the related discourses of the 
value of education, individual responsibility and equality of opportunity via lifelong 
learning. The beneficiaries of such investment in learning are the economy, the person, 
and indeed, all of society. In economic terms, the policy documents claim, global forces 
are exerting enormous influences over people's daily lives, and global competition and the 
liberalisation of markets are causing some industries to shrink whilst others expand (Fryer, 
1997). The principles of lifelong learning provide a rationale for extending learning 
opportunities throughout the lifespan and to a wide range of participants. Developing the 
kind of flexibility and responsiveness from which many people and not just the few can 
benefit, requires, 'a shift from the crude, entirely market-driven and sometimes 
threatening rhetoric, with its implied lack of alternatives or choice for both individuals and 
companies... ..[to] profound changes in our culture and our approach to the world of work' 
(Fryer, 1997, 13). In creating a change in attitudes towards learning, in the first instance a 
link between learning and a strong economy is emphasised. This link underpins the 
government discourse of economic efficiency for national competition. The emphasis is 
on the development of a culture of lifelong learning and the nurturing of the 'intellectual 
capital which is now at the centre of a nation's competitive strength' (DfEE, 1998, 10) 
through which we will 'learn to succeed' and modernise for a 'new Britain'.
'Learning is the key to prosperity - for each of us as individuals, as well as for 
the nation as a whole. Investment in human capital will be the foundation of 
success in the knowledge-based global economy of the twenty-first century. 
This is why the government has put learning at the heart of its ambition. Our 
first policy paper addressed school standards. This Green Paper sets out for 
consultation how learning throughout life will build human capital by 
encouraging the acquisition of knowledge and skills and emphasising
creativity and imagination. The fostering of an enquiring mind and the love of 
learning are essential to our future success.' (Foreword by David Blunkett, 
DflEE, 1998,7)
Learning for the Twenty-first Century, for example, claims that it is a mistake to equate 
learning or achievement with qualifications alone, and lifelong learning - which 
encompasses everything from basic literacy to advanced scholarship - 'is what people do 
when they want to make sense of experience'; it also warns against complacency, and 'the 
earnest, yet banal, view that education is fundamentally a 'good thing' or the assertion that 
there is a simple and self-evident link between educational attainment and prosperity' 
(Fryer, 1997,2).
In the second instance, learning not only benefits the economy but also benefits society 
generally, and is key in fostering 'social cohesion, belonging, responsibility and identity' 
(DfEE, 1998, 11). Intrinsic to this idea is that individuals, via their own personal 
development through learning, have a stake in forging a better society:
'It makes ours a civilised society, develops the spiritual side of our lives and 
promotes active citizenship. Learning enables people to play a full part in their 
community. It strengthens the family, the neighbourhood and consequently the 
nation.'(DfEE, 1998,7)
The discourse of self-responsibility is significant. Individuals are not only urged to 
'increasingly accept more control over the development of their own learning throughout 
life' (Fryer, 1997, 4), but also to use learning as a resource to affect change more broadly. 
In this sense, learning may involve an increase of skills, knowledge and understanding, as 
well as values and the capacity to reflect:
'If people and organisations are to influence economic and industrial change 
as well as respond to it, they need a range of skills, capacities and outlooks 
which will enable them to exercise choice for themselves. Lifelong learning 
can help people to seize new opportunities, engage critically with change and 
shape their worlds by asserting some ownership and direction over their lives, 
in work and beyond.' (Fryer, 1997, 12)
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The link between education and personal development draws on the liberal idea of the 
'unfinished' self. It is underpinned by the notion that the person is continuously 
developing and in the process of realising his or her self-potential, whereby effective 
learning 'leads to change, development and a desire to learn more....' (Campaign for 
Learning cited in Fryer, 1997, 16).
'The development of a culture of learning will help to build a united society, 
assist in the creation of personal independence, and encourage our creativity 
and innovation. Learning builds self-confidence and independence... Learning 
offers excitement and the opportunity for discovery. It stimulates enquiring 
minds and nourishes our souls. It takes us in directions we never expected, 
sometimes changing our lives.' (DfEE, 1998, 10)
Learning as such has multifarious advantages, and no disadvantages: it is multi-functional, 
and is implicated in the nation's civility, civic participation, family cohesion, as well as a 
person's spirituality, independence and creativity, and very zest for life. Learning for the 
Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) has described lifelong learning thus:
'[It] should indicate the role of lifelong learning in maintaining the country's 
competitiveness in a global economy and in the development of new skills, 
dignity, confidence and opportunities for all its people. It should also explain 
the contribution of lifelong learning in securing greater social cohesion in this 
country (Fryer, 1997, 4)..... Lifelong learning should be for all aspects of life 
and meet a variety of needs and objectives. It should foster personal and 
collective development, stimulate achievement, encourage creativity, provide 
and enhance skills, contribute to the enlargement of knowledge itself, enhance 
cultural and leisure pursuits and underpin citizenship and independent living. ' 
(Fryer, 1997, 29, my italics)
The responsibility of the individual to learn
The notion of the individual's responsibility to learn is supported by the discourse of 
individual responsibility. The creation of a culture of learning is presented in the policy 
documents as involving both individual choice for individuals, as well as an imperative. 
From the government's perspective, the imperative for learning arises out of the 
recognition that we are now in a 'new age' of information and global competition in which
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'familiar certainties and old ways of doing things are disappearing' (DfEE, 1998, 9). The 
individual has to recognise that 'a job for life' is a thing of the past (Fryer, 1997, 5) and 
that success and well-being is dependent on continuously upgrading skills. Within this 
notion of economic and personal progress the needs of the nation and the individual are 
collapsed:
'If people are not to be locked into particular jobs with limited life-chances, 
risking being marooned by change or denied scope for improvement, they 
need the generic, core and transferable skills which will strengthen their 
position in the marketplace. The aim should be to make people less vulnerable, 
at the same time as enhancing the capacities and competitiveness of businesses 
and other organisations. In this way we can develop the kinds of 
responsiveness and flexibility in employment from which the many and not 
just the few can benefit.' (Fryer, 1997, 12)
The discourse of the responsibility of the person to learn produces the idea that those who 
do not learn will be responsible for perpetuating the 'learning divide', with potentially 
negative consequences for British society. The 'uneducated' pose a particular risk:
'Social cohesion, whereby a sense of solidarity and common interest binds a 
healthy society, is best engendered by education. As the economic need for a 
more highly educated and skilled workforce increases, the undereducated will 
fall even further behind than they are now. We cannot risk increasing the gap 
between those with high skills, and those with low skills - or none at all. The 
uneducated will become disaffected and disenfranchised. Widespread 
alienation poses a threat to the stability of society. Education is not cheap, but 
ignorance carries high social and economic costs.' (Committee of Vice- 
Chancellors and Principals, CVCP, 1996, Our Universities Our Futures, cited 
in Fryer, 1997, 14)
One might argue that the perpetuation of the responsibility for learning discourse is an 
attempt by the government to reconcile the interests of the individual with the interests of 
the state. Both parties are represented as beneficiaries and as the ultimate 'winners' of the 
investment in learning: the state benefits in so far as a skilled and educated nation makes 
Britain a viable economic competitor, and the individual benefits in that greater personal 
economic prosperity or a higher level of personal/spiritual development can be expected.
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Participation in lifelong learning becomes obligatory in the sense that the person, 
regardless of background or motivation, is expected to conform to this liberal principle of 
education as a kind of public duty to both self and state (see Tight 1998b; Coffield 1999), 
and that the person who does not take up the opportunities on offer will be 'left behind'. 
This supports Peters' (1996) idea that the emphasis on the individual's right and ability to 
choose occurs within the logic of government.
The discourse of the responsibility of the individual to learn is linked to the government's 
concern with promoting a balance between rights and responsibilities amongst individuals 
(evident, for example, in its Education for Citizenship policy); as we have seen earlier in 
this chapter, in so far as the government makes opportunities available, individuals have a 
responsibility to make the most of them. The selected policy documents acknowledge that 
structural mechanisms disadvantage some groups of people, and concede that barriers to 
access and participation have to be eliminated before equality of opportunity can be 
achieved. However, whilst acknowledging the responsibility of the government, 
employers, providers and communities to work in partnership towards eradicating inequity 
and providing equality of opportunity, the policies nevertheless accentuate the role of 
individuals in directing their own learning. The following quote illustrates this directive:
'The focus of policy and practice should be learners themselves and the 
quality and range of learning opportunities made available to them. This 
would shift attention away from structures and institutions, which should be 
regarded as more or less efficient mechanisms for the delivery of 
demonstrably high quality learning in their given spheres.' (DfEE, 1997, 29)
The emphasis in the above quote is on the learning opportunity and the availability of 
high quality education, and the efficient mechanisms which put these in place. Once 
everything is 'in place', and the government and providers of education have removed all 
structural obstacles, learning can be instilled and transformation on the level of society, 
the economy and the individual can occur. As such, responsibility for participation in 
education, knowledge of the opportunities available, and personal aspirations invariably 
fall back on the individual. The document Learning to Succeed states:
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'In setting the new framework, we look to individuals to take responsibility for 
their own future assisted by intensive advice and support, to seek opportunities 
to improve their knowledge, understanding and skills; and to make their own 
investment in personal success.' (DfEE, 1999, 15)
The key to societal and individual success, as discussed above, ultimately lies in the 
ability of the human mind to learn, to take personal responsibility for learning, and so to 
reap the rewards of investment in learning. This is a notion which is produced by the 
discourse of individual agency. Whilst this notion places an emphasis on the individual's 
power to make autonomous choices, it simultaneously overlooks the fundamental role the 
state has in defining the parameters of learning which confines those choices within the 
discourse of national economic competitiveness. This is the inherent contradiction 
between the discourse of the economy and the discourse of the individual. The needs of 
the individual are subsumed within the discourses of economic efficiency and social 
justice which are perpetuated by the state, and whilst depicting the individual as a 
sovereign entity capable of making independent choices, the onus of responsibility is 
actually placed firmly on the individual to take up the opportunities available, and to act as 
the vehicle for overcoming inequality and putting society to right. This responsibility is 
the imperative, or the 'duty' of the individual, where those who do not play by the rules of 
the game will be 'left behind': People are free to make choices, yet are compelled to do so 
within the framework set out by government, and on pain of being 'left behind'. The 
'wrong' choices therefore make people responsible for their own exclusion. Failure to 
participate, ignorance of opportunities available and low aspirations falls back on the 
individual, and has resulted in 'victim-blaming' (Tight, 1998a).
Inequity in society
This theme draws on the discourse of social inclusion, and is concerned with the ways in 
which the selected policies represent ideas and categories with regard to exclusion and 
inclusion. It ties in closely with concepts of personhood discussed later in this chapter. 
The documents acknowledge that there are widening social and economic inequalities, 
many of which are 'multiple and mutually reinforcing, amounting to compound forms of 
exclusion on the one hand, and the emergence of a virtual 'super class' of privilege on the
other' (Fryer, 1997, 14). The consequences of such a 'noticeable and dangerous 'learning 
divide' is that....'On the one hand, there are those who are already well qualified and who 
continue to be learners throughout life. On the other hand, there are those who either leave 
education largely unqualified or who neither engage in learning as adults, nor intend to do 
so in the future' (Fryer, 1997, 15). The claim is that there is too much focus on successful 
learners, and too little support for those who lack confidence or believe that education is 
not for them. The Dearing and Kennedy Reports confirm this, stating that the success of 
policies on widening and increasing participation and achievement in learning was 
'mainly in providing opportunities for those who have already achieved or continue to do 
so' (Kennedy Report cited in Fryer, 1997, 15).
The main factors affecting participation in education are identified as 'early school 
leaving, poverty, lack of qualifications and skills, low status, lack of self-esteem and 
powerlessness' (Fryer, 1997, 16). 80% of people who say they have not participated in 
learning since school believe that it is unlikely that they will do so in the future (Sargant et 
al. cited in Fryer, 1997, 15). Moreover, one study showed that whilst 80% of 18 year olds 
from senior managerial and professional backgrounds went into higher education, only 
10% from unskilled backgrounds did so (Dearing cited in Fryer, 1997, 15). Another study 
cited lists a multitude of negative affects people with poor literacy and numeracy skills 
may suffer; apart from a greater likelihood of unemployment or low earning capacity, they 
are also more likely to be in 'poor health or suffer from depression and take less part in 
community groups and voting in elections' (Basic Skills Agency cited in Fryer, 1997, 15).
Learning is described as a means of harnessing the potential talent of young people 
otherwise 'wasted in a vicious circle of under-achievement, self-deprecation, and petty 
crime'. This is a discourse of the dangers of uneducated individuals. The greatest 
challenge, therefore, is to break the cycle of poverty 'which blights so many communities 
and widens income inequality' (DfEE, 1998, 11), and to change the culture in the many 
homes and workplaces where learning is not seen as having any relevance (DfEE, 1998, 
13). Learning has the potential of contributing to 'social cohesion, [and fostering] a sense 
of belonging, responsibility and identity' (DfEE, 1998, 11), but because attitudes are so
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deeply entrenched, creating a culture of learning requires a 'quiet and sustained revolution 
in aspiration and achievement' (DfEE, 1998, 13).
The tone of the selected policy documents displays an unwavering commitment to 
modernist principles, and asserts that structural inequalities are the main barriers to the 
take-up of education and to learning. The policies make the assumption that structural 
problems can be overcome, and that people can be relatively easily motivated to learn. 
They suggest that once structural barriers are removed and greater access to education 
becomes available, this will automatically create favourable attitudes to learning, and that 
people will use the resources available to them to bring about positive change in their 
lives. An irreprehensible vision of the future is proclaimed; the discourse is universalistic 
and therefore potentially inclusive of all people and all difference.
Agency and the power to effect change
This theme is constructed from the discourse of individual responsibility, as well as the 
related discourse of the value of education, and connects with aspects of learning as an 
investment for reward and the responsibility of the individual to learn. One of the 
implications of responsibility is that individual responsibility entails agency. I have argued 
elsewhere in this chapter that people effectively have 'agency without choice' in that 
choices are impinged upon by the broader economic remit of government. The policies 
represent agency and individual responsibility in such a way that the interests of the 
individual and the state are not necessarily linked, and conceivably at odds with each 
other. In this scenario, the state is represented as inherently flexible and society as in need 
of improvement; the individual, conversely, is cast in a role which makes him or her both 
responsible for changing society, and also therefore accountable for society. This interplay 
between society and the individual may be summed up in the following quote:
'The personal and social damage inflicted by inequality, social exclusion and 
restricted opportunity is now widely recognised. Lifelong learning should 
 epresent a resource for people, and whole societies, to help them identify such 
inequalities, probe their. origins and begin to challenge them, using skills,
r
information and knowledge to achieve change. Learning alone cannot abolish 
inequality and social divisions, but it can make a real contribution to 
combating them, not least by eliminating the ways in which social exclusion is 
reinforced through the very processes and outcomes of education and 
training.' (Fryer, 1997, 16)
Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) calls upon individuals to use their 
individual potential to bring about a more equitable and socially just society: 'Lifelong 
learning can help people to seize new opportunities, engage critically with change and 
shape their worlds by asserting some ownership and direction over their own lives, in 
work and beyond, through both individual and collective activity' (12). Terms and phrases 
such as 'critical reflection', 'creative initiative', 'new forms of participation in polities' are 
used, as well as 'self-activity, initiative and pluralism', and the suggestion is that 
democracy can be strengthened through participation in lifelong learning (Fryer, 1997, 
17). The individual's ability to challenge and transform the government's mistakes is 
underpinned by the idea that critical thinking and political activity are embedded within 
lifelong learning, and that the individual has the ability to exercise choice, and to think and 
act 'outside the box'.
Notions of transformation and the possibility of'doing things differently' have interesting 
implications for understandings of social capital explored in Chapter One through the 
work of Bourdieu. Bourdieu's theories do not sit easily with the policy rhetoric. According 
to Bourdieu, a person's habitus is an amalgamation of dispositions, attitudes, perceptions 
and practices which are unconsciously oriented but which nevertheless appear consistent 
and incline the person to act in particular ways. Practice occurs in the relation between 
habitus and a particular social context or field, such as for example, education. This 
relation is determined by those able to act within a specific field, where this depends on 
the person's habitus and access to cultural or economic capital. In this view, people are to 
a large extent bound to their social position: whereas for some this position is experienced 
as boundless possibility, for others the habitus is limiting in so far as they lack the 
required social capital to belong to the privileged class. The policy assumes that people are 
autonomous rational individuals who are capable of taking constructive measures to free
themselves from the structural shackles which have prevented them from being self- 
directed. As such, the policy presents a vision of society in which capital is convertible, 
and that in their bid for social mobility, any constraints on people can be relatively easily 
overcome by the efforts of people themselves. Indeed, the onus of responsibility to 
overcome their own habitus is especially - rather than exceptionally - on those people the 
policy describes as belonging to under-represented groups, such as the young 
'disadvantaged' or people with learning difficulties. In other words, it is effectively those 
who are most disadvantaged through structural mechanisms who are expected to change 
themselves and to 'get over' what ever is bothering them, and indeed, are also by 
extension ascribed the power to change society itself.
Although encouraging reflexivity, the government, as Greener (2002) has argued, does not 
want any kind of reflexivity, but a 'reflexivity that accepts the existing rules of the game 
and attempts to make the best of them, rather than attempting to challenge the rules 
themselves' (2002, 699). It is therefore likely that the government does not actually expect 
people to 'think outside the box' and challenge the government's way of doing things, 
because people, it is assumed, will simply see it as in their interests to make the best of the 
situation as it is presented to them. This points to the crucial issue of what is actually 
meant by autonomy or independent choice, and whether creativity, critical thinking and 
political activity, and any subsequent transformation within society, must concur with the 
dominant state paradigm. Most significantly, it raises the question of what this says about 
the (de)politicisation of the individual. It seems that, within the government's framework 
of universalism which encompasses the discourse of economic efficiency as well as the 
concepts of universal personhood and equality of opportunity, the notion of'resistance' or 
'emancipation' from dominant or universalistic state narratives holds little weight and can 
only bring about transformation and change at a superficial level. It may therefore only 
make sense to talk about 'resistance' which challenges the universalist discourse, that is to 
say, 'the rules of the game', itself.
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Concepts of personhood
This section examines how the selected policy documents construct their subjects, and 
who is excluded by these constructions. Whilst the documents were to a large extent 
thematically similar, their conceptualisations of personhood revealed both similarities and 
differences. Despite the general tendency within all the documents to produce the person 
as rational and autonomous, underpinned by the discourses of individualism and 
individual responsibility discussed in Part One, there was a marked difference between 
how the two earlier policy documents - Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 
1997) and The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998) - and the most recent one, Learning to Succeed 
(DfEE, 1999), constructed personhood. This is despite little more than a year between the 
latter two documents (February 1998 to June 1999).
Indeed, an overview of education policy over the last two decades reveals that although 
the proposition of 'education for all' has remained central to education policy in Britain 
since the mid-1980s (see DES, 1985; Fryer, 1997; DfEE, 1998; DfEE, 1999), there has 
been a shift away from the culturally relativist position on personhood evident in the 
policies of the 1980s (see DES, 1981; DES, 1985), which referred to particular racial and 
cultural groups as encapsulating a definitive substantive content (for critiques see Rattansi, 
1992; Asad, 1993), towards an ever more individualistic discourse of personhood in which 
the concepts of race, ethnicity and culture have all but disappeared. Education policies 
explicitly concerned with race and minority issues ceased after 1988, and race became 
what Apple (1999) has referred to as an 'absent presence' (12). In recent policy therefore, 
the individual has been conceptualised as culturally neutral, and differences between 
people are constituted largely in terms of external socio-economic factors which can be 
overcome.
The two earlier documents (Fryer, 1997; DfEE, 1998) discussed here may be described as 
representing a 'halfway house' in the transition from the endorsement of culturally 
relativistic concepts of personhood, evident in the education policies of the 1980s (see 
DES, 1981; DES, 1985), to a wholly individualistic concept of personhood, evident in the
later policy Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 1999). The key point is that within all the policy 
documents the individual is portrayed as an autotelic self in which the person can be 
understood as having or being an end or purpose in him or herself. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the discourses and arguments concerning individual responsibility and 
the idea that the individual has the power to 'empower' him or herself. Within this concept 
of personhood, individuals have the capability to become socially mobile and escape their 
current circumstances through the take-up of educational opportunities, which are 
represented as equally accessible to all. The policy presents a vision of the individual able 
to increase productivity as well as develop personally through ever more learning, training 
and hard work, and so to move ever closer to a unique and 'complete' self. This view of 
the individual combines elements of both economic and political liberalism in which the 
person is understood as de-contextualised and sovereign, as well as rational and utility- 
maximising. This 'individualist' notion of the person reflects an Enlightenment model of 
the self, representing the dominant discourse around personhood in the social sciences and 
the public sphere.
As we have seen, alongside the general policy conceptualisation of the person as 
essentially individualistic in the earlier documents Learning for the Twenty-first Century 
(Fryer, 1997) and The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998), are references to people as belonging 
to distinctive sub-categories within the meta-group of 'under-represented' people. These 
policies claim that policy development and lifelong learning strategies need to be targeted 
at particular under-represented groups and directed towards developing learning 
aspirations and confidence in these groups. Thus, universalistic notions sit comfortably 
alongside the particularisms of some socially designated groups. Under-represented 
groups mentioned in Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) include the 
following:
  Disaffected young adults, notably young men: more than 10% between 16 and 25 
experience high levels of disaffection and exclusion, remaining outside the labour 
market, education and training.
  Older people: participation of people over 65 is low in adult education programmes,
and people over 50 are not entitled to student loans. Medical evidence shows that 
continued mental activities can diminish the risk of developing Alzheimer's disease, 
and there is a 'therapeutic benefit of local classes to isolated, lonely and under- 
confident older people' (Fryer, 1997, 62).
  People with learning difficulties and/or disabilities: 'Adopting inclusive learning as a 
strategy means that institutions should avoid "the viewpoint which locates the 
difficulty or deficit with the student and focus instead on the capacity of the 
educational institution to understand and respond to the learner's requirement" (Fryer, 
1997, 63).
  Minority ethnic and linguistic groups. Black people get less opportunity to study at 
their employers expense, whilst older people from Black and Asian communities are 
especially disadvantaged, and 500,000 people for whom English is a second language 
experience particular difficulties (Basic Skills Agency cited in Fryer, 1997, 63-64).
  Prisoners and ex-offenders.
  Unskilled manual workers, part-time and temporary workers, people without 
qualifications, unemployed people.
  Some groups of women - notably lone parents, and those on the lowest incomes, and 
those living in remote or isolated areas.
  People with literacy and/or numeracy difficulties (Fryer, 1997, 16).
A single paragraph in Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) captures the 
myriad of obstacles experienced by various categories of people traditionally 
marginalised, where other people's attitudes, the problem of stairs, and institutional 
regulations are all smoothly juxtaposed in a few short sentences:
'Older people often find the modern drive for certification gets in the way. 
Unemployed people are regularly deterred by the rigid application of benefit 
rules. Too often, Black and Asian people still experience institutional and 
personal racism. Other people's attitudes are a major barrier for people with 
learning difficulties; stairs too often limit choices for people in wheelchairs; 
and those with learning difficulties are too often confronted by a lack of 
suitable facilities or properly trained staff.' (Fryer, 1997, 20)
Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) recognises that many black and Asian 
people are now second and third generation citizens in Britain, that this has implications 
for the need to recognise different racial and ethnic cultures, religions, traditions and 
values, and that this change should be reflected in provision for lifelong learning. The 
report makes general reference to black and Asian people, whereas The Learning Age 
(DfEE, 1998) distinguishes between different groups of black and Asian people, and 
acknowledges that there is a need to identify reasons why some people such as 
Bangladeshi women and Afro-Caribbean men, as well as women in certain academic 
disciplines remain under-represented (DfEE, 1998, 51). This reflects research which has 
pointed to the 'under-achievement' of working-class African Caribbean boys (Arnot et al, 
1999) - constituting a 'moral panic' in the late 1990s and referred to as a crisis in 
masculinity (Lucey and Walkerdine, 1999) - and later research findings which showed that 
Bangladeshi (and Pakistani) women and African Caribbean men were less likely to be 
studying in university (Social Trends 30, 2000: 56 cited in Tomlinson, 2001, 147). It does 
not, however, take account of data which shows that Asian boys and girls from working- 
class backgrounds tended to do better than their white and African Caribbean counterparts 
at A level (Arnot et al, 1999), and that people from ethnic minorities accounted for 13 per 
cent of students in Higher Education - where most of these were Indian or Chinese - in 
comparison to 9 per cent of the total population; significantly, however, all minority 
people were more likely to be studying at 'new' rather than 'old' universities (Social 
Trends 30, 2000: 56 cited in Tomlinson, 2001, 147).
There is limited information about why the named groups are particularly disadvantaged, 
and what might be undertaken - short of 'creating a culture of learning' - to rectify the 
problems. What is most striking about the policy conceptualisations of personhood, 
however, is that readers of the policy may be led to believe that there is something 
distinctive about being 'Asian', 'black', 'Bangladeshi' or 'Afro-Caribbean' which leads 
to their under-representation within the education system, rather than it being a problem of 
discrimination, institutional racism, cultural capital, etc. A similar observation may be 
made of other under-represented groups such as ex-offenders, lone parents, old people or 
people with learning difficulties. In all cases, references to such categorisations - 
within the broader context of the policies in which these people are on the 'wrong' side of 
the learning divide and lack qualifications and skills - carry with them meanings such as 
disadvantage, dependency and low-self-expectation, 'poverty, low status, lack of self- 
esteem and powerlessness' (Fryer, 1997, 16).
A word search of the later document Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 1999) revealed that 
there was a dearth of any reference to established categories of personhood, apart from 
'young people'. This document makes virtually no reference to ethnic minority groups. A 
word search was done for 'black', 'Asian', 'ethnic minority/minorities', for which no 
results were obtained. The words 'race', 'disability' and 'gender' produced one result 
where this was in the context of'a targeted action plan setting out the key challenges and 
objectives covering post-16 education and training' which would amongst other things, 
involve 'widening access particularly for those people who face disadvantage in the labour 
market because of their race, disability, gender or age' (DfEE, 1999, 28). In contrast to 
this, the category 'young people' was referred to 773 times. The phrase 'older people' was 
referred to 5 times. The phrase 'learning difficulties' appeared 5 times, 'disabilities' was 
found 10 times, and 'disabled' 3 times. The term 'culture' gave 4 results in the context of 
a new of lifelong 'culture of learning', and one result was obtained for 'ethnic groups', 
which appeared in the appendix and referred to the need to assess the impact of new 
arrangements on particular ethnic groups (DfEE, 1999, 76). The words 'poverty', 'poor' 
and 'class' yielded no results in the context of persons.
People as 'disadvantaged' were referred to 11 times, and the term 'disadvantage' was 
applied to people's situations 5 times. Here are some examples of how Learning to 
Succeed (DfEE, 1999) used the term: 'promoting equality of opportunity and ensuring that 
the needs of the most disadvantaged in the labour market are best met' (DfEE, 1999, 24); 
'ensure targeted support for the socially disadvantaged' (DfEE, 1999, 34) 'target more 
specific help on the most disadvantaged where specific financial obstacles act as a real 
barrier to participation (DfEE, 1999, 50). The 'disadvantaged' were also invariably 
juxtaposed alongside other 'types' of disadvantage, for example: 'the socially 
disadvantaged or those who otherwise lack confidence' (DfEE, 1999, 58); 'socially
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disadvantaged and disabled people' (DfEE, 1999, 58); the voluntary sector as 
'understanding the needs of the disadvantaged and excluded' (DfEE, 1999, 40); 
'disadvantaged young people and helping those at most risk of dropping out' (DfEE, 1999, 
42); the system as 'failing a significant section of the community, often the most 
vulnerable and disadvantaged' (DfEE, 1999, 16). The all-encompassing use of the term is 
summed up in the policy appendix, which states that in measuring success, and identifying 
areas for improvement 'we will also ensure commitment to equal opportunities. This will 
include systematic identification, assessment and evaluation.....to address significant 
underachievement by women, men, people from different racial backgrounds, disabled 
people, or any minority or disadvantaged group' (DfEE, 1999, 77). Within the context of 
the discourse of individual responsibility discussed in Part One, disadvantage may be 
understood as deficit or disease which is located within the* individual (see Rose, 1992).
The later policy de-categorises, and therefore too, universalises and neutralises the 
individual, and any differences which might exist between people are constructed in terms 
of structural differences. It is significant that the only 'traditional' category of personhood 
which remains trenchant throughout the policy literature is that of learning difficulties. 
This is perhaps indicative of a general and continuing understanding of personhood in 
biological terms, as I have argued elsewhere in Chapter Six: Discussion. The policies are 
therefore far removed from the education research literature which shows that structural 
factors such as race, class and gender potentially have a profound effect on people's lives 
and that social capital is unequally distributed (Ball et al., 2000; Archer et al., 2003). The 
conceptions of personhood within the three policy documents draw attention once again to 
the dilemma highlighted in Chapter One: Theories of Personhood; namely, how to create 
an inclusive society (and concept of personhood and education policy) without resorting to 
either individualism, or essentialist categories. This dilemma will be discussed in Chapter 
Six.
As discussed in Chapter One, philosophical concepts of identity have been used in two 
fundamentally different ways, and the policy uses both these conceptions simultaneously. 
In the earlier post-1997 policies in particular, assumptions around personhood are made
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using both essentialist and postmodernist language. References to under-represented 
people are made in easily identifiable categorical terms, for example, 'minority ethnic and 
linguistic groups', 'lone mothers', 'young people', 'people with learning difficulties', 'the 
disadvantaged', which assumes that there is something 'self-same' and distinctive about 
each group, and that it has a stable and permanent core and is resistant to change. At the 
same time, whilst these groups possess distinctive features which have a fundamentally 
unchanging core character, the policy also conceptualises individuals as inherently flexible 
and adaptable, with a limitless potential for change both within themselves, and in terms 
of their potential to effect change in society as a whole. This concept reflects the 'fluid' 
postmodern position on personhood, in which identity has the potential for constant 
renewal and transformation, and can be understood as constructed through interaction with 
an 'other'.
Thus, to sum up, a convergence of essentialist, pluralist and individualist conceptions of 
self, in which the person is perceived to have agency but is also expected to have 
responsibility, is evident in policy concepts of personhood. The interplay between these 
positions in the context of theories of personhood and the interview findings are discussed 
more fully in Chapter Six.
In the next two chapters (Chapters Four and Five) I discuss the interview findings. The 
interview data comes in two parts - identity and education - where these refer to different 
sets of literature, theories of personhood and education policy respectively. The aim was 
to investigate the impact of the concepts of personhood and equity which were reflected in 
the literature (theory and policy) on the lives of the respondents and to explore similarities 
and differences between the literature and personal experience. At the time of setting up 
the interviews there was very little published literature on the subject of mixed race 
identity and in relation to the FE sector in the UK. The interview questions were therefore 
based on more general literature and public discourses around race, ethnicity, and on the 
discourses around education which were identified in the selected policy texts. Ideas 
underlying feminist philosophy, for example, that women (and many racialised and
classed people) are marginalised in society and that collective political action is required 
in working towards greater equity, were also crucial in devising the interview questions.
Chapter Four examines the interview data on identity. The interviews included questions 
on how respondents understood the term mixed race, how they defined themselves, their 
experiences of adapting in different contexts and how they felt they had changed over time 
or due to some turning-point in their lives, as well as how they felt they were seen by 
other people and their experiences of difference and discrimination. The theories, concepts 
and discourses discussed in Chapter One are used to illuminate the themes and discourses 
arising from this data. The broader arguments in relation to theories of personhood will be 
discussed in Chapter Six: Discussion.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MIXED RACE PERSONHOQD 
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I present the interview data on identity. The chapter is divided into four 
main parts which reflect the dominant themes in the interviews. These are one, general 
understandings of mixed race and concepts of self; two, respondents' views on how they 
believed they were perceived or categorised by others; three, articulations on respondents' 
identity transformations; and four, respondents communications around experiences of 
discrimination. In discussing the data, my basic premise is that knowledge is historically 
and culturally specific and that identities are socially constructed through language (eg. 
Foucault, 1972, 1979). I reject essentialism as a theory and look rather to the role of 
discourse in constructing social phenomena, ideas, etc. Therefore, respondents' references 
to essentialist, individualist or postmodernist notions of self should be understood within 
the context of the discourses which form their identities. However, the words presented 
here are not representative of 'who the respondents really are' or what they believe, but 
are articulations which reflect their own versions of reality within given moments. The 
main discourses and themes arising out of the data are discussed in relation to the theories 
of personhood and previous research on mixed race explored in Chapter One.
PART ONE: (SELF) CONCEPTS OF MIXED RACE 
Understanding/s of the term 'mixed race'
The main difficulty with the terms 'race' and 'mixed race' is that they are based on 
assumptions about their scientific validity: although it has been widely acknowledged that 
there is as much genetic variation within as between 'races', the use of the term 'race' 
nonetheless appears to legitimate and reify distinct biological categories (Miles, 1989). 
Moreover, the term 'mixed race' suggests that such an identity arises out of two pure or 
original races, a notion which has also long been discredited. Academics and researchers 
have grappled with finding the 'correct' term which can encapsulate the true mixed race
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experience. In the States, for example, multiracialism (Root, 1996; Chiong, 1998; Winters, 
2003), and biracialism (Rockquemore, 2002) have been popular terms to describe people 
of two or more racial heritages; in the UK, the term 'mixed race' has never been seriously 
challenged, although some researchers have used alternative terms such as metise(se) and 
metissage which attempt to incorporate generational, ethnic and cultural concerns 
(Ifekwunigwe, 1999).
During my fieldwork too, as discussed in the Chapter Two, concerns were raised by many 
college lecturers about the term, especially with regard to how they thought students 
would react to the term being used to describe them. In contrast to the fixation amongst 
both academic researchers and college lecturers with finding the correct term to describe 
people of mixed parentage, the respondents in my research were well acquainted with the 
term 'mixed race', and did not find it problematic or offensive. In response to the 
question. "How do you feel about the term 'mixed race'?" only two respondents expressed 
any ambivalence about the term 'mixed race', and in both cases, still used it. Ruby 
(Punjabi Indian/Irish), for example, saw the issue of mixed race as complex because she 
did not believe in the concept of race as a biological concept, and although she used the 
term, felt ambivalent about it and suggested that 'mixed origin' may be a better term. 
Danielle (English/Jamaican), too, did not like using 'race' to define herself or other 
people, but conceded:
"It's just something you have to do in order for people to know, basically to 
identify a person to know what they 're talking about - it 's a bit derogatory, 
because there are people who are not white or black, but they have to deal 
with it because they 've been born in to it. "
Despite awareness of its pejorative nature, a number of respondents said they preferred the 
term 'half-caste' to 'mixed race'. lizard and Phoenix (2001 [1993]) in research undertaken 
in 1990-1991 found that respondents viewed the term 'half-caste' as informal whilst 
'mixed race' was kept for formal use. Cathrina (Jamaican/Irish) made a distinction 
between the way she and people she knew used the term 'half-caste' and the way 'other'
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people saw it as a racist term. This suggests that the use of the term 'half-caste' may have 
been an unpremeditated form of resistance against political correctness around the term 
'race' and race issues. Cathrina said:
"I don Y use mixed race, I just use half-caste.... I've always used it, half-caste, 
some people think it's racist, but most half-caste people I know don't think it's 
racist, but other people do. Like my dad says it's not a nice word to use."
Corinne (Jamaican/Irish), on the other hand, volunteered a criticism of the term half-caste, 
perhaps because it was so common amongst her friends and she wanted to express her 
dissent:
"/ 'm happy about the term [mixed race], half-caste is like half-breed - mixed 
race to me is the nicest term. I never use the tern half-caste but now and then 
people use it and I find it hurtful."
Despite the recognition of new possibilities for self-defining as mixed race, several 
respondents expressed their bewilderment that mixed race identity had become such an 
issue and talked about ethnic monitoring and categorizing or labelling generally as 
problematic. Tania (West Indian/English) said she felt comfortable with her diversity, yet 
found the official line on identity confusing, claiming: "On forms I could tick most of the 
boxes! I don't know where I'm supposed to fit in. I feel black, white, mixed." Similarly, 
Anabel (Guyanese/Indian-White) saw ethnic monitoring as bewildering and a way of 
racially differentiating between individuals:
"// was only when I came out here, after filling in these forms and they ask 
you about ethnic background, that is when I realised how much, how big an 
issue it actually is, this whole question of identity.....it was really baffling, this 
differentiation between people."
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Bev (African (Cuban-Jamaican)/English) regarded the "simple fact that you have to state 
your race" as a form of racism because monitoring was not translated into reality, and 
there was no evidence of racial equality. Nadia (Iraqi/English) also referred to this 
'intrusion' as racist, and rejected categorisation because employers could not be trusted 
not to discriminate against people on grounds such as race, sex, age, etc. Nadia said:
"It gets ridiculous with these forms - sometimes I say 'mixed race' under other 
and sometimes I just say oh none of you business - what's the point, why are 
they asking these questions, it sort of seems racist in a way even making it an 
issue. It's a bit like when you send an application form off for a job - wouldn Y 
/'/ be much better if they didn 7 know how old you were, what sex you were, or 
what race you were or anything, you know, that you 're just a name. "
Whereas both Bev and Nadia were concerned with race equality, their broader political 
views on how such equality might be achieved - and whether society or the individual was 
responsible - were quite different. Their views are discussed later in this chapter.
Chantel (African/English) appeared to reject the obsession with playing around with 
categories and labels, in the sense of 'a word is just a word'. Chantel, who used both the 
terms 'half-caste' and 'mixed race', remarked:
"If you look up race in the dictionary it tells you what it is. It's like what is a 
jumper? Just because you don't like the word jumper doesn 't mean it's not a 
jumper. It's a jumper, it's mixed race. "
In response to the question "What does the term mixed race mean to you?", respondents 
who used the word 'two' or 'half in describing mixed race identity were defined as 
having a dual concept of mixed race, and those who used the words 'mixture' or 
'different' were categorised as having a non-dual concept of race. Of the 17 respondents - 
just under half the sample - who had a dual concept of race, only 2 respondents 
specifically said that mixed race meant having one black and one white parent, whilst 4
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further respondents used the term 'half-caste', which is traditionally used to mean 'half 
black and half white. Significantly, the remaining 11 respondents in this category said that 
a 'combination' of two races could constitute mixed race identity. However, what 
constituted a race was not consistent amongst the respondents. Corinne (Jamaican/Irish), 
for example, who as we saw above rejected the term 'half-caste', referred to a dual notion 
of race where this was defined specifically along the following lines:
"Mixed race is some kind of black and some kind of white - Indian and white, 
Chinese and white, Indian and Chinese, but Indian and black is coolie."
In the non-dual category 21 respondents, just over half the sample, defined mixed race as 
having a 'mixture of races' or 'different races'.
The key finding, therefore, is that altogether three-quarters of the sample, that is 32 
respondents, talked about mixed race identity in ways which transgressed the black/white 
binary model, and included notions of second generational, intra-continental mix, and 
intra-continental dual-minority heritage (ie. Indian and Pakistani, or Mauritian and 
Philippino). The finding reflects a shift towards the dual-ethnic minority or pluralistic 
concept of mixed race identifiable in recent academic literature (see Ifekwunigwe, 1999; 
Mahtani and Moreno, 2001; Alibhai-Brown, 2001; Olumide, 2002).
Amongst these 32 respondents, mixed race was described as referring to either race, 
culture, nationality and religion, or any combination of these. The respondents understood 
mixed race in a myriad of ways which were in no way consistent with each other. Over a 
third of these respondents talked about mixed race as being about race and culture. All 5 
respondents who described their mixed race as intra-continental used this concept. For 
Paula (Rumanian/Greek), who had grown up believing her parents came from different 
races "because my mum was very, very dark and my dad white, and my mum did things 
one way and my dad another", being mixed race was about religion and coming from 
different countries. As Ella (Burmese/Mauritian) and Soraya (English/Turkish) talked, a 
considerable amount of uncertainty became apparent about what they actually meant by
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the terms they were using. The issue of race became confused with culture, and concepts 
such as 'country', 'language' or 'religion' became aspects of race or culture. Ella said:
"It's got nothing to do with culture, if you're from two countries in Asia 
you 're one race, and from one country in African and one in Asia then you 're 
mixed race. But Caribbean and African is also mixed race, and Chinese and 
Indian, I don't know why. "
Soraya said that mixed race could be everything from coming from different continental 
regions, different religions, or languages and traditions, to the way someone looked. 
Ultimately, Soraya concluded, it was the act of self-definition itself:
[Mixed race means] "Coming from two different races. Mediterranean - 
Spain, Greece, Turkey - is a race separate from European. Part of what comes 
into your race is your religion, like Pakistani and Indian are different races. 
Cypriot-Turks and Cypriot-Greeks consider themselves different from 
mainland Turks or Greeks - they speak each other's language, and the 
traditions are identical, but a Greek is a Greek and a Turk is a Turk. I can tell 
Greeks and Turks apart. Germans and English are a different race because 
they look different - I can tell a German a mile away...I think the self- 
definition is important."
A further finding showed that all 8 second generation respondents referred to a mixture of 
races to describe mixed race identity. Nichole (3A BlackM White) and Peta (African/West 
Indian-English), for example, made reference to traditional scientific forms of 'blood 
mixing' in their assertions of "not being 100% one thing." This finding refers specifically 
to the traditional idea of race as rooted in the biological realm. The definition of mixed 
race, whilst in one sense reminiscent of hypodescent (see Root, 1996, on the US at the 
turn of the century, in which 'one-drop of black blood' made the person black) is 
interesting in so far as essential race mixes could be multiple and infinite.
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Clara (Angolan-Portuguese/Portuguese) referred to this idea of 'infinite' races when she 
said:
[Mixed race is] "People of different races - there's Asian, that's one race from 
the Indian continent, and another is Oriental, European, South American, 
White, Eskimos and Siberians... "
The findings amongst the second generation respondents reflect what David Skinner 
(2004) in a recent conference paper describes as the 'new biologism'. Skinner has argued 
that biology is increasingly being used to answer questions about 'who we are', and that 
there is an increasing willingness to think about differences between people in biological 
terms. Skinner asserts that biology itself is becoming the bridge between new self- 
concepts of identity and racial difference, and refers to the 'Roots for Real' website and 
the BBC documentary 'Motherland - A Genetic Journey' (cited in Skinner, 2004) to show 
how people use DNA testing to connect with their historical pasts.
There are two key issues here. First of all, whilst it is important to stress that the findings 
presented here are communications of ideas in a given moment and not a representation of 
the 'postmodern' position, the findings suggested a lack of satisfaction with a dualistic 
explanation for mixed race identity and indicated an ease with a concept of mixed race 
identity as pluralistic and diverse. Whilst mixed race was not necessarily seen by 
respondents in this category as a 'non-race', it was seen by many as having infinite 
possibilities in terms of the kinds of racial, cultural, national and/or religious 'mixtures' 
there could be in one person. Thus, the respondents were reflecting the notion of identities 
as socially heterogeneous and diverse, as discussed in Chapter One (see Bhabha, 1990; 
Hall, 1992). Given the number of respondents who saw race and culture as interlinked, it 
is likely that more respondents, if probed, would have explored the concept of mixed race 
further to encompass the concept of culture, nationality, religion, etc.
It is also interesting to note that a third of the sample were either second generation mixed 
race, had dual ethnic minority parentage, or same-continent parents, and as such did not fit
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the - up until very recently - official definition of mixed race people as having 'one black 
and one white parent'. As such, the self-definitions of these respondents as mixed race 
reflected the broader shift in public discourse around understandings of mixed race 
identity. The very act of defining as mixed race amongst these respondents can be 
understood as an act of individualism, and in some cases an assertion of difference, and as 
such supported the pluralist and diverse understandings of what mixed race identity meant 
to them.
The second key issue is that despite the ease with which pluralist conceptions of race, 
culture, ethnicity, etc. appeared to sit alongside each other in the respondents' conceptions 
of identity, these conceptions were nevertheless depicted as 'bounded' in themselves. That 
is to say, even where Germans were understood to constitute a separate race from English 
people, as Soraya suggested, each 'race' was understood to possess some essence which 
distinguished it from all others. Thus, notions of difference and multiplicity, even when 
taken to 'postmodern extremes', did not preclude some notion of categorisation and 
essentialism. This may be referred to as postmodernism with 'limited versatility. At the 
same time, the complexity of conceptions around mixed race indicated both a defiance of 
any possibility of any coherent form of categorisation, and so too, of any systematic 
analysis. Nor can it therefore be a viable resource for combating inequality. This issue will 
be discussed further in Chapter Six.
Whilst notions of race, culture and ethnicity were referred to in postmodern pluralistic 
terms, the respondents used discourses of cultural diversity and race essentialism to talk 
about their own identities and experiences. The concept of 'race' in these personal 
accounts appeared to be rooted in the biological realm. In the next sections I will look at 
how respondents used notions of 'race' to define themselves in a variety of contexts, in 
describing their friendships, in how they felt they changed in particular situations, and in 
how they felt their identities had evolved over time to incorporate both 'halves' of 
themselves, where this was mediated by an understanding of 'where they were from'. 
Respondents also talked about how they experienced themselves as 'raced' by others. 
These issues will be discussed later in this chapter.
Self-definition
As we have seen, respondents' articulations of understandings of mixed race were 
predominantly pluralistic, albeit described in essentialist language, where most had 
diverse conceptions around what mixed race could mean, and who could 'count' as mixed 
race. In contrast to this, there was little evidence of pluralism in the respondents' self- 
conceptions of mixed race, which were described mainly in essentialist dual-racial, as well 
as individualistic, terms. The question asked was the same each time: "What is important 
to you in how you define who you are?" This appeared to be a difficult first question for 
many respondents, but the purpose was to get responses which were not influenced by 
previous talk of 'race' or 'mixed race'. As such no prompts were given, and I allowed 
respondents time to respond to this question. The most frequent responses to the question 
were 'being mixed race' (or mixedness) and 'personality'. Almost half the sample's 
immediate and spontaneous first response to the question was "not by race" and/or "not by 
colour", and as such disavowed race and colour as dominant aspects of their selfhood. The 
main themes identified will now be discussed.
The overriding concern amongst these respondents was to be recognised for who they 
were, where this was invariably described as being seen "just as me", "just as a person", 
"for the person within", or for their "personality." Other responses were to be seen "as an 
individual", "as a unique person", "as a human being" or "being a woman with children"; 
or aspects such as 'self-definition' (3), 'religion' (4), 'what I do' (4), 'knowledge' (2), 
'professionalism' (1) were considered most important.
In all, 16 respondents said 'personality', or some aspect of self which defined personality, 
was the most important factor in their self-definitions, 14 of whom also said they did not 
want to be defined by 'race and/or colour '. For these respondents, the category of race 
was seen as a separate issue from a sense of self, which may nevertheless be a 'raced' self. 
For Clara, who had three white grandparents, being black was about feeling black, not 
looking black: "I don't think how black you are has got anything to do with your skin at 
all, it's what goes on here [points to her head] and in here [points to her heart]." The
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following quotes were typical of respondents in this category, and demonstrated the 
prioritising of personality over skin colour:
"Not by the colour of my skin at all, never, how I am, how I present myself, 
how I interact with other people. It's a matter of common sense, not looking at 
someone, like they say, not looking at the book and judging it by the cover. 
You got to get to know a person, you got to get to know me, just like I get to 
know other people before I can judge them. To look at me and say oh she's 
black or she's white so I don 7 like her, that would be plain ignorance. " 
(Adriana (Angolan/Portuguese)
"As a human being. Personally I dislike it when people say I'm black, 
because I will tell them if you look at my bag, that's black, I 'm not black. To 
be honest, I'm not too keen about this issue of race and colour, I just view 
myself as a professional woman, and I am just interested in being seen as a 
professional person and one who is capable of functioning at a very high level 
of competence. " Anabel (Guyanese/Indian-White)
Danielle (Jamaican/English), drew on the personality discourse in defining herself (and 
rejected the category 'race'), but also saw herself as "not really being anything" and "not 
having a culture" because she was mixed race. Important to her was "just getting myself 
across and letting people know what I am and what I stand for." In contrast to respondents 
who felt they 'owned' their mixed race identity, Danielle described mixed race as
"Not having a race to fall back on, because most people are either black or 
white and it's sort of like being in the middle and not really being anything, 
because mixed race can be anything, it's not determined by a certain race, just 
sort of in-between."
Daniel (1996) has argued that a mixed race person who possesses a 'pluralistic' (neither 
black, white or biracial) and 'integrative' (the blending of black and white) identity may
produce a 'transcendent' sense of self, in the sense that it transcends 'race'. Rockquemore 
(2002) has also referred to a 'transcendent identity' to describe respondents in her study 
who claimed to 'opt out of the categorisation game altogether' (2002, 50). She compares 
such an identity with Robert Park's notion of the 'marginal man' in which the biracial 
person has the privileged position of being able to be objective about the social meaning 
of race, and discount its 'master status' (2002, 51). The implications of the perspectives of 
both Daniel and Rockquemore are that mixed race people are able to pursue identities 
which are effectively 'outside' the social realm of race. Whilst these views may to some 
extent hold in the context of the findings which show that most respondents supported 
individualistic notions of self, conceptualised mixed race as pluralistic, and explicitly 
rejected all notions of categorisation, the findings also showed that 'race' was fundamental 
to how most respondents perceived themselves and others.
Around one quarter of the sample said that both personality and being mixed race were the 
most important aspects of self-definition, where this was frequently accompanied by a 
rejection of race as a category. Here, mixed race identity was seen as an intrinsic part of 
selfhood. Thus, one might argue, essentialist and individualist facets of the person sat 
comfortably side by side and did not appear to contradict one other. Jennifer 
(Caribbean/English-Irish) wanted to 'put across' that she was mixed race without defining 
herself as mixed race, where this appeared to be a rejection of the category 'race' in the 
act of self-definition. She said: "Mixedness is not important in how I define who I am, 
although I want to put it across. My personality is important. I feel like a person, not more 
white or more black, just mixed." Anita (Mauritian/Filipino) said: "I see myself as a fruit 
salad, as a mixture. It's not important to me how people rate or class me, or where I come 
from, it's just how I am. I don't put myself in a category like black, Asian or white, don't 
see the point in that."
As mentioned above, over half the respondents rejected race as a category in their 
conceptions of self, and yet half of these again (that is one-quarter of the sample) also said 
that 'being mixed race' was important to them. Moreover, all of the second-generation 
respondents vehemently rejected ascription, yet also said their black racial heritage was
important to them. Thus, respondents seemed to have no conceptual difficulty with 
referring to 'race' in these apparently paradoxical ways. The distinction respondents used 
may be compared to Gilroy's distinction between 'racialisation' and 'race': respondents 
were diffident about any imposed classifications and wanted to be free to define 
themselves. In the attempt to forge a mixed race identity, however, recourse to the 
language of 'race' was inevitable. Lindsey (Bajan/Scottish) said that mixed race was 
important precisely because without the recognition of both the black and white sides of 
mixed race people, one side would always be denied. She said: "Mixed race is very, very 
important because a lot of white people see only the black in you and the same with black 
people, they see only the white." Analysis of the discourses outlined above is therefore 
difficult in so far as they seem to straddle as well as contradict each other: the rejection of 
race as a category may be a rejection of essentialism, yet the utilisation of mixed race as 
an intrinsic part of selfhood is simultaneously a recourse to essentialist discourse.
There was little evidence of the claim made by some authors that all mixed race people 
seek a mixed race category with which they can identify (Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Olumide, 
2002; Rockquemore, 2002). Whilst most respondents in my study referred to their mixed 
race identifications as neither black nor white, but as black and white, and there was a 
sense of relief and that mixed race was finally being recognised as an identity, none of the 
respondents explicitly talk about mixed race as a group or a category. In view of the 
findings above, it seems possible that they saw their identities in terms of 'individual' 
identities which were simultaneously racial identities but did not necessarily constitute a 
racial category to which they could 'belong'. In this sense, the findings reflect what 
Parekh (2000) has recently referred to as 'a community of citizens'. For many 
respondents, their racial heritage was an important aspect of self. Ella 
(Burmese/Mauritian) said:
"// is important to be aware of your roots, your culture, where you 're from. 
Being in England you're with western culture but I think you should never 
forget your origins in a way. It should be a strong part of you because that's 
where you 're from. It's a part of my identity, part of me. "
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Peta (African/West Indian-English), who described her culture as 'very English' saw her 
individuality as strongly connected with being African, where this connection was linked 
to her closeness with her father. She said:
"/ don't look at colour of my skin, colour doesn '/ come into it -1 am me, I am 
unique and there's nobody else like me. I 'm more black African than anything 
else, who you mix with doesn 't influence how you feel inside. If people ask me 
I 'm African, I've got the strongest roots there. "
"I was closest to dad which has influenced the way I see myself. I wanted to be 
like him, so if that meant I had to eat rice then I would do that. Now I cook 
African food, have pictures on the wall, watch documentaries on Africa. "
One quarter of the sample, all of them first generation black/white respondents, 
specifically said that they wanted both their 'black' and their 'white' sides to be 
recognised. Tizard and Phoenix (2001 [1993]) have pointed out that in their study a 
positive racial identity was not associated with living with a black parent, but that family 
ties and the resistance to being seen as either black or white frequently overrode any 
categorisation of them as black by others. In my study, family ties and a sense of'dual 
loyalty' (Tizard and Phoenix, 2001 [1993]) appeared to manifest itself in different ways. 
Both parents' heritages (and in some cases grandparents) were fundamental aspects of 
self, in the sense that 'where they came from' was 'who they were'. Identity was described 
in biological/racial terms and also sometimes the culture or places associated with these.
"Whenpeople bring it up I have to make sure they know I'm black and white. 
If people say 'are you black?' I say no, I 'm both, my mum's in the picture. I 
feel mixed race because of the colour of my skin, that's the main reason. And 
because of my father. I've got to admit he's still there - he brought me into this 
world, so I can't just say I'm white, I couldn 't do that, I don't think it would be 
right, denying part of my family. " Lianne (St. Lucian/English)
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"Because that's where my mum's from and I'm part of my mum...it's 
important, and you know you 're from there so you got to take an insight into 
what kind of things they do, you can't forget about something that is part of 
you. " Petra (Portuguese/black African)
To sum up the findings in this section then, perceptions of identity were individualistic in 
so far as they were based on self-definition, and 'personality' was the most frequent 
response in how respondents defined themselves. At the same time over half the sample 
rejected 'race' as a concept. Most respondents, including all the second-generation 
respondents, combined essentialist with individualistic discourses, and saw 'personality' 
and 'being mixed race' as compatible aspects of personhood and intrinsic to who they 
were. Being mixed race, moreover, was inextricably linked with biological/cultural 
parental heritage, in the sense of 'where I come from'. The findings in this section as a 
whole challenge essentialist theory which has always constructed identity in mono-racial 
and mono-cultural terms; the indication is that an essentialist model which has dual or 
multiple aspects may be more apt in describing the respondents' identities. The findings 
also challenge postmodern theories of identity, and the idea that mixed race identity is 
something fluid which can be freely chosen; they also to some extent contradict the 
findings above on more general understandings of mixed race which supported 
postmodern 'anything goes' conceptions of selfhood, although these conceptions were 
described by the respondents in essentialist ways.
Significantly, the respondents' rejection of any form of classification by others, yet their 
simultaneous self-reference as 'raced' persons, may have resulted out of the prevalence of 
mis-categorisation by others, and a subsequent desire to be seen for 'who they really 
were'. In the next section on friendship I will examine how some respondents drew on 
'traditional' dichotomous notions of black and white and a race/personality correlate in the 
assertion and negotiation of their own mixed race identities. I argue that such assertions of 
identity were defined against homogeneous constructions of race.
Friendship
The findings on friendship gave an indication as to who respondents identified with. The 
question asked was: "Are you drawn to particular groups of people/ who are your 
friends?" The data can broadly be divided into a) respondents who were drawn to people 
from a range of different backgrounds, and who talked about personality as being 
independent of a person's race, and b) respondents who were drawn specifically to black, 
ethnic minority and mixed race people, many of whom made a race/personality correlate 
in which black people especially had a particular 'type' of personality. Like the data 
discussed above on understandings of mixed race and self-definitions of mixed race, the 
findings in this section can be split into what one might call a diverse concept of 
personhood, which focuses on individual personality and downplays the significance of 
race, and an essentialist concept of personhood in which race is an important part.
Over half the sample (22 respondents) specifically said that they were not drawn to 
particular groups of people, and replied "not at all" to the question; many said their friends 
came from 'mixed' backgrounds, mentioning any combination of established categories 
such as black, white and Asian, and many used a 'personality' narrative in describing their 
criteria for friendship. Cathrina, for example said: "People I get along with I get along 
with no matter what colour they are, it just depends on the person itself." Danielle said she 
identified most with Asian culture, especially Islam and Hinduism, where her 'in- 
between-ness', or her sense of exclusion from full association with either of her racial 
heritages, perhaps contributed to this.
Only two respondents said they were drawn more to white people. Over one third of the 
sample (15 respondents) said they were drawn to people who were not white: 3 
respondents were drawn mainly to mixed race people, and not to black people because 
they were too racist; 4 were drawn to black people; 3 were drawn to black and mixed race 
people; 3 to other ethnic minority people; one person said she was drawn to African 
people, and one to Arab people because of their respective husbands.
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Respondents' definitions of themselves as black and white was an affirmation of their 
difference, and a forging of individuality premised on 'insider' knowledge of mixed 
raceness. However, it was also an act of separation from, defence against, or indeed 
subversion of the rigid boundaries of racial homogenisation imposed upon them from 
outside. In asserting their mixed race identities, as both black and white, some respondents 
distanced themselves from 'blackness' and/or 'whiteness'. This distinction was justified 
by evoking a race = personality link, in which distinctive ways of behaving were believed 
to be dependent on a person's race.
Traditional psychology utilises a common-sense notion of personality which can be 
described as essentialist in that it makes a direct link between personality and behaviour 
(Burr, 1995, 19). Essentialism is described by Burr as
'a way of understanding the world that sees things (including human beings) 
as having their own particular essence or nature, something which can be said 
to belong to them and which explains how they behave (things like chairs, 
paper and plastic spoons do not 'behave' in the human sense of 'doing 
something', but they do react differently to different environmental conditions, 
and these reactions can be explained in terms of the things we know about the 
'nature' of plastic or wood).' (1995, 19)
The idea of 'essence' as having a strong influence on 'behaviour' was reflected in the 
articulations of some respondents. These respondents drew on 'essentialist' notions of 
blackness and whiteness, etc. where a person's 'attitude' or way of behaving was linked 
with the biological 'fact' of their race. It is important to stress here that these were 
articulations made by respondents at a given point in time, and do not necessarily indicate 
that they made these race/personality/behaviour links more generally. However, their 
communications on the subject of race and behaviour may also be indicative of the 
prevalence of 'race thinking' within public discourse, discussed in Chapter One, and the 
idea - which lies at the heart of racism - that there are 'natural' links between race and 
behaviour. This type of essentialist thinking is of course also constructed, and therefore 
does not contradict my own theoretical position which views race as socially constructed.
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Keisha ("fully mixed") distinguished between the supposed difference in the personalities 
of black and white girls, and recognised and rejected what she saw as the negative 'black' 
personality traits within herself and other black people. She chose not to associate with 
black girls because of their discriminatory attitudes towards white people, nor with white 
girls because of their 'barbie-ness', in favour of a racially mixed group of boys who just 
had fun. For Keisha, the gender-specific racial diversity of such a group in which 
everyone (except girls) was understood to be the same regardless of race or colour, formed 
a protection against racism. A group of racially mixed girls on the other hand, did not 
appear so appealing to Keisha. She said:
"To be honest I hardly ever hang around with black girls cos there's 
something, I just don't like their attitude. I do have a temper and everything, 
but certain things they do I don't agree, like most things they do I don't like, 
their racist comments about white people or mixed people and that. The white 
girls I hang around with have been called things you wouldn't like to hear, 
and they know what it's like. It's their personality, it's about personality - 
some white girls I won't hang around with because it's too like a Barbie, too 
much like a Barbie, so I 'm like you 're not my type of person. Like it depends 
on the person itself. Black girls I'd call more like a tomboy, more like a 
tomboy than a Barbie. "
"Mainly I hang around with boys, and it 'sjust like, I find it so much fun! It's 
like when I go out with a group of them it has to be mixed. So you know when 
you 're in a group and someone passes a racist comment, it affects all of us not 
just one, cos in a way we 're all different, and it's not about your culture. "
A number of points may be made about Keisha's position. She made a distinction between 
gender difference and all other kinds of difference: whereas being 'mixed' and 'different' 
had positive and transformative potential in so far as it could ultimately challenge racism, 
'difference'/transgression of norms of gendered behaviour was seen as problematic (where
girls had 'attitude' or were like 'barbie'). One irony of this position is that whilst allegiance 
within such a group may have been seen as forming a protection against racism, it was 
gender-exclusive. Keisha simply distanced herself from what she saw as negative 'female' 
traits, and so too of any idea of 'girls together', and aligned herself firmly with the boys. 
She created a tomboy/Barbie dualism in her description of the difference between black 
and white girls. As such, white girls, according to Keisha, displayed more 'feminine' traits 
(in so far as 'Barbie' represents the archetypal feminine woman), whilst black girls 
expressed themselves in more 'tomboy' and therefore more masculine ways. Interestingly, 
this perceived masculinity in black girls was associated with 'personality', 'attitude', and 
'racist comments', whereas Keisha did not represent the boys as expressing these 
characteristics. Keisha appears to have framed herself within a very specific version of 
femininity which rejects what she saw as female expressions of masculinity or excessive 
femininity. In this sense she can be seen as constructing a 'middle position' on gender. The 
behavioural constraints evoked in her pathologisation of representations of gender among 
her female contemporaries suggests some of the tensions and psychic costs in maintaining 
such positions.
It should be noted here that few respondents talked about gender-specific experiences, or 
indeed, made any reference to gender at all within the context of either personhood or 
education. The focus was clearly on race; and yet, as Keisha's talk illuminates, their 
constructions were also clearly gendered. Like Keisha, Cerisse (Scottish-African/ 
Zambian-English) referred to the 'attitude' of black girls, and said: "Most of the black girls 
here have attitudes, some are aggressive and go round in gangs. I just keep myself to 
myself and don't get in anyone's way." So here again, black women were being 
masculinised and hence pathologised in discourse. Zaseena (English/Jamaican), Cathrina 
(Jamaican/Irish) and Kelly (English/Bajan) did allude to gender differences with reference 
to bullying and education. Moreover, all the respondents who mentioned boyfriends and 
dating said they preferred black men, again linking 'race' to an essentialised mode of 
personhood/ physical type. The ways in which these findings relate to issues around 'post- 
feminism' is discussed later in this chapter.
In the case of Charlene (Jamaican/White), who identified as mixed race but identified 
more with black people, the conflict between homogenous constructions of blackness and 
a dual-racial identity was apparent in her description of how she saw the difference 
between black and white 'kinds', where this was an explanation for her own preferred 
racial allegiance to black people. Charlene, therefore, also referred to a biology = 
personality link. Charlene said:
"They're my own kind White is my own kind as well, but I'm more on the 
black side. I 've always been more around black people, but I don't act black, 
most people say I act white. I get along with them more better. I like white 
people, yeah, I don't mind them but, I just get on by my own tack but, well, I 'm 
half and half, so I get on more with black people, I don't know why. "
Lindsey (Bajan/Scottish) drew on a race/personality correlate in the negotiation of her 
friendships, but one in which racial 'boundaries' were fuzzy enough to allow people to 
move across racial groupings. Lindsey's best friend was white - "She always hangs 
around with us, she fits in, she's one of us" - and yet Lindsey said she "felt out of place 
around white people" and was drawn mainly to black people. At the same time she said 
that she did not herself possess what she perceived as distinctively 'black' personality 
traits, but rather was "quieter and more self-conscious around black girls cos black people 
are a lot ruder than white people, a lot ruder, and I'm not like that, I'm not a rude person."
Two of the three respondents who said that they were particularly drawn to mixed race 
people did not use a race = personality correlate or racialise others as 'different' to them, 
and said that with mixed race people they had a common link based on shared experience. 
Aasha (Indian/white American) said she was drawn to specifically Indian/white mixed 
race people, where the commonality was about shared cultural similarities, and seeing 
how people have dealt with these culture experiences:
"I've developed friendships with a few people in my life who happen to be 
half-white half-Indian, and I don't mean happen to be, because I think there is
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a reason, I think that that was the bonding point. I understand what it's like to 
have different worlds, and one thing I do understand about that is that if you 
are mixed you are in this place that's in-between. "
Ruby (Punjabi Indian/Irish) talked about a 'newer community' made up of mixed race and 
other marginalised people to which she felt she belonged:
"Most people I feel really close to have felt marginalised or excluded from 
their own communities, and in a way I feel part of the 'newer community' 
because of that. Quite a substantial proportion of these people are mixed race. 
We do gravitate towards each other which isn 't random, is more than just 
luck. I think it's often because I find myself in places searching for things at 
the same time as other people. "
For Dianne (Welsh/Mauritian), who referred specifically to culture rather than race, said 
that cultural differences were important:
"/ get on more with ethnic minorities, mainly Filipinos and Mauritians, and 
Nigerians as well, because they have more culture to relate to like 
food...English people don't tend to have a culture, they don't have values, 
they 've only got Sunday lunch. "
Adapting
Several researchers have described the experience of being mixed race as the ability to be 
black, white or mixed race in different situations. Maria Root has referred to this 
phenomenon as 'fluidity' (in Rockquemore, 2002, 48). Daniel's (1996) idea of an 
'integrative identity' is applied to mixed race people who self-reference themselves 
simultaneously in black and white communities. Daniel makes the distinction between a 
synthesised integrative identity, in which people feel equally comfortable in black and 
white locations, and a functional integrative identity, where they can function in either
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community, but feel a stronger identification, or feel more comfortable with black or 
white people.
The respondents were asked whether different sides of their personalities came out when 
they were together with people who shared a particular parental racial heritage with the 
respondent. 37 respondents gave responses, of whom 21 said they did adapt themselves in 
different situations, 14 respondents said that they did not, and 2 respondents' responses 
were ambiguous. Two dominant narratives around personhood, which reflect those in the 
previous sections, can be identified: respondents who said they did not adapt tended to use 
a 'fixed' concept of personhood in which personality always remained the same, whilst 
those who did adapt in particular settings tended to use a 'fluid' concept of personhood in 
which awareness of racial/cultural differences within particular settings determined their 
behaviour or how they felt.
In all, just under two-thirds of the sample said they did adapt in different situations. 
Respondents talked mainly about adapting with 'black' or 'ethnic minority' people, not 
with white people. Like in the section on friendship, the race/personality correlate was 
evident amongst some of those who said they did adapt. Respondents talked about 'putting 
on an act' especially with regard to their language and behaviour, and said that they talked 
about different things, or talked or behaved in different ways with black and white people. 
Sherry (Guyanese/German) illustrated this point: "It's funny how you slip into the way 
they [black relatives] talk, the patterns and intonations, and then when you leave you 
become all English again! I try not to do it, but it comes out!" Being able to adapt was 
also seen as a positive attribute by some respondents. Corinne (Jamaican/Irish) said:
"I can get on with anybody. At home I live in a white culture, and then at my 
father's house I 'm living around a black culture, so I 'm seeing two worlds, 
two cultures, t\vo sets of people.....so I know how to get along with white 
people very well and I know how to get along with black people very well, so I 
think it's broadened my mind to just getting along with people as a whole. "
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Notably, the three respondents who were most drawn to mixed race people said that they 
adapted in different situations but that mixed race people were the only people they did 
not adapt with. For Aasha, who said she "playact[ed] Indianess", the likelihood of some 
resonance with mixed race people meant that she could be freer with them than with either 
Indian or white people. Kelly, who talked extensively about bullying and racism from 
black people at the school she had previously attended, said that she was "totally different 
around people of different races"; on being with mixed race people, however, she said: 
"Then I'm just me cos I know they're just being them and I can say whatever I like." All 
of these respondents said that they were drawn mainly to mixed race people (see previous 
section on friendships), possibly because they were 'unthreatening', and felt that they 
remained the same with them. Aleasha (Grenadian-Scottish/Dominican), who said she was 
most drawn to black people, but also rejected by them, said that she often adapted herself 
around black people because she wanted to be accepted, but with mixed race people she 
was "just myself." Ruby, although feeling part of a newer community which had many 
mixed race people in it, said that she still adapted in a generic sense. Her early experiences 
of having to adapt as a racialised person in a white family and white environment meant 
that it had become a way of life for her, and her main challenge was to stop adapting per 
se: "I did this as a survival technique from an early age, and part of what's important in 
my development is rejecting that. I really check myself now, I still do it, but am much 
more aware of what I'm doing and why, and I really question myself and it's really hard 
work." These respondents all said they experienced considerable discrimination or non- 
acceptance at some point in their lives (see section on discrimination).
One quarter of the sample (10 respondents) said that they did not adapt when they were in 
different racial/cultural environments, most of whom simply said that they "stay[ed] the 
same." These respondents had a 'fixed' concept of their own personhood, in which 
personality did not change. Lianne (St.Lucian/English) said: "No, not at all. It's just me, I 
can't explain it but I don't feel that at all, don't feel more one way when I'm in a different 
situation, just feel myself, just the same person, I don't change, I don't do things 
differently with other people." Danielle said: "If I did [adapt], I would do it without 
realising, but I think I am always myself." Adriana said: "No, I am who I am, it doesn't
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matter who I am with. Otherwise you would just be a fake." Nalia (3/4 Black/ 1A Chinese) 
said: "If there was a group of all different races I don't think I would be more inclined to 
go over to the black people or not, but I would say from past experience it's more the 
person." Other respondents drew on a race/personality link. Jennifer (Caribbean/English- 
Irish) appeared to contradict herself when she said: "Some people are affected by race and 
colour and how they act around them but I'm just the same"; however, she also said that 
she changed around black people, but that this was because of their personality and not 
their race. Brenda (Afro-Caribbean/Indian-white Jewish) said that she remained very 
much herself, "I am what I am", but adapted in so far as she knew "how far I can go with 
them [African people] culturally." The implicit assumption here, again, was that a 
person's race was inextricably linked to that person's personality.
Some respondents talked about the negative aspects of adapting in terms of the irritation 
they felt about the inflexibility of people who adhered to essentialist notions of 'black' or 
'ethnic minority' communities, and the pressure put onto the respondents to conform to 
these notions. Bev said black people were "often set in their ways, they only listen to 
particular music, don't want to hear anything new or are only interested in black people 
who have done something", whereas white people were often more open to differences 
between people. Some respondents talked about both adapting to and resisting notions of 
essentialism and the pressure to adapt. Nadia felt awkward around Muslims because if 
they knew she was half-Arab they expected her to behave like a Muslim; Nadia's 
challenge was to find a balance between adapting to her father's culture and rejecting 
aspects of it. Similarly, Ruby said that she was resigned to Indian people expecting her to 
know things about Indian culture: "It makes me feel frustrated, and a bit sad. I used to be 
angry about it, but I'm a bit weary about it now." For Keisha, who had been brought up as 
Jamaican, adapting meant denying what she saw as her pluralistic culture:
"My mum doesn 't even understand me when I speak, tells me I 'm speaking too 
much English, stop it! Yes, I get pissed off when she doesn't understand me, 
what I 'm saying, cos in a way I do have more Jamaican stuff on me, but I 
don 'tfeel I 'm more Jamaican than anything else. "
Other respondents saw adapting as a positive trait. This was explained by evoking both a 
the pluralist concept of personhood (discussed in the section 'Understandings of mixed 
race'), and & fixed notion of personhood, in which a person mobilised different aspects of 
their personality in different situations, including those which concern race and culture, 
but saw herself as essentially unchanging. Chantel said: "I think I'm a bit of everything, so 
I don't just act a certain way", and although she described her behaviour as slightly 
different with African or English people, she claimed her personality did not change, and 
did not think other people would not notice this change. Similarly, Tania said that she did 
not change, but that there were "different facets of me in one" which found expression in 
"all different spheres of life, as a mother, a wife, in work, in church." Tania believed that 
precisely because she was mixed race, and did not have a 'race' or "anywhere to go home 
to", she could "fit in most places" without adapting. Zara (Columbian/Polish Jewish- 
English) saw adapting as a necessary part of everyday life, "not in a way that is 
compromising or that I'm insincere or lose my integrity, but there's definitely certain 
behaviour, certain ways of speaking that in certain environments just don't make sense 
and it's not a big deal." Zara said that putting on an act was simply showing different sides 
of her personality and did not make her "feel any different inside."
To sum up, whilst a quarter of the sample used the 'personality' narrative, a significant 
finding in this section, like in the section on 'friendship', was that a person's race was 
inextricably linked to that person's personality. If we look again at these last two sections 
on 'friendship' and 'adapting', we see that the emphasis was frequently on 'racial' 
differences and correlated 'personality' differences which appeared to separate people, 
and, in the section on adapting especially, on the ways in which respondents negotiated or 
'got round' those differences in their quest to be accepted for 'who they are'. The findings 
in both these sections suggest that identification (and dis-identification) with others and 
experiences of adapting in particular situations are linked to experiences of categorisation, 
discrimination and self-acceptance.
One could also claim that the findings which uphold essentialist notions of 'race' 
contradicted those on definitions of self which show that over half the sample specified
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that they did not define themselves in racial terms ('not by race' or 'not by race or 
colour'), and indeed, rejected 'race' as a category. Arguably, this discrepancy resulted out 
of the kinds of discourses of race which respondents were surrounded by and felt were 
available to them, for example, their rejection of being 'wrongly' categorised, and their 
desire to be seen for 'who they really are'. In the respondent's quest to extricate herself 
from what she perceived as an uncomfortable or discriminatory situation, she draws on a 
discourse of racialisation in which rejection of others could be justified by evoking the 
race/personality link. Most respondents readily dismissed the concept of 'race' when 
talking about definitions of self, yet responses to more indirect questions around identity 
revealed that the idea of 'race' as a category was not irrelevant, but a trenchant aspect of 
many respondents' lives, both as a means of identification with others, and possibly as a 
means of self-preservation. This issue is discussed further in Chapter Six.
PART TWO: CATEGORISATION
How Respondents Believed they were Perceived by Others
In Part One I examined some aspects of how respondents defined and perceived 
themselves. In Part Two I will examine how respondents believed they were perceived by 
others. Most of the research done in the field of identity is based on a presumption of the 
interrelationship between subject and society, in which actors are situated within social 
environments that designate available categories of identification and set limits on how 
people are able to understand themselves. Thus, within this perspective, self-perceptions 
of identity are not constituted within a vacuum. According to Nagel (1996) a person's 
identity is a mixture of subjectivity and ascription. She states.
'An individual's ethnic identity is a composite of the view one has of oneself 
and the opinions held by others about one's ethnicity. The result is a volitional, 
if circumscribed model of ethnicity. Ethnic identity lies at the intersection of 
individual ethnic self-definition (who I am) and collective ethnic attribution 
(who they say I am). Ethnic identity is then a dialectic between internal 
identification and external ascription.' (21)
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Similarly, in the context of mixed race identity, Rockquemore (2002) has argued that a 
social identity can only function effectively where the response of individuals is consistent 
with the response from others (41). Validated border identities are validated within the 
interactional sphere and can only have social meaning where self-perception and social 
ascription are in accordance with one another. Rockquemore (2002) has claimed: 
'If identity is perceived as an interactionally validated self-understanding, then 
identities can only function effectively where the response of individuals to 
themselves (as social objects) is consistent with the response of others. In this 
schema, individuals cannot effectively possess an identity that is not socially 
typified; there must be no disjuncture between the identity actors appropriate 
for themselves and the place others assign to them as a social object' (41) 
Invalidated identities, on the other hand, occur where racial self-understandings do not 
match the identities ascribed by others. Rockquemore (2002) states: 
'Unvalidated border individuals also consider themselves to be uniquely 
biracial; however, their program is not validated. Others primarily assume they 
are black, and therefore, they report experiencing the world as a black person, 
although they understand themselves as a biracial person. When people's 
racial program is not validated by others in their significant social network, 
they either alter their program or remain in a nebulous, marginal and 
unresolved state with regard to their racial identity.' (93) 
Some studies have found that the relationship between appearance and racial identification 
is significant whilst others have found that the relevance of appearance has been eclipsed 
by social factors. The theme of appearance was frequently alluded to by the respondents 
who believed that the way they were seen by others was based on how they 'looked' The 
responses supported the finding in Rockquemore's (2002) study which showed that there 
was no association between self-perceived skin colour and the way that mixed race people 
racially understood themselves. In contrast to Rockquemore's (2002) study, however, 
which showed that there was a link between respondents' self-perceptions and how they 
believed they were seen by others (91), my study showed that there was a profound 
discrepancy between self-perception as mixed race and how respondents believed they 
were perceived by others as either black or mono-racial. 
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The findings showed that in most cases there were considerable differences between the 
way respondents believed they were seen by others, and the way they defined themselves. 
Respondents invariably felt 'incorrectly' categorised - or possessed an 'invalidated' 
identity - as black or as having some other mono-racial background. It is important to 
remember, however, that one of the main criteria for being interviewed was self- 
identification as mixed race - thus the number of respondents who had an 'invalidated' 
border identity (that is to say, the discrepancy between how they saw themselves and how 
they believed they were seen by others) may have been higher than if I had also 
interviewed people who were by standard definitions mixed race but had self-identified as 
black or white (etc). Mixed race identity as an emergent category of identification enables 
the process of validation in which identity becomes meaningful of the self.
Several of the younger respondents especially talked about the prevalence of mixed race in 
some parts of London today with a degree of relief. For some, the increased visibility of 
mixed race in the last few years had correlated with positive changes in attitudes towards 
mixed race people, and that this had facilitated their own transition from a mono-racial 
identification to a mixed race identification. This is discussed in greater depth later in this 
chapter. Corinne, 21, illustrated this point:
"When I was younger colour wasn 't really an issue. As I got older, especially 
when I fill out application forms, some of them have the mixed race box and 
some of them don't so you have to put 'other' and write it in, and I think as 
I 've got older and I've seen them little things it's made me change as I want to 
be recognised as a mixed race because it's what I am. I don't want to be 
classed as 'other', somebody who's not recognised. I 'm not black, I 'm not 
white, I 'm mixed race. "
Kelly (English/Bajan, 21) explained that despite the fact that "people stick to their own a 
lot", and that there were very few mixed race people when she was at school a few years 
ago, "5 years down the line, most of my brother's friends [aged!3] are mixed race", and 
that most children in primary schools today "had some kind of mix." For Kelly, this was
one reason for changes in attitudes towards mixed race people in the last five years. 
Charlene (Jamaican/White, 16) explained how in previous years anything that was 'in- 
between' was not recognized at all, whereas today people recognized differences in skin 
tone, and that this enabled self-identification as mixed race:
"When I was young you was either black or white, they didn 't really recognize 
mixed race as an individual colour in itself. But I think people tend to, I think 
it's got a lot to do with skin tone. If you 're more dark people will see you as 
Black, if you 're more lighter people will see you as white, if you Jre in-between 
then they don't, people didn't, recognize you at all, but I think now it is being 
recognized, now you can just say you 're mixed race. "
None of the respondents reported that they felt that they were seen for their 'personality' 
or for 'who they really are', yet well over half the sample, as we have seen in the previous 
section, said that their personality was important in how they defined themselves.
36 respondents gave responses in racial or cultural terms about how they believed they 
were perceived by others. These responses can be divided into either 'correct' and 
'incorrect' categorisations, or a mixture of both.
A. There were 7 'correct' categorisations, all from first generation respondents. Here, the 
respondents said they were 'probably', 'mostly', or 'always' seen as mixed race, and that 
their primary racial identification was as mixed race. Kelly said: "They always ask who's 
black and who's white, they always see it." Corinne (Jamaican/Irish, 21) said:
"As mixed race and I hope to think as lucky, I 've got the best of both worlds, 
so I 've never really yeah had, nobody's ever really said anything to me, so I 
don't really know what people's opinions are, I just hope they see me as mixed 
race and lucky."
B. The 29 'incorrect' categorisations can be divided as follows.
In 21 cases of first generation mixed race respondents, assumptions about their heritage 
were 'incorrect'; here, respondents' perceptions of how others saw them did not 
correspond with the respondents' racial self-identifications.
(i) 2 respondents felt they were 'incorrectly' seen as white, and 1 respondent as 'quarter- 
caste'. Sherry (Guyanese/German, 31), who in my opinion was clearly not white, said that 
she was seen by others as white, even though she thought of herself as dark. As a child she 
had played mainly with Asian girls and everyone had thought she was white. She found 
people's curiosity interesting. Charlene (Jamaican/English, 16), on the other hand, found 
other people's assessment of her as white irritating, and said:
"When they say I'm white it's not that I don't wanna be white, it's just I 
wanna be called what I am, there's nothing wrong with being white, but just 
that I wanna be classed what I am. "
(ii) In 10 cases 'incorrect' heritages were given, such as Asian, Chinese, Algerian, 
Turkish, Greek, Egyptian and South African, where these were invariably mono-racial 
categorisations in which the ascribed category did not correspond with either of the 
respondents' parents heritages. Most respondents in this category were not first generation 
black-white.
The enduring "what are you?" question commonly posed to people of mixed race 
(Williams, 1996; Parker and Song, 2001, 7), although experienced by many of the 
respondents, is perhaps best illustrated by people in category (ii). This is interesting in the 
context of the research that has been done to date on mixed race in the UK and the US. 
Williams (1996) found that individuals were frequently asked the question 'What are 
you?' by strangers and acquaintances who were trying to ascertain the 'correct' 
categorisation, and that biracial people adapted themselves and projected different selves 
in different situations. Omi and Winant (1994) have referred to this as a momentary crisis 
of racial meaning.
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Aasha (Indian/white American, 31) felt comfortable with the question, and said:
"I find the more different places I go to, I find the more people ask very early 
on the 'where are you from' question. They know there 's something else about 
you, so it's trying to figure out the name, trying to figure out the look, 
something, so I think that's a pretty obvious thing, that people just latch on to 
whatever it is, sometimes guessing what it is. I'm fine about it, it doesn'(really 
bother me, people are 'where are you from' and then you ask them where 
they 're from and then you start talking about how you grew up and it can be 
an interesting way of sharing something about yourself. "
Brenda (Afro-Caribbean/Jewish-Indian, 42), a second generation respondent, talked about 
how the question of her race always hung in the air, initially unvoiced but eventually 
spoken:
"People often like to clarify where I'm from, even though sometimes they 
don 7 like to ask, but eventually they will ask, you know, where I am from. That 
is quite important to them. Until people know what I am they will be a bit 
more reserved with me. I hope they see more than the colour of my skin, that's 
quite sad really isn 't it, but you do have some experiences and you do know 
it's down to the colour of your skin. I thought you were Italian. "
Aleasha despised the 'what are you?' question, and said that she was "constantly being 
asked what are you, what are you, god it's horrible. It makes me feel different and 
annoyed, it gives me whole heap of emotions." Some respondents in this category also 
disliked other peoples' curiosity and felt that wrong assumptions were based on 
stereotypes about their race or culture. Nadia (Iraqi/English, 38) said that she was "a bit 
cagey about her background because there's a lot of animosity and that can be quite 
difficult. People don't understand the difference between being pro-Iraqi and pro-Saddam 
Hussein." She thought she was seen as "European or French or something" and added 
"these days it's okay to be French isn't it?" Tasha (black American/English, 26) was
frequently asked if she was Chinese, and said she had ambivalent feelings about this; 
Anita (Mauritian/Filipino, 16), found other people's 'double' misconstruction of her racial 
heritage funny:
"Everyone thinks I 'm Indian or Bangladeshi, I think it's funny cos when I then 
tell people what I am they get so shocked cos I don't look Chinese at all!"
Dianne (Welsh/Mauritian) commented on the myriad of racial identities assigned to her, 
where these were invariably based on appearance. Dianne referred to her own sense of self 
as a buffer against other people's wrong assumptions about her background. Altogether 7 
respondents said that other people's curiosity either did not bother them, or they felt no 
way about it, or had 'got over' other people's negative attitudes towards them. Amongst 
these respondents the personality narrative was dominant. Dianne said:
"Some people think I'm white, others think I'm more mixed. Some people think 
I'm Spanish, or Columbian. Or some people just think I'm Italian or 
European. Some people have a pre-judgment of a person. Some people think 
I 'm bitchy, I think it's because of the eyes. I don't really mind it because at the 
end of the day I know who I am and I don't need anyone else to tell me who I 
am cos I know my own identity....! find it quite funny when people come up 
with places I have never heard of or places where I think 'oh wow I'd love to 
be from there.'"
(iii) 8 first generation black/white respondents 'incorrectly' felt they were seen as black (6 
respondents) or Asian (2 respondents). Several respondents were seen as black but 
simultaneously felt discriminated against because they were not 'black enough'. This will 
be discussed in greater detail later. Lianne (St. Lucian/English) said: "Even though I look 
mixed race, a lot of people see me as black and expect me to act and be a certain way, so I 
have to put the point across that I am mixed race. Black boys often say oh you must like 
this or like that because you're black." Tania (West Indian/English) defined herself as 
mixed race, believed she was seen as black, and saw her personality as white. She said:
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"Yes. I think people see me as black, not mixed, but when they get to know me 
I'm probably very while. I don't think it enters people's minds that my 
husband might be white, they just see me with a black man. Even now people 
are surprised when they see my husband, and my kids. "
For Kelly, questions around her identity were not just about being mixed race, but about 
which parent was black and which parent was white:
"They are always shocked when I say that my mum's black and my dad's 
white, they always assume that it's the other way round. But once they 've got 
past that they don't normally ask any more questions. It did used to annoy me 
when I was younger, I used to feel I should walk around with a sign on my 
head saying 'my mum's black and my dad's white', but now I've got used to 
it."'
C. All 8 respondents who were either second-generation mixed race or had a multiple 
mixed heritage were 'incorrectly' categorised. In 6 cases, others' perceptions were 
'incorrect' in so far as they felt that they were seen primarily as black, but also 'correct' in 
that all of them also identified as black or with black culture. Two respondents, however, 
despite identifying themselves as mixed race to me, felt black people 'incorrectly' 
categorised them as mixed race. These respondents wanted to be seen as black and to be 
accepted into the 'black community', but this acceptance was contingent on denial of their 
mixed race heritage. Both respondents expressed the view that other people made negative 
assumptions about them based on their colour, and emphasised personality as the main 
antidote to this.
"My black identity is very important, but I 'd like people to see the person 
within rather than the person outside, but that's very hard for people to 
understand at the moment. As soon as people see the colour they think you 're 
this or you 're that. " (Nichole, 3/4 Black/ 1A White)
For the intra-continental group of respondents, their phenotypical ambiguity gave them an 
element of choice on a purely superficial level, a choice which did not seem readily 
available to first generation black/white respondents or second-generation respondents. 
The issue of 'passing' for white is relevant for this group (see Ali 2003) and in some cases 
perhaps also for lighter-skinned black/white respondents; this is an issue which is relevant 
in the context of discrimination - these respondents did not experience less discrimination, 
but they tended to experience it from white people.
Feelings of'difference'
Around half the sample (21 respondents) responded affirmatively to the question of 
whether they had ever felt 'different', where 'difference' was perceived as negative, and 
the attitudes of other people, and in some cases experiences of discrimination, were given 
as the main reasons for respondents' feelings of difference. Respondents usually talked 
about their perceived difference in terms of'looking different', 'having a foreign accent', 
'race as always being an issue for others', and 'being treated differently because of 
colour'. Around a third of the sample (14 respondents) said they said they had never felt 
different to other people, or difference was not problematic for them, or were ambivalent 
about the idea of difference. Respondents in this category occasionally referred to the idea 
of a universal personhood in which everyone is the same, and in which personality 
transcends race. Petra (Portuguese/African, 17) said, "I don't think I'm different from 
black or white people. I'm just a normal person." For Chantel (English/African, 18), 
'difference' was a common human experience, and with an air of inevitability said, "We 
all feel different, we all feel special, we all feel left out sometimes, we all feel lonely, we 
all feel popular at different times."
Five respondents said they saw their difference as positive, and that it gave them access to 
cultures, languages and places which were normally accessible only to white or black 
people. This supports Tizard and Phoenix's (2001 [1993]) finding that difference was not 
necessarily seen as something negative and could be regarded as an asset. Olga (25, 
Italian/Eritrean), for example, said that she was happy to be mixed because it gave her
153
knowledge about cultures and languages, and made her a more tolerant person. Kelly 
(English/Bajan) liked the fact that she could fit in anywhere as a mixed race person: "I 
don't think I'd want to be any other race for the pure fact that I can walk into a room and 
feel comfortable no matter what race there is in the room, I feel I can fit in with people no 
matter what." It is interesting to note that the respondents quoted here who were either 
ambivalent or positive about their difference all had white fathers and black mothers. 
Jennifer described how these days people 'celebrated' mixed race identity, and talked 
about the positive aspects of being mixed race. Her comments were reminiscent of the 
current public and media discourses around mixed race. Jennifer said:
"When I was little I got called racist names about being black, but now I 
actually get complimented for being mixed race. Now people like it when 
you 've got lots of different cultures in you. It's not a trend, but it is something 
that you can be proud of I 'm proud of being white, glad I have Irish and black 
in me - I can find out about different families and things, it's just nice to have 
lots of different things in you. "
Although almost all the respondents felt that they were wrongly categorised by other 
people and ascribed mono-racial backgrounds, and only five respondents explicitly talked 
about their difference as positive (over half the respondents talked about their feelings of 
difference as negative), over a third of the respondents saw other peoples' curiosity of 
them as positive (28 respondents said that people/friends were curious about their 
background, half of whom saw this curiosity as positive). Respondents said that people's 
curiosity meant that they could learn about different cultures and religion, and that it made 
respondents feel good about themselves. This again supports the view that mixed race 
people are celebrated for their cultural diversity and, to some extent at least, see their role 
as harbingers of a more culturally aware society. 11 respondents said that people did not 
show curiosity about their background. Anabel said: "People see that we are all different 
and all similar"; Chantel said: "Most people don't care about the race thing"; Lianne said: 
"So many people nowadays are mixed race. If it was a new thing then they would, 
obviously."
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Respondents were asked whether the way in which they thought other people categorised 
or perceived them influenced the way they saw themselves. The purpose of this question, 
as outlined at the beginning of Part Two, was to attempt to gain some insight into whether 
respondents felt that their perceptions of self had been influenced by other people's 
perceptions of, and reactions to them. Of the 30 respondents who gave responses to this 
question, half said that the way other people saw them did not influence the way they saw 
themselves, and half said that it did. (The 5 pilot study respondents and 5 other 
respondents were not asked this question). The respondents who said that categorisation 
had no impact on how they saw themselves tended to use the 'I am just me' narrative, and 
a defiant tone was clearly evident. Anabel said: "I stand on firm ground." Yasmine 
(Pakistani/English) said: "I do what I want to do, when I want to do it, with who I want to 
do it, I'm a very stubborn and determined person." Peta asserted: "I'm white and I'm 
black, and I do what I want not what you think I should do. I'm not apologising for who I 
am. I'm happy about it and if you don't like it - tough." Kelly, who had been bullied 
during her years at school said: "When I was at college I was determined just to be me - if 
people didn't like it then that was tough." Corinne said that whilst the way she looked 
might influence the way other people saw her, their opinions had no affect on her:
"People always say like where's your mum from, where's your dad from - I 
feel no way about it at all. They 're trying to put me in a category, but I 'mfme 
to answer their questions. If I was darker they 'd see me as black, if I was 
lighter they 'd see me as white. It would probably influence other people's 
opinions or feelings or whatever, but mine, no matter if I was dark or I was 
light, I would still see myself as the same."
Dianne, who was proud of the fact that she was Welsh/Mauritian mixed race because this 
made her "unique", illustrated the difference between being seen by others in racialised 
terms, and seeing herself as mixed race where this was an intrinsic part of her personality 
and individuality. She believed that the way people saw themselves determined how they 
would be seen by others, but that categorisation by others could be transcended by self- 
definition. She said.
11 Hem you see yourself is how others will see you, that's how they 're going to 
perceive you into their minds... My race is how people see me first, that's how 
they build a foundation and they can elaborate from there. I don't see that 
race should be an issue: it's not an issue for me and it's not an issue amongst 
my friends. Your identity expresses who you are as a person, it's very 
important to just be honest and be yourself and not hide the fact that you 're 
something."
Other respondents felt the way they saw themselves was influenced by other people's 
perceptions of them. Lindsey said: "People seeing me as black probably influences the 
way I see myself as black - if I was lighter I might feel more white." Like Dianne, 
Danielle distanced herself from racialisation, but also from being mixed race because she 
felt angry that people did not look beyond this 'superficial' fact and constantly compared 
her with mixed race celebrities because she had curly hair. She said:
"A few people say racist things, like there's only a few famous people are 
mixed race, and people come up and say I look like Mel B or Aleasha Keys - 
just cos I 've got curly hair people think I look like Mel B - and find it really 
annoying and derogatory. I felt it was robbing me of my identity and it 
influenced the way I look at the way people use race to determine who people 
are. It made me think that we shouldn 't use race to determine how people 
should be."
PART THREE: EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION 
Personal evolutions
In particular, the findings on how respondents felt their identities had changed or evolved 
over time further revealed how many respondents felt influenced by the way other people 
saw them. Whereas the findings discussed in the previous section were pertinent to the 
present, this section explores what respondents said about their past lives in relation to
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how they perceived their identities today. The question asked was: "Do you feel that your 
sense of self has changed over time or due to some turning point in your life?" Most 
respondents reacted positively to this question, and did not ask for clarification. The 
findings supported, and demonstrated on a more profound level than in the previous 
section, the interplay between perceptions of self and the ways in which many respondents 
were influenced by others.
Around three-quarters of the sample talked about how their sense of self had changed, and 
how this related to their feelings of difference. Several respondents talked about how 
perceptions of their own difference as negative had transformed into acceptance of their 
difference as positive: whilst negative responses from others had prompted negative self- 
perceptions, positive responses facilitated positive self-images. These changes were often 
described as transitions from mono-racial/cultural identifications to mixed race 
identifications which involved a shift from "pleasing others to pleasing myself or "seeing 
myself through others to seeing myself as myself. Whereas respondents had perhaps 
previously felt that they had had to 'fit in', deny a part of themselves, or adapt in different 
situations, they now felt less different and more able to be themselves.
In most cases, these 'personal evolutions' were concurrent with respondents themselves 
having more contact with mixed race people and living in increasingly diverse populations 
such as London. Thus the greater the exposure to 'difference', the less the respondent saw 
her own difference as negative. Personal changes also correlated with an increasing 
awareness of changing attitudes towards mixed race people generally. Younger 
respondents especially, frequently commented on the prevalence of mixed race people 
generally and how 'normal' it was to be mixed race in the multicultural areas of East 
London in which they lived. Personal evolutions were therefore not only talked about by 
older respondents, but also by 16 and 17 year olds. Clara talked about her identification 
with one 'half of her racial heritage to acceptance of herself as herself. Corinne's 
identification shifted from a black 'other' to a mixed race person. Nichole overcame her 
internalised view that her colour was a barrier to self-achievement. Soraya was bullied as a 
child until she fought back, and overcame racism within her family. She said:
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"When I was younger I wished I was white, so that I wou/dn 't have any more 
problems in life, even my name caused problems....but over time that, if 
anything, reversed on me. I would get paid compliments for the colour of my 
skin, compliments for my name because it was unusual, it was different, which 
made me feel different about myself "
Jennifer (Caribbean/English-Irish) said that she was accepted at school because she "acted 
in a certain way, the way they liked it", and continued:
"But now I've grown-up a bit more I feel I'm not white, I'm not black, I'm 
mixed, I am who I am, I just feel I 'm not trying to copy anyone. When I started 
to hang out with mixed race girls I started to fee I more free to act as I want. "
Anabel talked about the shift from conforming to the roles she felt other people expected 
of her, to discovering what her own needs were, and her own identity was, separate from 
others.
"Yes, I remember trying to please everybody so more or less adopting 
different roles to please everybody. The turning point was about 5 years ago 
when I realised how exhausting it had become, mentally and physically, that's 
when I began the journey towards personal wholeness, my identity as a person 
in my own right where I was pleasing myself and not the whole world as such. 
Despite what others may do to me or may say to me, nothing could shake that 
identity of myself that I have now. "
In contrast to the findings above, being amongst mixed race people or in a diverse 
environment made some respondents feel more self-conscious about their own difference. 
The negative impact of being faced with 'difference' for the first time has also been 
recorded by Tizard and Phoenix (2001 [1993]). Cathrina (Jamaican/Irish) grew up thinking 
that she, her parents and her siblings were all white, and only recently discovered that her 
real father was black: "When I was young I used to think that I was brought up in Spain
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and that I had a tan, cos I never knew that my dad was black. I thought my sister's dad and 
my brother's dad was mine" [Cathrina's step-father was white]. In the case of Cathrina, 
one might argue that the saying 'ignorance is bliss' was apt, where lack of knowledge of 
her mixed race-ness appeared to be a protection against her feeling different. Tasha (black 
American/English), who grew up and lived in Cambridge until recently, had always 
classed herself as black "cos I grew up in place predominantly white and the way other 
people saw me made me feel more black." She said she had never felt different until she 
moved to London: "In a multicultural place like London you are always asked what you 
are, whereas in Cambridge if you're a slightly different colour you are classed as black." 
Tasha remarked that she felt 'different' where she lived now - in a very ethnically mixed 
area of London - because "cultures tend to stick together", and that even mothers who 
took their kids to school were "segregated." Tasha said she now defined herself as mixed 
race because that was how black people saw her. Similarly, Danielle said that she had 
never been made to feel different in the States where she lived from aged 6-10 even 
though there were no black, Asian or Oriental people; living in Camden, because of the 
"culture-overload", she had come to understand "that everyone was different", and that 
this made her feel different.
For many respondents, difference was overcome through transformation and a sense of 
self-empowerment, or a new awareness of difference where this no longer carried negative 
connotations. Like in the previous section which showed how essentialist and individualist 
discourses could co-exist alongside each other in the respondents' articulations of their 
own identities, respondents' personal evolutions involved recognition of their mixed 
raceness alongside recognition of their individuality and autonomy. The suggestion from 
these findings was that the respondents felt that they were allowed to become the person 
they 'essentially' believed themselves to be. However, respondents did not feel that they 
were the gatekeepers of their own freedom and freedom was still contingent on 
experiences and judgments from outside - that is to say, they did not have the unrestricted 
freedom to define themselves as mixed race, or 'just as a person', or to behave and be 
treated as they wished.
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Denial and Retrieval
This section focuses in particular on the importance of the family environment, and 
especially on how respondents perceived themselves in relation to both their parents. I 
examine what a small number of respondents, who talked in some depth about their lives, 
said about identity transitions in which they 'retrieved' or 're-claimed' a part, or 'half, of 
their identity which had previously been denied or lain dormant. This transition was most 
frequently articulated as a move away from respondents seeing themselves in monoracial 
terms, and through other people's eyes, to seeing themselves as mixed race. The process 
may be described as a transition from dis-identification with one 'half of the self to 
identification with the 'whole' self. In all cases this 'half was represented as the father's 
heritage, which in all cases was also the minority heritage. The re-claimation of identity 
involved recouping or instating an identity which the respondent essentially believed 
'belonged' to her, in which the marginalised culture was no longer rejected, but embraced. 
In all cases, respondents talked about how this retrieval was an assertion of their mixed 
race identity, or 'who they really are'. Thus, respondents had in the past conceivably 
experienced their identities as partial rather than whole precisely because they were not 
able, officially at least, to claim their 'whole' identity.
As discussed elsewhere, much of the earlier literature in the field of mixed race focused on 
what might today be considered a pathologisation of mixed race identity (see Stonequist, 
1937; Clark and Clark, 1939, 1947), and that problems arose for mixed race people 
because of their dis-identification with being black. Gibbs (1997) argued that choosing the 
black culture over the white could result in a negative identity formation which could be 
associated with the devalued social status of the black parents' culture. Gibbs and several 
other researchers have also claimed that over-identification with the white parent as the 
symbol of the dominant culture, could be at the expense of the minority culture. In her 
study of mixed race children in Britain, Ali (2003) found that identification with parents - 
'to be like' a parent - occurred in the context of both gender and race, where 
understandings of race were closely connected to colour and appearance. However, Ali 
(2003) also observed that whereas children with one black and one white parent
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sometimes identified as black, none of the children with one parent from other minority 
cultures identified solely with that culture. My data showed that none of the respondents, 
regardless of ethnic mix or whether they were first or second generation mixed race, 
identified solely with one side of their heritage. In all cases, respondents acknowledged 
both parents' racial heritages, where these heritages were frequently referred to in terms of 
'where they came from', for example, culture, country, nationality. As such, they did not 
efts-identify with either parental heritage. The emphasis on specifically racial/biological 
affiliation in the first instance - and in the second instance cultural affiliation - confounds 
the postmodernist notion that people are inherently free to choose their identities.
The work of the political philosopher Ernesto Laclau is interesting in this context. Laclau, 
in writing about universal and particular political identities, has argued that universals are 
not natural 'givens', nor are they ever 'whole', but rather are always contingent and 
symbolic of a 'lack, or a 'missing fullness'. This is what makes democratic politics 
possible: universals are forced to assume a stability which they do not possess, and a 
series of finite particularities aim to assume universal tasks which surpass them (Laclau, 
1996). Laclau states: 'The universal is the symbol of missing fullness.... [it] is part of my 
identity as far as I am penetrated by a constitutive lack....the universal emerges out of the 
particular not as some principle underlying and explaining the particular, but as an 
incomplete horizon suturing a dislocated particular identity' (Laclau, 1996, 52). Central to 
Laclau's argument is the idea that the subject is not a mere subject position within a given 
structure, as that would prohibit democracy, but that the subject is a 'will' which 
transcends structure, where this 'will' is formed from the lack within that structure and out 
of the need to identify with that lack. Thus, it is the conflict between different 
particularisms which temporarily fills the structural gap. Following Laclau, one could 
argue that universal categories of racial identification are not only forced to assume a 
stability which they do not possess - hence the blanket categorisation of mixed race 
people as black or some other typified mono-racial category - but that emergent and 
particular identities such as mixed race are what make democratic politics possible. As 
such, the advent of mixed race as a viable identity may have important implications for 
how identity is viewed more generally as fluctuating and changeable.
All the respondents discussed in this section said that the way other people categorised or 
perceived them influenced the way they saw themselves, that this made them feel different 
to others, and that this difference was the main reason for them re-claiming the part or half 
that was 'missing'. Zara (Columbian/Polish Jewish-English) and Clara (Angolan- 
Portuguese/Portuguese) actively sought more knowledge about their backgrounds where 
access to the culture of one parent had been denied: both had 'invented' their fathers' 
heritages and incorporated these into their own identities. Aasha (Indian/white American) 
had rejected her father's Indian heritage and later re-claimed it, whilst Bev (African 
(Cuban-Jamaican)/English) had switched from deliberately over-stating her mixed 
raceness, to accepting her mixed race 'self.
Ruby (Punjabi Indian/Irish) talked about how her family's denial of her Indian and Irish 
heritage had had the effect of causing her to deny her own difference. Being with people 
who had also experienced marginalisation had enabled her to start to accept herself, rather 
than always try to fit in with others. In Part Four, Ruby's articulations around the issue of 
discrimination within the family will be discussed. Ruby said:
"The way others see me has had a tremendous impact. It's taken me a long 
time to learn to trust myself and the way I see myself. It was not only 
important to deny my Indian but also my Irish background - even my mother 
denied my Irishness [she was Irish] because I was brought up in England, and 
I was the enemy for her. A few years ago I started meeting people who had 
been brought up in similar circumstances to my own and that's when I stopped 
feeling so different, people who had not only had racism outside the home, but 
also racial prejudice within the home. In trying to be accepted I denied a part 
of myself, especially my Asian heritage, in my late teens. Then I started to 
accept myself less as other people saw me, but on positive attitudes rather 
than seeing myself in negative terms. The change has been more a gradual 
thing, and in a way it still goes on. I'm not saying I'm sorted, it's still 
challenging and I still have to....maybe it's made me more acutely a\vare and 
vigilant but also stronger and able to know what's real and what isn 7. "
Zara, who grew up with her Polish Jewish-English mother, and had had a Jewish 
upbringing, became increasingly interested in her Columbian heritage in her late teens. 
She described this as a gap, something that had been denied. She did not seek out her 
father, whom she had never met, but in a sense replaced his presence in her life by 
'becoming' Columbian. She learned Spanish and began to have more contact with Latin 
Americans in her early 20s, and then married a Columbian and had a child with him. 
Although Zara was against categorising people in terms of race or culture, she wanted to 
be seen as Latin. As a child people had thought that she was Pakistani, and Zara believed 
that this perhaps contributed towards her 'inventing' herself as Latin American. For her, 
the 'wrong' categorisation was less to do with discriminating against Asian people than 
with the aspiration to be seen for who she felt she 'really' was, which was racially half- 
Columbian. Categorisation by others, then, not only asserted the respondent's difference 
but also asserted it as wrong, making the respondent doubly different.
"/ became much more a\vare of a Latin, I don 7 know, something Latin about 
me, almost like I could put a label on myself sometimes like I'm not Asian, I 
don't know, it's difficult to explain. In one sense I don't like being categorised 
or categorising, but there was this phase of me reinventing myself or adding to 
myself, and that is me purposefully consciously saying I want to make this part 
of me. I remember as a child they used to take the mickey out of me and call 
me Paki or whatever, and I'd be like 'look, if you 're gonna be racist then just 
get it right, don 7 ass...you know, call me what I am!' I don 7 know, I don 7 like 
it, I don 7 like be ing put into that, I think cos I feel like I 'm not that and I don 7 
relate to that....in one sense it's negative cos I'm putting Asian into a category, 
but just from my experience of Asian people, I don't want to be categorised 
like that. On the other hand I don 7 mind people categorising me as Latin cos I 
quite like to have that identity to a degree, maybe cos I felt like I didn 7 have it 
as a child, and it's almost like in my adulthood I 've recreated a part of myself 
and had links with a whole other world which I didn 7 really know much 
about. "
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Aasha, who grew up with both her parents in an all-white environment in the States, felt 
extremely unattractive as a child - "I was told by a boy I went to school with that I look 
like a monkey" - and as a result was very introverted and very into her library books. 
Questions around her identity from her Indian relatives and children at school gave her a 
negative image of her Indian heritage.
"My father's relatives came to stay when I was young and there were always 
questions about my name and why I looked different, and religion-wise too - 
all my friends were Christian and went to church and Sunday school and I 
didn 't know anything about that. Being half Indian I was different and people 
couldn 't figure out what it was, they thought I must be Italian, that's as exotic 
as they could think. I was embarrassed about my father, I thought people 
would look at him and not understand where he came from and that he spoke 
funny English. "
Aasha talked about two main turning points in her life, in which she first rejected her 
racial and cultural heritage and invented herself as 'white', and then later accepted her 
mixed race heritage. The first turning point involved a rejection of her father in the sense 
that he was the cause of the embarrassment she experienced: "I was embarrassed about my 
father, I thought people would look at him and not understand where he came from and 
that he spoke funny English." At the age of 9 she realised that she could fight back against 
being constructed as 'Indian' by refusing everything Indian:
"// had built up and at that age I realised that I could actually do things that 
could enable me to reject it, I didn't just have to be upset about those things, 
but I could say well I 've got a second name I can use, I don't have to eat this 
food, I can tell people my father is the neighbour, I can make up stories, I 
don't have to be this person. I went by my middle name which is Christine, 
because Aasha was too foreign, because I didn't want people to know who my 
father was, I didn't want to have anything to do with anything that was 
Indian."
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Aasha recalls the second "real" turning point at around age 14 or 15, when she began 
meeting new people outside school and started using the name 'Aasha' again. Getting over 
puberty and a physically awkward period was for Aasha the main factor. She believed 
that, despite the questions and taunts from others as a child and a teenager, she must have 
been getting some positive signals about her difference and the way she looked, and this 
helped her to see that being part-Indian was "alright, and even a good thing":
"/ began to feel comfortable about how I looked, and then I realised that the 
way I looked had to do with where my parents come from, and maybe it's an 
advantage to look a bit different, not to look like every blond blue-eyed person 
around you. I think when I had the reverse, you know, kind of accepting again, 
I think that was more subtle, I think that happened over time"
Bev's experience of denial and invention also had stages - she saw her difference as a 
disadvantage during childhood and began to utilise her mixed race to her advantage, and 
later finally accepted herself for who she was. As a teenager, being mixed race prompted 
positive reactions from other people, especially men, and Bev 'developed' her mixed 
raceness by attempting to see herself through other people's eyes:
"At 13 I looked like a boy, boys took no interest, they only liked blond blue- 
eyed girls. Then I grew my hair and older men liked me, I was always told 
what a nice mix I am, that Jamaican-English was the best mix, got loads of 
positive feedback from what I looked like. So I went from ugly duckling to 
what everyone wants and my head got enormous. By 151 was the best I'd ever 
looked, but I also realised the only reason men were interested was because of 
the way I looked - because I was mixed, not black nor white."
Like Aasha, Bev's turning point also came around 15, when she realised that she wanted 
to be classed as "me, as a person who is Bev is Bev, that has nothing to do with the actual 
race", and as someone who was mixed race and "lives by a mixed culture." Bev talked 
about the development of her own agency in this process of transition where she, like
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Ruby, had begun to be able to trust herself, and that acceptance of herself firstly, 
subsequently determined how other people saw her: "Now how I see myself will be how 
you see me. If I wait for you to make a judgement about how I am, and behave the way 
you expect me to, then I'm not being myself." Bev, like many other respondents, used the 
'self as self discourse, where personality and being mixed race was considered an 
important facet of personhood, but 'race' was not.
Clara's mother was white Portuguese and her father mixed race Portuguese- Angolan, and 
she had mainly white people in her family. Clara, like Aasha and Bev, talked about her 
identity transition as manifesting itself in two stages: the first stage invoked an 'invention' 
of the dormant minority heritage (similar to Zara), and the second concerned a shift from 
identifying with one particular culture to "acepting herself as herself (like Aasha and 
Bev). On her familial experiences she said:
"My dad has lots of issues with being black - he is black, but will die before 
tell ing you he is black. He 's Portuguese and refuses to accept blackness, black 
men he says are good for two things - breeding women, leaving them, and 
drugs. They said black Is no good, (hey tried to brainwash me into believing I 
am white and that white is better than being black. I was desperately looking 
to him for support and leadership, or him saying it was alright to be black, but 
my dad didn 't see it. Maybe that pushed me towards the black culture more, 
because they were so desperately trying to deny its existence. "
For Clara, her parents' denial of her mixed race identity, and her father's refusal to 
acknowledge his own black heritage, triggered a reaction against that denial. Furthermore, 
Clara also talked about the convent school she attended from age 7-16, where the white 
girls would scrub her hands with a nailbrush "cos they were trying to get my skin white", 
and that experiences of racism had contributed to her "leaning towards black." Thus one 
might argue that experiences of racism together with her father's denial of his black 
heritage provoked Clara into finding out who she really was. From the age of around 15, 
her feeling of being 'black' overrode any insistence by her parents that she was white
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Portuguese: "It's how I feel inside because my parents would say you're Portuguese, but I 
don't feel in the least bit Portuguese - so I think it comes from within, it's how I feel 
within - which is black." One might also claim that because of her experiences, Clara 
developed a greater sensitivity to what 'blackness' actually meant, and indeed, effectively 
'lived out' her father's heritage for him, and that 'feeling' black could in turn have 
influenced how she experienced racism.
"Growing up, over the years, I've had a lot of people coming up to me and 
saying 'what are you', and I know what they mean, it's like, what's your 
background, but it's actually made me ask myself what am I? I used to look at 
my mum and say I 'm not the same as her, and I 'm not quite as dark as my dad, 
and I always really felt as if I didn 't belong anywhere. I wanted to belong, 
identify with someone, say I 'm the same as that person, which means I 'm 
alright."
Overcoming self-doubt and racism appeared to be the catalysts in Clara's transition in 
recent years from a sole identification with her black heritage to a self-definition which 
also incorporated the notion of 'self as self: "People come up to me and say 'What are 
you?' And I'm like, first of all I'm a person before anything else. I've only come to the 
conclusion that I am me regardless of my colour in the last two or three years." Clara 
believed that she now possessed a strength which enabled her to recognise how her past 
experiences had contributed to how she saw her identity today. She was now able to go 
beyond her previously reactionary stance in her 'invention' of her black self to a 
recognition that her black identity did not stand separately, but was an intrinsic part of her 
'self as self. Her tone was defiant:
"When I was younger I did have a hell of a lot of issues around colour. I think 
mainly what its stem was the need to belong and not knowing am I black am I 
white am I Portuguese am I English am I that am I this?. There were so many 
questions in my mind and my parents didn't help me at all, so they probably 
added to my confusion. Now I 'm strong enough to say I 'm me, sod you lot,
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even though I identify more with black culture the bottom line is I don 7 give a 
toss about anyone else, this is me you can either like it or lump it."
To sum up, Aasha and Bev quite consciously 'invented' themselves, albeit in completely 
different ways. Whilst Aasha denied her minority parental heritage and Bev accentuated it, 
the effect and intention were similar in that both women sought to define themselves in 
such ways as to be more acceptable to other people. This was in contrast to Zara and Clara 
who consciously and deliberately retrieved their marginalized heritages; in the case of 
Clara this did not make her more acceptable, rather the opposite. In all four cases, the 
women had a clear idea about who they believed they 'essentially' were and had now 
become, and in all cases the women had switched from a role they believed was in some 
sense externally imposed, to one which was self-defining. For Aasha and Bev, the belief 
in who they now were was different to the 'inventions' of self they had previously been; 
Clara had partly relinquished her 'invention' of a sole black heritage, whilst Zara still 
thoroughly lived out what she described as her 'invented' role, where this had ceased to be 
invented and was now her actual identity. For these respondents, the quest for a sense of 
'wholeness' was the driving force behind the denial and invention of identity. It draws on 
essentialist discourse/theory, and again, in the struggle to become a complete individual, 
challenges it in a new way.
The respondents in this study articulated the duality of their identities, which drew 
strongly on the 'imagined communities' of their essentialised pasts which were seen as 
positive and integral parts of themselves. Bakare-Yusuf s (1997), in her investigation of 
the internal contradictions within the homogeneous construction of the 'black community' 
and the 'authentic' black female experience in a study of cultural taste, found that black 
women tried to make sense of the 'plurality of their identities, cultural ethnicity, cultural 
capital and experience, against the backdrop of some 'essentialising past' which attempts 
to homogenize the experience of the black (female) subject' (83). In contrast to this, the 
mixed race respondents in my study were attempting to make sense of their dual- 
essentialised selves against a backdrop of an 'essentialist past' in which their identities 
were socially ascribed as mono-racial. Arguably, identities were also forged against a
backdrop of the 'pluralist present' in which mixed race identity has often been regarded as 
the definitive postmodern identity - fragmented, shifting between two or more worlds, and 
never permitted to be 'whole'. As such, respondents' 'newly discovered' identities were 
perhaps possible only within such a postmodern world, in which difference and 
multiplicity were seen, in a superficial sense at least, as the norm. Thus, the formation of 
respondents' 'whole' identities involved the interplay between essentialist criteria insofar 
as these drew on knowledge of parental heritages, and pluralist criteria insofar as 
respondents were able to make personal choices with regard to assertions of their own 
racially heterogeneous, as opposed to racially homogeneous, identities. In this sense, 
respondents could declare their identities as static or shifting, and as invented, undone, and 
re-invented.
PART FOUR: EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION 
General experiences of discrimination
Experiences of discrimination of mixed race people have been recognised as different to 
the discrimination experienced by either people with two white parents or two black 
parents of account of the discrimination they may experience from both black and white 
people (Tizard and Phoenix, 2001 [1993]). In some contemporary academic circles there 
has recently been talk about whether discrimination on the grounds of class may override 
those on the grounds on race (informal discussions at conferences 2004). This, in my 
opinion, is another example of the snowballing effect of the de-racing (and de-gendering) 
of society: Whilst uttering the term 'race' still appears to send shudders down some 
(white) people's spines, class is discussed openly without impunity. This reflects both 
public discourse and policy rhetoric which talks about disadvantage and poverty (and 
disability) where this is still associated to a large extent with white working-classness. 
What follows is an account of what the respondents said about their experiences of 
discrimination, and not an analysis about what they meant by what they said. 
Discrimination was without exception talked about as racial discrimination, and never as 
gender or class discrimination. The findings refer to experiences of discrimination in their
169
everyday lives, and not whether they felt they had been discriminated against in education 
or in terms of life chances, which showed different results. The findings presented here 
radically contradict the findings on 'inclusion' and having the 'same chances' in 
education, which revealed that respondents overwhelmingly believed that they and most 
other people had equality of opportunity, and did not experience discrimination in 
education.
4 respondents said they had not experienced discrimination. 9 respondents said they had 
'not really' or 'generally not' experienced discrimination, and gave examples of minor 
incidents which they did not describe as discrimination. Aasha (Indian/white American), 
for example, said "I've been teased and made fun of, but I don't think I've been 
discriminated against." Chantel (English/African) claimed there was nothing specific 
about experiences of racial discrimination, and that discrimination on account of gender 
was just as prevalent. Similarly, Adriana (Angolan-Portuguese/ Angolan) did not see other 
people's perception of her as the 'odd one out' as anything unusual, and qualified this by 
saying that discrimination was inevitable and therefore not really discrimination because 
both black and white people always react negatively to perceived difference.
27 respondents specifically said they had experienced discrimination. The experiences 
ranged widely in both type and quantity. Some respondents regarded "little things" such as 
name-calling, or things which "happen all the time" such as queue-jumping as 
discrimination. Other respondents said, "I could go on for hours" and "tons, absolutely 
tons." Types of discrimination talked about were bullying at school, rejection, exoticism, 
institutional racism, and discrimination within the family. Discrimination from white 
people was usually talked about dismissively, whilst discrimination from black people was 
described as overt. Anita's (Mauritian/Filipino) quote illustrates how discrimination was 
normalised by some respondents: "I've been called Paki a few times by someone in a van, 
but I didn't really mind cos I knew I'm not from there and they're just racist, they are no- 
one important to me. So it didn't affect me, I started laughing, it doesn't matter." Dianne's 
quote also indicated how the normality of discrimination had become imbued into her way 
of thinking, yet just beneath the surface was frustration. Dianne (Welsh/Mauritian)
initially maintained that she had never experienced discrimination and yet within seconds 
revealed that she had:
"No, not at all, never. Actually my sister looks white although she is half 
Mauritian. When they see me in Cambridge they look at me as if I 'm some sort 
of alien because down there you won 'tfind any ethnics and when they do see 
one they make a judgement of you as if you're a thug or a bad person. It 
makes me feel horrible because people judge me because of the colour of my 
skin or race or cultural background, because I think it is wrong to judge 
people before you actually know them. "
I will focus more closely on intra-familial experiences of discrimination, and experiences 
of discrimination from black people, because the data gathered on discrimination was 
surprisingly extensive and this area of investigation has seldom been documented.
Discrimination within the family
8 respondents talked about discrimination within the family. Yasmine (Pakistani/English) 
resisted her stepmother's controlling behaviour by living a 'double-life' - "at home I was 
a quiet obedient little child, when I was out I was WILD." She said that her stepmother 
had been abusive, telling her she had "pig's blood" amongst other things, but Yasmine 
continued to talk to her "out of respect." Zaseena and Cathrina, both 16, said they were 
ridiculed for looking different to other family members. Zaseena (English/Jamaican) 
resignedly said her mother made fun of her colour: "My mum calls me yellow. She's just 
messin' about but, sometimes that gets on my nerves but, that's just life." Cathrina 
(Jamaican/Irish), whose real parental heritage was kept hidden from her as a child, said:
"When I was young I used to think that I was brought up in Spain and that I 
had a tan, cos I never knew that my dad was black. I thought my sister's dad 
and my brother's dad was mine [he was white]. We don't look nothing alike, 
like when I say that that's my sister they say no, it's not. "
Lindsey (Bajan/Scottish) said: "I learnt the truth about my family as I got older." Whereas 
her white mother's parents (her grandparents) treated the children "no differently", her 
father was treated "like shit." She said her mother had protected her parents and tried to 
blame it on them coming from Scotland where there were no black people. Lindsey saw 
her own hatred of her grandparents, her fury with her mother, and her adamant defense of 
her father as the reason her mother now says that her family is her children, not her 
parents.
Ruby, who was adopted by white parents, Ruby recalled an incident in childhood when 
she brought home a tin of curry powder and her mother had screamed at her and left the 
house refusing to come back in until Ruby had got the curry powder out of the house. 
Ruby explains her mother's behaviour in part as the result of the discrimination she herself 
experienced as being Irish in England in the 1960s. Ruby said that the nuns in the mother 
and baby home where she was born had told her birth mother that 'keeping her' would be 
a constant reminder to her of the sin she had committed of being with an Indian man. She 
says:
''My whole life is predicated on the fact that my parents couldn '/, /"/ just 
wasn 't acceptable the relationship that they had, I was not acceptable. It was 
unacceptable that my birth mother could keep me because I was mixed, and 
my search for my identity, this experience, is very much woven through this. 
And equally my up bringing, of being brought up as working-class English - 
there have been a lot of external influences that have determined what was 
and was not acceptable. So it wasn't acceptable to be Indian, it wasn't 
acceptable to be Irish, it wasn '/ acceptable to be working-class - so I almost 
removed myself from myself "
She said that these days she had to protect herself from her mother, but had a good 
relationship with her. Like the respondents discussed in the previous section on denial and 
retrieval of identity, Ruby's 'removal' of herself from herself was part of the process of 
bringing her closer to who she really was. She said:
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"My search is to be at peace with myself and to be at peace with all these 
different parts of myself that have caused a great deal of difficulty. It's 
reclaiming what was denied, it doesn 't matter about Irish-ness, Asian-ness, 
regardless of my racial heritage - it's how to feel good about myself. "
In an attempt to both understand and resist the discrimination they experienced, most of 
the respondents appeared to have entered into a process of self-examination in which their 
relationship to close family members, and by extension to larger society, was assessed and 
re-negotiated. Apart from Clara (discussed earlier in this chapter) who separated 
physically and emotionally from her family, the respondents dealt with their experiences 
of discrimination in individual ways. To some extent, however, it seemed that all the 
respondents attempted to come to terms with their experiences by normalising these and 
contextualising specific situations in temporal or cultural terms, and in the case of the two 
16 year-old respondents, by expressing resignation. Most respondents either said or 
implied that things were 'better' than before. The respondents saw themselves as bridge 
builders, and even as pedagogues, which involved a negotiation around and bringing 
together the 'black' and 'white' parts of the family. Constructing identity in such ways 
was possibly a form of self-protection against loss of and rejection from family members, 
but this area of research requires further investigation. This finding supports the data 
which shows that many respondents wanted to be recognised as mixed race, and indeed, to 
'make peace' with both sides of their heritages, an option which had not necessarily been 
available in the past. Dual-loyalty, one could argue, was therefore a requisite for the 
assertion of a dual-identity, a loyalty which was all the more precious because of its 
fragility. Lindsey's observation about her mother protecting her parents, and Ruby's 
recognition of the need to protect herself from her mother, are just two examples of how 
complex issues around family love and loyalty can be.
"Not black enough"
The subject of discrimination of mixed race people by black people, yet it was an 
important issue for many mixed race people I interviewed. Paul Connolly (1998) has
claimed: 'We cannot assume that racism will always be associated with beliefs about 
racial inferiority; that it will always be signified by skin colour; that it will only be white 
people who can be racist' (1998, 10). Gillborn (1996) has remarked that whilst black and 
Asian people can be said to be relatively powerless in the macro context, they can also 
exercise power and act in a racist manner towards their peers in micro settings such as the 
school (170). Several other authors have written about racism as recently fragmented into 
new composite and often contradictory forms of discrimination, and have suggested that 
the idea of'racisms' might be appropriate to explain this condition (Back, 1994; Rattansi, 
1995; Mac an Ghaill, 1999). One such 'racism' identified in the data was that of 'not 
being black enough', that is to say, of 'acting too white' and 'selling out' to the white 
establishment. Clare Gorham (2003) recently wrote: 'Black people see degrees of 
blackness - and in some cases, the wrong shade of black' (Guardian Weekend, 35). This 
again, draws on the notion of the one-drop rule mentioned earlier - one drop of 
'whiteness' can tarnish a black person.
In Weekes' (1997) study in a US context, 'acceptable' blackness' was defined in terms of 
an essentialist construction of Black womanhood, determined by the length and texture of 
a woman's hair, her skin shade, and frequently her parentage. As such, these constructions 
drew on highly gendered discourses. Weekes (1997) has argued that these perceptions 
come from the ideas that black women learn within their own communities, and that, seen 
from their marginal positions in society, a uni-dimensional version of blackness gives 
them a sense of relative empowerment (113). Creating essentialised identities on the basis 
of skin colour and hair texture therefore places many mixed parentage individuals on the 
'boundaries' of blackness (Weekes, 1997).
Hair, eye and skin colour were often mentioned by the respondents, and three second 
generation respondents specifically talked about being on the 'boundaries' of blackness 
because of'shade' discrimination. Nalia (3A Black/ 1A Chinese) said that she was singled 
out at school because of her "reddish hair", and was often told "you got something in 
you." Nichole (3A Black/ 1A White), who identified herself as mixed race to me, and saw 
herself as mixed race, chose to hide this fact from black people. She said:
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"/ have black people coming up to me and asking me if I'm mixed race cos 
I 've got green eyes, and I say no I 'm not, I deny it. I don'/ mention that my 
mother is half-white - I might say it to a mixed race or a white person, but 
they usually think I'm black any\vay. "
Kelly (English/Bajan), a first generation respondent, who was 'correctly' categorised as 
mixed race, said that she was bullied at school by a group of black girls for 'not being 
black enough' on account of being part of a group of white girls. She also talked to white 
boys, which the black girls did not like. She described this as "racism in a way, but more 
kind of a bitchy power thing, you know, you think you're better than us." Kelly felt that 
although she was not accepted by black people, she had an advantage over black people in 
being accepted by white people because she was mixed race.
"/ think that people are more willing to accept mixed race people than what 
they are to accept like a white person or a black person. If someone doesn 't 
like black people, sometimes they '11 accept a mixed race person cos they 've 
got white in them, but if a black person doesn 7 like white people they won't 
accept you cos you got white in you. "
Tasha (black American/English) experienced discrimination from black people, and 
especially from black men when they saw her white children. She said this was because 
black people were more into the idea of a 'black community', a view held by several 
respondents. Cathrina (Jamaican/Irish) expressed a sense of resignation, contending that 
there has been little progress in suturing racial divisions:
"Yeah, like some black people yeah, think like, cos know back in the day used 
to be like blacks on one side and whites on the other, a lot of racism used to be 
going on, like I was on the bus and I heard someone say that, ah, mixed race 
people they shouldn 't be made, black people should stay with black people 
and white people should stay with white people. Like when you listen to [music 
band], some black people think that half-caste people shouldn't listen to it, cos
they got apart of white inside. "
Danielle (English/Jamaican), as we have seen earlier, felt 'robbed' of her identity in being 
compared with mixed race celebrities, and talked about feeling 'in-between'. Danielle 
threw some light on this sense of'in-between-ness' by talking about what she perceived as 
other people's, including her friends', false categorisation of her as black, and rejection of 
her as mixed race. She talked about black friends being racist about white people in her 
presence, where they did not perceive her as white, and about the discomfort she felt with 
white people who assumed that she was "like black people."
"They don't think about half my family being white because it's part of me, 
but they [black people] don't think of me being different to them. "
"/ have always felt with some of the white people I've met that they think I'm 
not part of their race, they just brush me of and think oh mixed race people 
are like black people, they don't take in that, I don't like saying this, but that 
half of me is like them basically. "
As mentioned earlier, for many of the respondents, being seen as 'me', or for their 
'personality', was inextricably tied in with being perceived as mixed race, that is to say, as 
black and as white, or as black with some white, or as Turkish and English, etc. For many 
first generation black/white respondents especially, this meant defying pressures from 
outside to ally themselves with their 'black side' only, reclaiming their white identity, and 
standing up for who they felt they really were. In this sense, the 'I am-ism' mentioned at 
the outset of this thesis need not be understood as an expression of a culturally empty 
liberal humanist position as suggested, but as a signification of individuality personality 
imbued with racial and cultural experiences, that is to say, 'I am black and I am white, I 
am just me'. Lindsey and Jennifer, both categorised as black, felt that they had to 'defend' 
their whiteness. Lindsey (Bajan/Scottish, 19) expressed her anger at black people denying 
her mixedness:
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"// '5 mainly young black people talking about white people. They come out 
with rubbish and say "no offence ", that really bugs me. I have to defend my 
whiteness in those situations. Sometimes I have to say like, excuse me, my 
mum's white you know, and they'll say but I'm not talking about your mum, 
something stupid like that, they just don 7 get the point. People like that I can 7 
be bothered to explain myself to. "
However, Lindsey also conveyed her lack of agency in being able to do anything about it, 
remarking: "It becomes too familiar to me, I defend it and then I forget about it. But I 
don't want to let them get away with that, what they just said to me." For Jennifer 
(Caribbean-Asian-Portuguese/English-Irish), who asserted "I am not afraid to say I'm 
mixed", said the fact of her whiteness - through her white mother - was just as relevant to 
her as the fact of her blackness - through her black father:
"/ 've had people try and say to me you 're more black because my skin's dark, 
but I say to them I 'm just as much black as I am white because at the end of 
the day my mum's white and my dad's black so I'm mixed. It doesn't bother 
me now because everyone seems to know that everyone has got a bit of 
something different in them. "
Categorised as 'black' by other people, yet self-identifying as mixed race generated 
problems for many mixed race respondents insofar as they were neither seen as 'white 
enough' (from white people) nor as 'black enough' (from black people). It is my 
contention that exclusionary essentialist politics, both in public discourse and government 
policy, have emphasised homogeneity, and that this has reinforced 'black consciousness' 
amongst many black people. This has inevitably had considerable consequences for mixed 
race people who have developed a race consciousness which attempts to 'go beyond' 
blackness. The danger is, that an assertion of mixed race identity draws specifically on 
essentialist categories of, for example, black and white. As such, thinking around mixed 
race identity may go 'beyond black' but not 'beyond race'. Respondents were, after all, 
simply using and reflecting the discourses they knew. I would argue therefore, that the
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political processes which surround social relations require further investigation in the 
context of mixed race people who experience the mismatch between self-perceptions of 
their own heterogeneity and the discourse of black and white homogeneity as 
exclusionary. The following quote epitomises the notion of 'going beyond' the social 
construction of race, to reveal the concept of the liberal, liberated, and essential T which 
some social constructionist theorists find so threatening. For Chantel (English/African) 
this assertion of this T is in itself the process of'becoming' a person.
'7 sometimes hear people say 7 look in the mirror and I know it's a black 
person standing there, know it's a white person standing there, ktww it's a 
half-caste person standing'. I look in the mirror and I think I know it's a 
person standing here who hasn 7 achieved everything they need to, who needs 
to go out today....! don't think about the colour of my skin, I just never think 
about them kind of things, not because I never have, I just don 7 think it's 
important."
A consistent theme running through the findings in this chapter has been how many 
respondents appeared to construct their identities against homogeneous constructions of 
selfhood. Observable too, has been how these constructions were defensive positions, and 
were frequently rationalized using a 'race logic' in which 'undesirable' personality traits 
and/or behavior were depicted as inextricably tied to a person's race and/or culture. It is 
difficult to ascertain to what extent these understandings focussed on race specifically, as 
opposed to culture. Indeed, in her study of mixed race children, AH (2003) observed that 
race and racism were not always the most salient in their lives, and that they were more 
concerned with colourism, culturism and nationalism. The form ideas around race took 
was often conflated with ideas about culture, religion, etc. In my study, it is certainly 
possible - as we have seen in the respondents' articulations on what the term 'mixed race' 
meant to them - that they conflated the concept of race with concepts of culture, colour, 
religion, nationality, language, accent, etc. The key point here is that notions of difference 
and experiences of discrimination were the principal issues talked about by the 
respondents, and that differences between people were, to some extent at least, seen as
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'natural'. It follows that discrimination against specific people was therefore also seen as 
natural. In this vein, Malik (1996) has persuasively argued that pluralism and a focus on 
difference has created a situation in which differentiation and inequalities between people 
will always exist, and for this reason endorses a universalistic conception of personhood.
'Race logic' was also used by some respondents to demonstrate how they should be 
exempt from discrimination because, in biological and racial terms, they did not belong to 
the group which was discriminated against. Zara, as we saw in the previous section, felt 
'incorrectly' discriminated against for being Pakistani when she was actually half- 
Columbian, and described how she unwittingly became caught up in categorising and 
stereotyping others in the assertion of her own identity. Corinne's view was that it was 
illogical to discriminate against someone with whom one had biological or racial 
similarities, and imputed this common-sense understanding to others. In this sense, 
Corinne (Jamaican/Irish) had naturalised a 'race logic' which made some people the 
'natural' and logical victims of discrimination, and others, those who had white in them, 
the 'wrong' victims. Therefore, apart from being pushed down the stairs by her Irish uncle 
when she was aged 6 because she was black, Corinne saw her mixed race identity, her 
biological make-up, as protecting her from racism. She said:
"That's the only discrimination I've ever had in my life, that was it. I think 
I've been protected from that cos I'm mixed race. I mean obviously it's not 
going to stop it, people are always going to be racist and discriminate, but 
being mixed race I think it does, it shields you because people can't, if they 
throw abuse at you, if they're while they realise that you 've got some white in 
you. "
The data in this chapter shows that many of the respondents clearly saw their own 
identities in terms of their relationships with other people. In general terms, the relevance 
of relationships with others was talked about in respondents' articulations around 
friendship, feelings of difference, how they felt they were perceived by others and whether 
they adapted in different situations, and the ways in which many of them felt they had
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changed over time. More specifically, respondents talked about the impact close 
relationships had on them in terms of the discrimination they experienced within the 
family, and the 'turning-point' experiences of self denial and non-acceptance to 
acceptance of self, where these experiences were invariably linked to intimate 
relationships such as those with parents. It is probable that a similar study done with 
mixed race men in further education in London would have yielded different results. 21 
out of the 32 respondents who were asked who they were brought up by, grew up in single 
parent households - 19 with their mothers only (60%), and 2 with their fathers only. 
Given this finding, it perhaps seems surprising that gender was explicitly raised as an 
issue so rarely by these respondents. Even in the respondents' articulations around the 
denial and retrieval of identity and experiences of discrimination, in which parents were 
often implicated, gender-specificity beyond a mere reference to 'father' and 'mother' was 
not talked about. One could argue that this is indicative of a post-feminist stance 
(McRobbie, 2000) in which the dominant discourse of gender equity positions 
discrimination as a 'thing of the past', and therefore renders any discussion around the 
issue of gender erroneous and misplaced.
The 1990s saw the 'post-feminist' assertion of'girl-power', which heralded an assertive 
femininity and paved the way for considerable new opportunities and freedoms for women 
(McRobbie, 2000). In terms of education there have certainly been advances for women, 
many would say largely due to feminism as well as other developments in education and 
family systems (David, 2003); national results, for example, show that girls perform better 
than ever before in schools, even in subjects such as maths, science and technology (see 
Francis, 2000). Post-feminism was a discourse which marginalised feminism, and 
constructed women as independent, successful, and equal to men. Whelelan (1995) has 
argued that young women are internalising this post-feminist ideology, and so too that 
feminist politics is a waste of time. As McRobbie (2000) observes, few young women 
today identify as feminists. In a study by Volman and Ten Dam (1998), the authors argued 
that students refused to describe gender differences because inequality was seen as 'old- 
fashioned', and the students believed that gender differences should not have relevance. 
Several feminist authors have pointed out that it is still masculinity and the masculine
principles of individualism, and the co-principles of competitiveness and instrumentalism 
within the context of education, which are valued and furthered over feminist and/or 
feminine ways of doing things. As McRobbie (2000) has pointed out, this 'assertive' 
femininity is far from being evidence of feminism. Rather, she argues, it merely shows 
how far a popular version of feminism 'can be pulled in the direction of the political right, 
where the values of brutal individualism and the pursuit of wealth and success turn all 
personal and social relationships into an extension of the market economy' (211).
The respondents' (working) class positions were established from details they gave about 
their backgrounds, educational trajectories and so on, and in their identity constructions 
(Skeggs, 1997). However, like gender, the issue of class was absent from the women's 
talk about their lives. The links between femininity and class have been stressed by some 
authors, particularly the ways in which young white working-class women are positioned 
by discourses of the 'right' kind of femininity (Skeggs, 1997). It is likely that the absence 
of class and gender was partly due to the fact that, unlike the issue of race, I did not 
specifically ask the respondents about gender and class in the interview questions. 
However, the infrequency of respondents' allusions to gender and social class does appear 
to support research showing that these structural issues are understood as less salient to 
individual lives than might have been the case previously (Volman and Ten Dam, 1998). 
In the interview questions on experiences of education specifically, issues concerning 
class and race were alluded to by only a small number of respondents, and gender was 
absent. Issues around the inter-sections between gender, class and race will be discussed 
further in Chapter Five.
This chapter has examined how respondents constructed their identities in terms of their 
own self-perceptions and in relation to others, how they felt their identities had changed 
over time, and respondents' experiences of discrimination. The data reveal that theories of 
essentialism, postmodernism or individualism singularly applied are not helpful in 
understanding the complexity and multiplicity of ways in which the respondents 
constructed their personhood. Rather, aspects of these different theories and their interplay 
are useful for understanding the different contexts of the women's lives.
The next chapter, Chapter Five: Experiences and Views of Education, discusses the 
interview data on the respondents' perceptions and experiences of education, and their 
opinions on education policy discourses, and considers this data within the context of the 
government and policy discourses around personhood and equity identified and explored 
in Chapter Three: Policy Analysis.
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS OF EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I revisit the themes and concepts laid out in Chapter Three: Policy 
Analysis, and discuss these in relation to the data collected on the respondents' 
experiences of education and their opinions on government policy around education. To 
recap, in Chapter Three I examined some of the key discourses in government education 
policy and some of the critiques of these discourses, and I analysed a selection of three 
post compulsory education policies (Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997), 
The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998), and Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 1999)) for the 'stories' 
they presented, how people were represented within the framework of inclusion and 
exclusion, and how the documents constructed subjecthood (see Ozga, 2000). Chapter 
Three discussed the theme of lifelong learning, the over-arching instrumentalist, economic 
and personal development discourses and the related discourses of equality of opportunity, 
individual responsibility, and the value of education (Fryer, 1997; DfEE, 1998; DfEE, 
1999). The questions asked in the interviews arose out of the themes and discourses 
identified in these documents, and the analysis of the interview findings involves an 
exploration of how the respondents positioned themselves in relation to the dominant 
discourses in education policy.
Part One of this chapter examines respondents' experiences of education, namely, what 
respondents said about their choices of courses and colleges, their plans for the future, and 
whether they felt they had had the same chances as 'everyone else' in education. Part Two 
explores respondents opinions on current discourses in further education policy, namely, 
what they thought a 'good education' was, other people's inclusion, and whether people 
could 'learn to want to learn'. Part Three explores what a small number of respondents 
who were critical of government discourses and education policy initiatives said on the 
subjects of race, class, identity, in/equality and educational aspirations and opportunities.
Recent social theory has focussed on how personhood is influenced by the processes and
pressures of individualisation. I draw on Beck et al.'s (2001) notion of individualisation, 
which he describes as 'institutionalised individualism', to contextualise respondents' 
experiences of education and their opinions on current government discourse on 
education, and how this is mediated by the respondents' perceptions of race, class, 
rationality, stasis and change. However, whilst Beck et al. (2001) have argued that class 
has been superseded by 'lifestyle', I take the view that individualism is embedded within 
structural inequalities and oppressions which are a reflection of class processes (see Reay 
and Ball, 1997; Ball et al., 2000; Reay, 2000).
PART ONE: EXPERIENCES OF EDUCATION
Respondents' choices and experiences of courses and colleges
There has been increasing interest amongst UK researchers in how working-class people 
make educational choices in secondary and tertiary education, and the complexity of the 
process of young people making choices in education has been highlighted by the growing 
literature in this field (see Maguire et al, 1999; Ball et al., 2000; Foskett and Hemsley 
Brown, 2001). Research has shown that environmental factors, the family and social 
context such as culture and class, the institutional context, and the context of the daily 
experiences are significant (Ball et al., 2000). Several studies have indicated, for example, 
that Asian students were more likely to follow professional career paths (Mirza, 1992), 
which may be related to the entrepreneurial concerns of their parents. Recent research has 
shown that choice is framed by a complex array of interacting factors in which young 
people take a path of least resistance by either staying on at school or following a course 
which is the norm for their socio-economic group (Foskett et al., 2003). A recent study on 
young people's trajectories into post-compulsory education (Croll and Moses, 2003) found 
that whilst intentions regarding staying on at school were strongly related to parental 
education, there was a significant minority of children from families with no qualifications 
who achieved good GCSE results. The study also showed that the orientations to stay on 
in education amongst school pupils at the age of 11 were strong predictors of the choices 
they actually made at 16. This supported other recent research which indicated that
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continued later involvement in education depends on participation in education 
immediately post-16 (Gorard and Rees cited in Croll and Moses, 2003).
Choice of college
21 respondents (over half the sample) said they had chosen the college because of its 
location, where this usually referred to- its proximity to home or work. This finding 
underlines the government policy objective that FE colleges should serve local 
communities, and gives an indication as to why they have survived as local colleges. 
Apart from location, social reasons were highly prioritised in their choice of college, and 
the respondents either had friends there, or friends/relatives had recommended the college, 
or respondents wanted to meet people from different backgrounds. A few respondents said 
they wanted to go 'somewhere different': Danielle "wanted to jump in at the deep end", 
whereas Keisha, who travelled over an hour from north London to east London every day 
said she chose the college because she "liked the facade." Only one respondent said she 
had tried other colleges first, one said she chose the college because it had childcare 
facilities, and one because it was a "good college." Three respondents said that they had 
chosen the college because it was the only one offering the course they wanted to do, and 
three students said they had had no choice in coming to that particular college.
Type of course
Nearly all the respondents said that they were doing an academic course, whilst in fact 
only a few students were doing A Levels, AS Levels or Access courses. The government's 
recognition of the lower status attached to vocational qualifications by both young people 
and employers has led to what Mizen has argued are vocational qualifications with an 
academic 'sheen', such as the new 'vocational A levels' and 'vocational GCSEs' launched 
in 2002 and 2003 respectively (2003, 460). This pseudo-conflation of the vocational and 
the academic by the New Labour government has perhaps led to some confusion about the 
status of qualifications, and it is possible that respondents perhaps viewed any type of 
qualification as 'much of a muchness', or gave little thought to the differences between
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vocational and academic courses/qualifications. This contrasts with a study done in the 
late 1990s in two secondary schools in southern England, in which Killeen (1999) 
observed that students had an awareness of the difference between academic and 
vocational qualifications. The prevailing view, Killeen (1999) argued, was that any kind of 
degree course, regardless of its content, was seen as better than following a post-19 
vocational education and training route. My data would appear to support the 
universalistic notion depicted in education policy that any kind of learning or education 
serves a purpose and has value in itself. At the same time, it supports Raggatt and 
Williams's (1999) argument that some forms of education are valued over others and that 
in our culture status is attached to academic qualifications as opposed to vocational ones.
Choice of subject/course as positive
Reasons given for choosing particular subjects/courses were diverse and specific. Almost 
half of the respondents said they had chosen their course as a means to an end, for 
example, to get a particular job, career or to gain a qualification. 24 respondents 
specifically said they had experienced no problems with the course/college and gave 
positive feedback: most said they had learnt many new things or that it was a good course. 
Around one quarter of the respondents, usually students who were doing hairdressing, 
beauty, fashion or art courses, used words such as "like", "enjoy' or "interesting" to 
describe how they felt about their courses.
Other positive aspects of course choice concerned the notion of personal change. Three 
students said they had wanted a change in direction: Tasha had previously done 
hairdressing from home, and was now doing an Access to Nursing course; Clara said she 
needed a complete change from working with mentally handicapped people and was now 
doing a hairdressing course, "to give me time to myself and catch my breath"; and Dianne, 
who had originally planned to do a performing arts course and then decided to study law 
instead "because I wanted to change my whole identity as a person", and it had given her a 
chance to "find herself." Bev said she now had "routine and order. I haven't had to think, 
everything is planned for me and I only have to turn up and work."
Around one quarter of the sample clearly viewed their current education as positive and as 
worthwhile for its own sake, where these respondents tended to be unspecific about why 
they had chosen particular courses. This finding supports a study by Francis (1999b), in 
which secondary school students' discussions of post-compulsory education reflected a 
discourse of the 'importance of being educated' per se, without explaining why it was so 
important. The main theme here was that education provided greater alternatives in the 
future; it potentially 'opened doors' or 'broadened horizons'. Siham said that her 
qualification might get her a better job, but the main reason for studying was "because I 
just wanted to do something." Peta, who had done an NVQ in Childcare, said the course 
she had done was "another notch in my belt, something to fall back on", even though she 
was now doing something completely different. Anabel said the computing course she was 
doing was for her own personal development, and would help her and her work colleagues 
generally. Chantel, who was doing a Business Studies course which had forced her "to be 
more intelligent because you have to use your brain", also said:
"/ needed a course which would take me onto a career path where I would 
have more options. There are things I love more than this course but because 
it opens more doors, this is a money world and I want some of it, and that's 
about it."
Lack of choice
Four students said they had not had a choice about the courses they were studying. Cerisse 
had to do a summer course which prepared her for GCSEs. Cathrina said the course had 
been chosen for her by the school as "they thought the course would be good to help me 
with my reading and writing, and get me better grades." Zaseena, who was doing a basic 
level course chosen by her school teacher, said: "I don't want to do anything. After school 
I wanted to stay at home and look after my brother, and get a Saturday job, but my mum 
wanted me to have better grades than I did so she said go to college." Lindsey, 19, was 
doing the only course offered to her [a basic general vocational course] because she had 
failed the entry test to do GCSEs. She expressed anger at this:
"How the hell do they expect you to improve if they 're going to be like that - 
I had no preparation and I 'd been out of school and not done any thing for a 
year. I didn 't have a choice. I don V know if I 'II pass [the course]. I don't 
know where I 'II be in a year. "
Problems with courses
Only a small number of respondents said they personally had problems with the course, 
giving reasons such as being too tired after work (Anabel), failing courses (Yasmine), or 
having difficulties with assignments (Jennifer) or exams (Dianne). Three respondents 
mentioned problems of management, such as timetables getting mixed up and tutors not 
turning up (this was referred to by Asha who had to travel some distance to the college), 
that the college had a "bad attitude to students" (Nadia) and did not keep them informed 
about changes, that too many people started the course because of the high-drop of level. 
Lindsey said she had not received the support she needed, and Peta had left her course 
prematurely because she had had a "weak tutor." Three respondents referred to the issue 
of 'race' as a problem: Aleasha said that she had problems with the people in her class 
because she believed they did not like her because of her colour. She said it was "a race 
thing", and because she did not talk slang like them "they think I think I'm too good for 
them." Nichole, who had expected a totally mixed class said that she was "shocked that 
the course consisted mainly of white people, and 5 token black, and 5 token Asians!" Zara 
commented on being troubled by the division she observed between Asian and white 
students at the college she had attended a few years ago.
The main obstacles to learning outlined in the selected policy documents were not 
experienced by the women in this study. None of the respondents, for example, expressed 
any worries concerning the 'simple physical problems of the time, costs, location, range 
and accessibility of learning opportunities' and nor did any of them talk about the 
'absence of childcare, transport arrangements and even course times which may not fit in 
with collecting children from school make difficulties for parents with school-age 
children' (Fryer Report, 1997, 3.3). This finding is perhaps not surprising given that the
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respondents were all education users, and it should be borne in mind that a sample of non- 
users of FE may have yielded very different results. The issue of 'institutional and 
personal racism' referred to in Learning for the Twenty-first Century (Fryer, 1997) was 
talked about by only one respondent in questions around education; this, as discussed 
elsewhere, was in stark contrast to the responses to questions around identity, in which the 
issue of racism was frequently acknowledged.
Some education research has shown that an 'extensively diversified market in post-16 
options produces instability and dislocation' (Fergusson et al, 2000, 283). In a study of 
800 16-19 years olds, at least one third engaged in multiple trajectories which were 
explicable within a language of markets and choice; this is a market, however, which not 
only fails to translate into the rational discourse of transition from school to employment, 
or into further or higher education, but also does not allow the possibility of'opting out' 
(Fergusson et al., 2000). Therefore, being faced with an increasing range of options 
entails, rather than provides a route out of, dependency. The findings in this section, which 
show that most respondents were studying in FE because they wanted to, and that 
comparatively few students - many of them in the 16-19 age range - said they had lack of 
choice or problems with the courses they were studying, challenges the supposition that 
top-down educational policies have created 'an army of reluctant conscripts to post- 
compulsory education' amongst 16-19 years olds (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997, 17). The 
findings are also interesting in the context of Fergusson et al.'s (2000) study which 
showed that over three-quarters of their sample were there by default or because they were 
badly informed. The apparent discrepancies between the published research and my 
findings may provide a useful basis for further investigation into the reasons behind mixed 
race and black people's articulations of experiences of FE.
Futures: "As long as you're happy..."
34 respondents were asked about how they saw their futures in order to gain some insight 
into whether there was any correlation between course choice and educational and career 
trajectories. The 5 respondents not asked were ex-students who were now working
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(Aasha, Brenda, Peta, Tania and Ruby), none of whom said they had any plans to change 
their careers, and two of whom had jobs which were unrelated to the qualifications gained. 
The questions asked were: "How do you see your future? Do you think you will have the 
skills and qualifications you need to do that/get there/etc?" All the respondents asked said 
they were working towards some specific objective. 30 of the 34 respondents studying in 
FE colleges at the time of interview (including Yasmine and Zara who were not in an FE 
college, but were still involved in education - Yasmine had a place at an FE college to 
qualify further and Zara was at university) were positive about gaining the qualifications 
and skills they needed in order to follow their proposed courses of action; these students 
all responded "yes" or "I hope so" to the second question.
A further finding showed, however, that whilst the majority of respondents were lucid 
about their aspirations or career plans, related these directly to the course they were (or 
had recently been) studying, and believed they would have the necessary skills and 
qualifications to progress on their chosen paths, 19 out of the 34 respondents were 
simultaneously equivocal about their futures, and did not have a clear vision of where they 
would be or what they would be doing in the future. This finding contrasts sharply with 
the findings presented so far on the rational instrumentalist benefits of education, the 
belief in meritocracy, and respondents' plans for the future. It would seem that 
respondents were able to think in both the short and long term about their educational and 
job aspirations, but could not actually envision themselves within those projections. The 
discrepancy between the respondents plans and their perceptions of reality can be 
described as a state of liminality in which young peoples' futures in the labour market are 
perceived as inherently unclear (Bettis, 1996 cited in Archer 2003a).
Many respondents distanced themselves from the idea that their futures (in an educational 
and labour market context) were predictable, and talked largely in terms of'keeping their 
options open' with regard to their educational and career aspirations. The discourse of 
personal development was palpable, and the underlying notion was that something - even 
if it was not a good job - would come out of education. It seems therefore, that 
respondents believed that nothing could be taken for granted, but that everything was
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'worth striving for' (see Lewis and Maude 1950, 245). Following Beck's (1992) notion of 
the 'risk society', it is conceivable that this was a rationalisation of how many respondents 
perceived their futures as risky and peripatetic. Similarly, in a study of working-class 
people's participation in HE, Archer et al.'s (2003) showed that respondents believed that 
a university degree would enhance their employment prospects, but that they also believed 
that there were considerable risks attached to post-graduate employment because the 
employment market was overcrowded. My findings are also echoed in a study of mature 
students' participation in Access to HE courses, in which they, perhaps unwittingly, 
justified going along with the government's agenda by choosing to view education as 
'personal insurance' (Warmington, 2002). These findings show how a dominant discourse 
may become part of a personal narrative which supports and upholds that discourse.
Several respondents described their futures in terms of dreams, and referred to the concept 
of happiness as something more important than following a particular career path. Nadia, 
for example, who was studying drawing and painting, said: "As long as you're happy it 
doesn't matter whether you get a good job at the end of it - I'd rather be happy and pot- 
less." Dianne said: "I try not to think about the future too much, just let things happen, 
whatever life brings really. I see my qualification as leading me to something happy, it 
doesn't matter what I do as long as I'm happy." Adriana said that she was working hard 
towards becoming a lawyer because she wanted to be "doing something good, something 
I've worked and qualified on", but that "the main thing is being happy with what you're 
doing, so I might even change my mind about what I'm doing."
Some respondents made references to their dreams and then commented on how they had 
done something else. The theme of 'dreams' was also one observed in a recent study by 
Archer and Yamashita (2003a). Jennifer, who was doing an NVQ in Beauty Therapy, said 
that the most important thing was to "fulfil your dreams", but because she did not know 
what she wanted to do, "maybe medicine or science", she had chosen "something 
enjoyable first." Olga, who was learning English as a second language, said her dream was 
to be a translator, but also that she just wanted a job - "nothing special just something that 
can make me independent, and be happy with my daughter." Paula, studying for a
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Diploma in Public Services, felt she was settling for less than her dream to be a forensic 
scientist, but accepted that because she was "not good at science, a police officer will do." 
Chantel said: "I have no idea! I dream too much. University would obviously be the ideal, 
but I can't know for sure!." In accordance with the dominant discourses around the take 
up of educational opportunities and individual responsibility, the reference to dreams was 
perhaps self-protection against the pressure to make a career choice which the respondent 
felt they might not succeed in and yet were compelled to aspire to nonetheless.
The apparent mismatch between the respondents' high self-expectations regarding their 
futures, and the way they talked about their futures as uncertain is borne out by Fergusson 
et al.'s (2000) study on the unstable trajectories and multiple relocations experienced by 
16-19 year olds. The authors claim that: 'Movement seems opportunistic rather than 
purposive. It is characterised by ad hoc, multiple and diverse experiences rather than any 
semblance of 'career'.... It is a system in which inclusion is assured, but outcome is 
uncertain' (Fergusson et al., 2000, 295). The findings also echo Bloomer's (1997) 
challenge of the assumption that learning careers accord with rational planning; rather, he 
argues they 'happen or 'unfold", and that many young people's 'futures are unpredictable 
to the extent that there is much that is unpredictable about the conditions under which 
unfoldment and happenstance takes place' (153).
These uncertainties about the future are also reminiscent of what Bourdieu has referred to 
as a 'sense of limits', in which a person's habitus constrains choice and action. Hodkinson 
et al. (2000 [1996]) have argued that choices are formulated within 'horizons for action', a 
concept which allows for the incorporation of both static and fluid elements of a person, 
and is the interrelationship between 'pragmatic rational decision-making, choices as 
interactions within a field, and choices within a life course consisting of inter-linked 
routines and turning-points' (358). Within these horizons of action, people take measures 
to maximise their chances of success and simultaneously minimise their sense of failure. 
Supporting this view, Archer and Yamashati (2003a) in a recent investigation into inner 
city school leavers post-16 aspirations observed that young people 'knew their limits' in 
that they tended to choose 'safe' options in terms of staying with the subjects and courses
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they felt they were 'good at' (58). The issue of class is key within these more generalised 
observations about post-16 aspirations and choices, and draws on the idea that people are 
not passive players within dominant discourses, yet still have limited choices (Reay and 
Ball, 1997).
The idea of a 'sense of limits' does not sit comfortably with the rhetoric around creating a 
'learning society' which advocates further education and presents the potential student 
with a wide range of educational choices. Given the education discourses and policy 
discourses discussed in Chapter Three, one might expect that more and more people will 
choose to stay on in education because without qualifications they will be 'unmarketable'. 
As such, whilst seen as a choice, tertiary education is perhaps not so much an option as an 
imperative. As we have seen, the majority of respondents, in terms of their intentions at 
least, transgressed the supposed 'limits' of their social and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 
1984) and talked positively about their aspirations for the future. However, the degree to 
which respondents believed their 'limits' could be overcome was constrained in so far as 
they did not appear to be able to realistically envision their futures as they imagined them.
None of the respondents explicitly talked about 'not being good enough', 'knowing their 
limits' or choosing 'safe options' with respect to course choice or plans for the future. 
This was in contrast to the findings in Archer and Yamashita's (2003a) study. A few 
respondents appeared to have what one might call 'excessive aspirations', in so far as they 
were doing level 1 or 2 qualifications and talked about embarking on long and arduous 
educational careers. Whilst I do not in any way suggest that these respondents' goals were 
unattainable, the findings raise the question of whether they were inadvertently setting 
themselves up to fail in the bid to conform to the government discourse of the 'educated 
individual'. In two of the three cases below, the respondents put the onus of responsibility 
for their possible failure not onto themselves, but onto something external to them.
Nichole, who was studying towards a Basic Maths certificate, wanted to be a reception 
teacher. Nichole's attitude was that if she did not succeed she would not blame herself. 
She charted her educational route:
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"/ then need to do GCSEs, A levels, an Access course, then a degree, and 
then a PGCE. It's a long, long process. But I need to do this or I'll stay a 
nursery nurse for the next 40 years..... If I don't get anywhere, it won't be 
because I'm not good enough, but because competition is so fierce. "
Nichole's viewpoint may have arisen out of an awareness that education does not 
guarantee the desired job. Indeed, it also suggests that aspirations may be limitless 
precisely because personal 'failure' can always be disguised within such a 'no guarantee' 
framework. Cathrina, who said she had difficulties with basic numeracy and literacy, was 
doing an NVQ/Certificate for Skills and Working Life (level 1 qualification). She said she 
did not know whether she would get the necessary qualifications to become a primary 
school teacher, but that if she did not, it would be because she had changed her mind: "I 
don't know if that's going to happen cos I might like something else after I do the course." 
In contrast to Nichole, Cathrina framed her views within the discourse of 'eternal choice'. 
Petra, who was studying for a GNVQ in Foundation Science, wanted to be a doctor or a 
therapist. She believed that anyone can go to college provided they put their mind to it - 
"it's free, and you get enough money to live on" - and that success was down to hard 
work: "If they want to be here they have to work hard, no-one can force them. If they 
don't want to be here it's because they don't want to use their brains."
The findings on respondents' futures, although limited in scope, reflect the government's 
emphasis on individual responsibility to take up the educational opportunities on offer, 
and so give a people a sense that they are investing in futures of their own choosing 
(Peters, 1996). In a culture of responsibility to the self, in which education is both a right 
and a duty, people are expected to become managers of their own biographies on pain of 
being left behind or economic sanction, and at risk of personal failure. Those who do not 
become outsiders or 'status zero' (see Fergusson et al., 2000, 289). As Beck et al. (2001) 
have observed, within this schema the interests of the individual and rationalised society 
are merged, which the authors call the 'paradox of institutional individualism' (23). The 
findings demonstrate that the appearance of conforming to the rhetoric of 'achievement'
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and 'self-responsibility' was evident, and any sense of personal limitation was disguised 
within the government endorsed discourse of education for personal fulfilment. Any 
ambivalence or uncertainty about respondents' futures - whether articulated in terms of 
happiness or dreams, or excessive aspirations - were expressed within the government 
discourses of economic efficiency and personal development central to the policy 
documents discussed in Chapter Three (Fryer, 1997; DfEE. 1998; DfEE, 1999). Although 
very few respondents explicitly said that education would not necessarily ensure a 'good 
job', this understanding was implicit in the way many respondents resorted to a 'quality of 
life' discourse as a protection against a sense of personal failure. As such, the sense of 
'duty to oneself in taking up educational opportunities available may increasingly co- 
exist with the idea that education is useful in itself, and following Beck et al. (2001), 
people may value their 'own time' and happiness over work, status and materialism more 
and more.
PART TWO: OPINIONS ON POLICY DISCOURSES
The value of education: "Education is better than silver and gold'9
Respondents were asked what they thought a 'good education' was in order to evaluate 
some of the similarities and differences between policy discourses and personal opinions. 
The responses to some extent corresponded with how the women spoke about their own 
educational futures. Respondents talked about education as providing a range of different 
purposes and functions, and as something good in itself. The responses strongly 
underscored the discourses of economic efficiency and the value of education (in terms of 
instrumentalism and personal development), and the policy discourse of learning as an 
investment for individual reward. The requisite of a 'good education' was described by 
around a quarter of the sample as about getting good grades or the right qualifications. 
Around half the sample referred to the importance of issues of support and access, such as 
the "good teacher", "good facilities", "good resources", "equality of opportunity" and 
"access to opportunity", as fundamental to a 'good education'.
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Education was in multifarious ways a means for 'self-betterment', in which life-skills such 
as eclecticism, adaptability and happiness were frequently prioritised over job and career, 
and a way of gaining access to the 'good life' where this did not necessarily have to mean 
a high income or material wealth. The narrative manifested itself in two main ways. In the 
first way, education was described in materialist instrumentalist terms, and was seen as 
necessary for a "good job" or a "better job" or a "job you want to do", and for "getting 
somewhere in life." Over half the respondents reflected the policy discourse of 
meritocracy, and said that the higher the level of education, the better the chances a person 
had of getting a good job. As Nichole succinctly put it: "If you don't study then you don't 
get that prize job at the end of it." Not much research has been done into the opinions of 
young people around the relationship between jobs, education and the economy. Francis's 
(1999b) study of school students' opinions on post-compulsory education has showed that 
there was an unproblematic link made between academic success and future job prospects. 
These instrumentalist findings support the discourses discussed in Chapter Three (Fryer, 
1997; DfEE, 1998; DfEE, 1999), in which a direct link is made between (lifelong) 
learning and education, an economically competitive society, personal success, and 
individual responsibility.
In the second way, education was seen as crucial to self development. Many respondents 
combined instrumentalism and personal development in their articulations around the 
value of education, where a combination of the two constituted the potentially 'better', 
more 'rounded' individual. My finding contrasts with a study by Killeen (1999), who 
observed that students adopted a wholly instrumentalist view of education, in which 
qualifications could be directly exchanged for employment opportunities. Peta said that a 
good education was a fundamental aspect of the person: "Good job, good prospects and a 
good life, and being independent and confident, a good grounding basically. It's part of 
the whole persona, it's very, very important." Keisha referred to a good education as "not 
only to get a job, but I want to do it for myself, yeah, I think it's important to learn as 
much as you can while you still have the brainpower, and you can still get a good job from 
it." Emma said that education was about "getting everything that you want, doing 
everything that you want to do, finding out things for you." Bev, who saw a good
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education as something which would enable her to work so that she could get "the house, 
the car, the holiday", also said that it was about "stimulating your brain" and about doing 
things "that will benefit other people and help them be productive." (The alternative for 
Bev was being "at the mercy of what telly puts into your head"). This amalgam of the 
functionalist and personal benefits of education, which hold within them a diversity of 
possible outcomes, is supported by the discourse of the liberal individual as an 
'unfinished' self perpetually striving for completion.
Some respondents talked about the relevance of education within the broader spectrum of 
'life'. This may be compared to the way in which the policy documents discussed in 
Chapter Three saw personal investment in education as a holistic endeavour which not 
only made the person 'better', but benefited society as a whole (Fryer, 1997; DfEE, 1998; 
DfEE, 1999), Ella said that "it's not just about getting the grades, it's about having the 
understanding and applying it to life because that is the whole point." In a similar vein 
Kelly remarked: "Education itself is not the key, it plays a big part in people's lives but 
it's what you do with it that matters." Paula said: "It's the most important thing in life, and 
it should come first before any other thing." Keira said: "My parents told me that 
education is something no-one can ever take away from you. That is what it means to me."
The older and/or ex-further education students tended to emphasise the theme of self- 
development, and play down the economic function and instrumentalist gains of 
education. Their narratives strongly reflected a humanist discourse in which a direct link 
was made between the 'innate' value of education and becoming a better person. The 
responses are to some extent reminiscent of what Foucault has referred to as 
subjectification, in which the individual becomes constructed as self-surveying acting 
subject who seeks self-understanding (Rabinow, 1986), 'invited', so to speak, to take part 
in the quest to 'get to know him or herself better'. Anabel claimed that learning itself was 
like a key which could 'unlock' and 'liberate' a person from ignorance:
"Education is better than silver and gold - that is something that has been 
instilled in me, learning is the key, the only thing that can unlock you from
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ignorance. And I mean it's not a case of having an education to earn loads of 
money, it's that freedom from ignorance, and yes, so, you liberate yourself so 
that you can grow and sprung in different directions, whereas without an 
education its just like you are sunk in a pit that you can't come out from. Your 
inclination could be to be a carpenter, good, it's a humble job, right? But at the 
same time you have moved from that stage of ignorance to one of knowledge 
and you grow in that field, and all sorts of qualities will develop as a result of 
being in that field."
For Ruby, talked about a good education in terms of her own life, and said that it was first 
and foremost about her search for her identity, where this involved sharing experiences 
with other people who were also searching for their identity:
"The education I've received in my life has been much more than just about 
my formal education. I feel I 've been very much educated by other people 
looking for their own identity. It's about sharing experiences, I think that's 
been a really key thing, and to have access to as many opportunities and as 
much information, to be well-supported and have people believe in you and 
your abilities, and to believe that everyone has ability. "
Unlike almost all other respondents who talked about the value of education in terms of 
benefits for themselves only, whether this was in instrumentalist or personal development 
terms, education for Zara was primarily a source for enabling people to think analytically, 
and a fundamental prerequisite for the broader political project of equality and justice. A 
'good education' was an important aspect of individual identity in that it opened up the 
possibility of alternative independent modes of thinking which could potentially have an 
impact on the kinds of choices an individual would feel were available to them. As such, 
Zara's views reflected the discourse of social inclusion, and she was the only respondent 
who made any reference to the issue of agency and the power of the individual to effect 
wider change in society, identified in the policy documents.
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"Something that helps you to think, be analytical, be able to act and take 
decisions that will help you to be independent. It should be able to give you 
the ability to act in a way that sort of enables you to deepen democracy and 
make society a fairer place, in the sense that people have more control. 
Education and control are linked quite a lot, control over one's life, one's 
future, ones decisions. I suppose it's choice, which doesn't imply that 
education actually does that at the present moment, or the education that 
I 've had has done that, but that's what I think is a good education. "
Tania also saw a good education as part of a wider political project, but her articulations 
were supported by both the discourses of both social inclusion and economic efficiency. 
Unlike Zara, who believed that independent thinking was essential to creating a more 
egalitarian society, Tania argued that people should be educated in the trenchant 'basic 
values' espoused by the Tories in the early 1990s, and that a cohesive family structure was 
the cornerstone of both the 'rounded individual' and an economically competitive society.
"A good education would bring out the best in people, would enable a person 
to know themselves, what their strengths and weaknesses are. People should 
be educated in morality, relationships, parenting, forgiveness, discipline - if 
the government wants an economic society it has to deal with the root of the 
problem which means building a secure society through reviving family 
structure."
The findings on the value of education suggest that consumerism was a significant 
motivation behind getting an education, but that other factors frequently played an 
equally, and in some cases more important role. These findings are consistent with Beck et 
al.'s (2001) assertion that material sacrifices are bearable if they are accompanied by a 
guaranteed increase in self-development, where this has arisen out of a considerable shift 
in the social perception of what constitutes wealth and poverty in recent years (162). The 
authors argue that for many, the 'conventional symbols of success (income, career, status) 
no longer fulfil their need for self-discovery and self-assertion or their hunger for a 'fuller
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life" (Beck, et al., 2001, 38). The findings, however, refute their claim that the 
development of personal capacities is intrinsic to the 'better educated and more affluent 
younger generation, and that the older, poorer and less educated groups remain clearly tied 
to the value system of the 1950s' in which people's main goal in life was a 'happy family 
home, a new car, a good education for their children and a higher standard of living' 
(Beck et al., 2001, 38). As the authors have pointed out:
'On the contrary, the old and apparently eternal pattern of 'more income, 
more consumption, more career, more conspicuous consumption' is breaking 
up and being replaced by a new weighting of priorities, which may often be 
difficult to decipher, but in which immaterial factors of the quality of life 
play an outstanding part. Control over a person's 'own time' is valued higher 
than more income and more career success, because time is the key that 
opens the door to the treasures promised by the age of self-determined life.' 
(Beck etal., 2001, 161)
The findings in this section show that education was understood largely in terms of its 
functional-instrumentalist value and its potential for developing the individual on a 
personal level. They support the policy discourse of investing in learning for reward 
discussed in Chapter Three (Fryer, 1997; DfEE, 1998; DfEE, 1999), expressed in the 
words of David Blunkett: 'Learning is the key to prosperity - for each of us as individuals, 
as well as for the nation as a whole' (DfEE, 1998, 7). Learning was seen as something 
which in itself had only advantages, and no disadvantages. Respondents did not talk about 
benefits of education for the economy or society, but saw education in purely personal 
terms - as the pathway to the 'good life', where this invariably involved getting a 'good 
job', and becoming a better or more complete person. Only one respondent said that the 
act of self-betterment had the potential for creating a better society. In this sense, almost 
all the respondents appeared to have bought into the idea that the interests of the state and 
the individual - as the joint beneficiaries of education- could be merged.
Same chances as everyone else?
Only 4 respondents explicitly said that they felt they had not had the same chances as 
everyone else in education, or that they had not had the education they would have liked,
and in all cases these were second generation mixed race where their racial heritage was 
predominantly black. (This, as discussed elsewhere, contrasts with findings on experiences 
of discrimination generally). This finding suggests that the vast majority of respondents 
believed that they were the beneficiaries of an egalitarian education system, and as such, is 
underpinned by the discourse of equality of opportunity in education.
Aleasha was the only respondent emphatic about not having had the same chances as 
everyone else. She had attended an all-black secondary school, but left because of 
incessant bullying, and therefore did not sit her GCSEs; the same thing happened at 
college, where she said she could not concentrate, experienced a lot of fear, and failed her 
exams as a result. She then got pregnant (she was a single mother) and took two years out 
before coming to her present college to do a GCSE in Humanities. Anabel, who was a 
teacher studying a computer course for her own personal development, said that she had 
"not always" had the same chances; the discrimination she had experienced from lecturers 
on her degree course "was so overt I really felt that I stuck out like a sore thumb", and she 
felt she had had "to work extra hard" to get her degree. Colleagues, in contrast, had always 
been supportive "even though they were all white."
Nalia was one of very few respondents who made any reference to class differences and 
unequal chances in education. She said: "I've probably had the same chances as other 
working-class people, but not the same chances as upper class people." Nichole too, made 
reference to class distinctions: "In the beginning, no....I had few advantages in life and 
had to struggle to become a nursery nurse." Brenda, also a second generation respondent 
said that she felt she had had the same chances as everyone else, but made a distinction 
between her own experiences and those of her siblings:
"/ think I have. I did well at school, which helps a lot, so I could make 
informed choices, and if things went wrong that was my fault. Certainly I had 
the opportunity to make choices. I was a self-starter, and had a lot of self- 
motivation. I think racism affected my siblings though, they went back to 
school and college and did the whole thing again as mature students. "
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Three of the four respondents who felt that they had not had a choice about their college 
courses also implied that they felt they had not had the same chances as everyone else: 
Cerisse said that she had been forced to do a summer course; Zaseena, as mentioned 
previously, had not wanted to do anything, but also said she wanted to be a beautician, and 
gone to college because her mother had told her to. Lindsey recognised that she could 
have done better at school if she hadn't had 'boy trouble', but also said that being 'on her 
own' in failing exams was because she was not as clever as her friends who could both 
'bunk' and pass exams. At the same time, she felt she should have been given a second 
chance to do her GCSEs at the college she attended. Her personal narrative therefore 
shifted from one of self-responsibility, to one of 'innate' intelligence, to one in which the 
responsibility for a person's education (and future?) lies with the education provider.
"Yes, definitely at school, but I messed up big time, I could have worked 
better. Some teachers had faith in me but I had a lot of boy trouble. I was on 
my own - me and my friends we 'd bunk lessons and that, but they was a lot 
cleverer than me, a lot cleverer, and they still got their GCSE 's, even though 
they got a D or a C. Here I haven't had the same chances cos they didn 't let 
me do my GCSE's. "
Whilst most respondents said they believed they had had the same chances in education as 
everyone else, the majority of these respondents also said that there were specific groups 
of people who were not equally included in education. In response to the question: 'Do 
you think that everyone is equally included in education?', 8 respondents said they 
thought that everyone was equally included in education and 31 respondents said they did 
not think everyone was equally included in education. Of those who replied negatively, 8 
respondents did not qualify this further, and 9 respondents said "poor people", and 9 
respondents said "disabled people" or "people with Special Needs" were not equally 
included in education; in addition, 5 respondents said race or colour was sometimes a 
problematic issue with regard to inclusion, and four people answered "yes and no." These 
findings are supported by the discourse of social inclusion, and the policy discourse of 
social inequity which is founded on the idea that a sharp 'learning divide' exists within
British society. The data to some extent also reflect the increasingly universalistic policy 
line on personhood - most clearly in evidence in the latest policy Learning to Succeed 
(1999) - which makes little or no reference to race, culture, ethnicity, gender, and some 
references to disability and people with 'learning difficulties'.
Self-responsibility: "It's there if you want it"
The discourse of self-responsibility for learning was strongly in evidence in the 
articulations of the respondents around inclusion in education, and underscores the 
discourses of equality of opportunity, individual responsibility, and the responsibility of 
the individual to learn. Most respondents in this study, as we have seen in Part One, 
believed that their choices were largely unfettered. They saw themselves as responsible for 
the decisions they made about their futures, and believed personal success was down to 
motivation and commitment. Social background and low self-expectations might impede 
other people's choices to get an education, but most respondents saw themselves as 
exempt from such constrictions. The dominant view on education was 'it's there if you 
want it'. Asha put this bluntly: "Yes, if they want it. Everyone has the chance to learn but 
not everyone wants to take the opportunity to learn, but it is there for everyone." The 
implication here was that there were no external barriers to accessing or participating in 
education, or that these could be overcome. Moreover, not only was education freely 
available, but it was up to the individual to take, and make the most of, their chances in 
education. The mass availability of education in Britain was in itself seen as a marker of 
an equal society, and any inequalities which did exist could be ironed out by education. 
Thus, education was also seen as a great equaliser of difference, and that it was up to the 
individual to 'get educated' in order to 'get over' whatever was bothering them.
It was interesting to note that all 4 respondents who did not believe they had had the same 
chances in education said they did not think other people were equally included in 
education either. However, they all saw the problem as lying with the individual and not 
down to external contributing factors. As such, they also used the narrative of'it's there if 
you want it' which supported the discourses of equality of opportunity and individual
responsibility. I will examine what 4 women said on the theme of inclusion in education. 
Aleasha said that whilst not everyone was equally included in education, this was
"not the government's fault, but the individual's fault, because people 
discriminate against each other - the college is very strict on the race thing 
and stops it to a certain extent. It's people's fault why it happens. One of my 
really big problems is how to be included - inclusivity doesn 't work for me. 
Everything reverts back to discrimination. "
Like Aleasha, Anabel did not think everyone was equally included in education and also 
saw the problem as lying with the individual. In contrast to Aleasha, however, who 
believed the problem of exclusion was down to people's discriminatory behaviour, Anabel 
saw the main problem of "denied opportunities" as the choice young people themselves 
made not to study, where their attitudes were influenced by the prevalent 'get rich quick':
"I don't know why people have been denied opportunities, maybe they 
themselves have contributed to why those opportunities were not offered to 
them. It could be to do with attitudes to learning, where it's all about getting 
rich quick - every teenager now wants to be a pop-star or a model. So they 
think why must I go four years and study hard at university and struggle on a 
grant, and you come out with a debt of how many thousand pounds. "
Nichole, who was studying Basic Maths and wanted to become a reception teacher, and 
felt she had had "few advantages in life", also said that she was "determined" to succeed 
in her aims and suggested that some form of'sacrifice' was necessary in studying, as this 
was the mark of true commitment:
"// 's up to you. I don '/ think there are any barriers, it's there if you want it, 
you just got to go and get it. It would be harder if you have dependants but you 
have to make some sacrifices to get what you want, and some people aren 't 
prepared to do that. "
Nalia was the only one of the 4 respondents discussed here who believed that other 
people were not equally included in education where this was not solely down to the 
individual. She talked about the kind of inequities which education research 
literature has revealed exists around access to and participation in education. She 
said:
"Not really no. They try but it's hard Some people have the ability but they 
still fall through the net. Attention is mostly given to those that do want to 
learn, and that's hard enough, and others just get ignored. "
Ultimate 'failure' in education was perceived by over three-quarters of the sample as the 
individual's inability to 'keep up', where poverty and disability - and notably not class 
and race - were named as the main markers of disadvantage. The omission of race, gender, 
class, ethnicity, etc. in respondents' articulations was again reflected in the policy 
documents, especially in the latest one Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 1999) which made 
only one reference to each of these classifications. Disability as the most frequently 
mentioned classification also mirrors the policy documents.
Despite acknowledging that some people experience barriers to education, the main idea 
amongst the respondents was that such disadvantages could be overcome. The findings 
support the idea discussed in Chapter Three, that individuals are responsible for taking up 
education in so far as it is made available to them. Dianne asserted that "even disability 
has special schools, and overseas scholarships give everyone globally the chance to 
study." Nadia defended the education system and said: "they [the government] haven't got 
the means to make it better and are doing sterling work considering." Whilst recognising 
that some people such as mature students and single mothers might find going into further 
education "quite hard to wangle", Nadia asserted that the important thing was "to want it 
enough - it shouldn't be so easy that anyone can do it willy-nilly and take advantage." 
Bev said that of the thirty women who started her course (of whom only two did not have 
children and most were single mothers), only fifteen women were left. However, 
according to Bev this was not a problem of childcare, cost, or timetabling, as the course
was designed for people with children, but a problem of personal motivation. As such, the 
responsibility again lay with the individual:
"Despite the daily problems, it's down to you to get work done. Not everyone 
has the same chances, you have to really want to do it, you have to help 
yourself. But it will be hard, and that scares a lot of people - the government 
doesn't tell you that...The only people that won't be educated are those who 
can '/ be bothered, and have to work in menial jobs. "
Respondents' frequent references to 'poor people' - which was not reflected in the policy 
documents - as not being equally included in education, was reminiscent of a social 
exclusion or disaffection discourse, in which people 'opt out' or become 'status zero' (see 
Fergusson, 2000). The insuperable benefits of education through equality of opportunity 
and personal development, evident in the policy documents (Fryer, 1997; DfEE, 1998; 
DfEE, 1999) discussed in Chapter Three, Francis (1999b) has pointed out, sees those who 
are uneducated as a problem (see especially DfEE, 1998). By placing the responsibility for 
learning on the individual, as we have seen in the policy documents (Fryer, 1997; DfEE, 
1998; DfEE, 1999), those who do not learn, or choose not to learn, are deemed inadequate 
persons - a situation of 'educated' versus 'under-educated'. Within this framework, it is 
possible that respondents were distinguishing themselves from (poor and disabled) others 
by way of a dependency/independency dichotomy in which respondents saw themselves 
as independently making choices about their lives and their futures, and posited their own 
agency against the supposed dependence of those unable (or unwilling) to help 
themselves. This supports criticisms of government policy, criticisms which hold that the 
reasons for exclusion are understood as fundamentally located within the (deficit of) 
individuals themselves, where these individuals may be aggregated into pathologised 
social groupings (Colley and Hodkinson, 2001, 335).
Education was represented as the panacea for all ills by the respondents, in which getting 
an education was seen as both a right and a duty, both to the self and the state. This clearly 
reflects the government/policy discourses of a) learning as an imperative and b) the onus
of responsibility on the individual to take up learning, discussed in Chapter Three. 'Duty 
to oneself to learn was represented as non-negotiable by the respondents, where the 
responsibility for that task lay with the individual. The notion of 'it's there if you want it' 
replicates the government's policy aim of creating a 'culture of learning' within British 
society, whereby once all external barriers are removed, nothing stops the person from 
getting him or herself educated. This was expressed through the idea that not only can 
"anyone can do it", but also "everyone should do it."
Learning to learn: "It has to come from within"
The question: "Do you think people can learn to want to learn?" elicited the opinions of 28 
respondents (excluding the 5 pilot project respondents, and 7 others) on how they saw 
other people's attitudes towards education and learning. This question related to the 
rhetoric of lifelong learning, and specifically the government's policy objective of creating 
a 'culture of learning' (Fryer, 1997; DfEE, 1998) discussed in Chapter Three. The impetus 
behind this question was to gain some insight into how respondents viewed possible 
constraints on aspirations and participation in education.
The responses correlate with the findings above on self-responsibility in education, that 
'it's up to the individual' and that education is 'there if you want it'. As such, the findings 
uphold the discourses of equality of opportunity, individual responsibility, and the 
responsibility of the individual to learn. Personal motivation was specified as the key to 
learning success, and lack of motivation was identified by most respondents as the main 
reason why people chose not to learn. The predominant finding was that respondents used 
a narrative of'innate predisposition'. This finding did not correspond directly with any of 
the discourses around education identified in Chapter Three; it did, however, support the 
humanist position on selfhood discussed in Chapter One. Many respondents said that 
people had to be predisposed towards learning, that the will to learn was something which 
was innate, or "came from within", and that this "depended on the person", or was down 
to individual personality. Referring back to the findings above on respondents' opinions 
on inclusivity in education, it would appear that these views are in danger of pathologising
those they identified as 'poor' or disabled' people, in which their 'inability' to help 
themselves may be due to an inherent and predisposed lack of motivation, rather than due 
to, for example, a failure of resources. The fundamental danger here is that 
individualisation is discursively linked with individual pathology (Ball et al., 2000; Beck 
et al., 2001). Social inequalities are explained away by individual disposition and social 
problems are increasingly understood in terms of personal psychological inadequacies 
which are no longer seen as being rooted in the social realm (Beck et al., 2001).
Chantel said that the basic resources had to be available, but that after that it was 
essentially down to the individual: "If you want to learn you will learn. You can help, but 
it has to come from within." Similarly, Sherry said:
"Everyone has different ideas and aspirations. It has to come from within, the 
decision is up to them. It depends on personality and what they really want to 
do. It depends on where they are in their life, whether they want to do it, or 
depends on what they want to do, you know, depends on whatever turning 
point they 're going through. "
All eight respondents who said that everyone was equally included in education used the 
narrative of personal responsibility and also said that learning could not be forced. Nichole 
said: "Education is there if you want it, you can't force people, it just depends on the 
person", whilst Adriana said "If I want to do nothing what can you do about it? Some 
people are just too laid back and don't put themselves up for it." Similarly, Petra 
commented: "At the end of the day it's their choice to be someone - if they don't want to 
do it you can't force 'em." Parents too, according to Asha, were superfluous in this 
respect: "Some people are forced by their mums but if you're not interested you're not 
going to learn nuffink. Some people they just don't want to learn nuffmk." Danielle 
flippantly remarked that nothing could make people want to learn, adding "well, not 
unless you paid them", and laughed as she realised that her idea was probably not as 
disingenuous as it first sounded.
About half of the 28 respondents said that changes in attitudes towards learning were 
possible over time, where these respondents nevertheless drew strongly on the notion of a 
predisposed or core positive attitude to learning. As Kelly pointed out: "It has to be there 
from the beginning, from day one." Whilst some people would never change, Kelly felt 
that she was advantaged over others because of her early experiences, where her 
relationship with her grandmother especially was crucial to her later decision to apply for 
university to study dance: "My nan's very educational even though my parents weren't -1 
always had her in my ear badgering on. It's a lot to do with yourself - either you get on or 
you don't." As if to emphasise this point, she drew a parallel with her brother, who, 
despite the extra support he got at school "just abused it....he got away with so much 
being dyslexic, and would never change his negative attitude towards education."
Like Kelly, Bev believed that some people would never change, but saw herself as an 
exception, not least within her own family, where the birth of her daughter had been a 
turning point in enabling her to make a 'different' decision for herself. Bev contrasted 
herself with her friends: whilst she was succeeding against all odds through her own 
personal effort, they were being 'left behind', where this was a personal choice and one 
which Bev perceived as apathy. She said:
"Some people are quite happy to stuff sausages, that's how they like to live. A 
lot of my friends love to watch day-time TV, go out for a couple of hours, rave 
at the weekend They don't want their heads in books. Mine was a personal 
choice and I want letters after my name cos no-one in my family has done 
that..... People might not think there is anything better for you, and you might 
be happy with the people that you 've been with at the tomato packing factory 
and you don't want to leave. "
Some respondents talked about the 'right moment' or 'turning point' which had initiated a 
transformation within them. Paula said that she believed that people do change but that it 
"takes time"; Tasha said that "this is the right time", as her children were now older; and 
Nadia who, talked about her desperation at being an 'at home' mum, said it had taken her
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a "long time to get round to it, you have to catch people at the right moment."
Some respondents talked about the different attitudes to learning of teenage boys and girls. 
For Zaseena, the predisposition towards learning was inherent and did not change as 
people, notably boys, got older. She asserted that:
"Even with a 'second chance' people would still mess up. I don't think it 
could change, it's just what the boys want, they 're not willing to change 
theirselves. Girls, you can help them, but most girls are just like boys, you 
can't change them either. "
Cathrina, on the other hand, claimed that younger and older people had different attitudes 
to learning. Older people, according to Cathrina, had external pressures which reflected 
the discourse of individualisation in that people lacked the ability to 'choose' whether they 
wanted to learn or not. 'Messing up' for young people was directly related to peer pressure 
which condemned studying as 'uncooP, and she gave her opinion on how she saw this 
impacting on girls. This peer pressure often resulted in bullying which was occasionally 
about race and "usually boys on boys and girls on girls", but generally about what people 
wore, and whether "it's in fashion or not, if you've got the new stuff." Cathrina said:
"Yeah, cos when you 're young you don't think that it's really important to 
learn, and you get older you realise that you gotta learn, there's not really a 
choice.....Youngpeople think that it's unpopular to go home and study, you 
should be out with your friends and getting into trouble, yeah, they think that's 
good, they might lose their reputation if they 're studying their books a lot. "
Recent research has shown that the manner in which boys' constructions of racialised and 
classed masculinities are linked to the ways in which they approach education. Frosh et al. 
(2002), for example, observed that young men constructed masculinities around being 
'hard' or 'cool' where this involved adopting an anti-school attitude. Similarly, Archer 
and Yamashita (2003b) have found that constructions of 'bad boy' masculinities are
constructed in opposition to education, and are perpetuated because they are a safe option 
in which their peer status is assured. The social context, in this case the FE college, is an 
expression of the 'social' life of a person (Ball et al., 2000) and is one of the contexts 
within which self-esteem and the pressure to establish group identity is found amongst the 
16-19 age group. This research is also reflected in the following quote from Cathrina:
"Boys think college is pathetic, they 're either smoking weed or making kids,
16 year-old boys or 15 get a girl pregnant, it's a sport to them, for them it's
popular to chat about stuff like that, just tell them [the girls], 'do what you 're
doing about it', and they don 7 care, and that just messes up girls' lives.... they
forget about the girls, it's just the next girl innit. "
The data findings in this section give an indication of how respondents believed things 
'ought to be'. Many respondents presented a picture of the 'ideal' individual as one who 
was responsible for her own motivation, success, etc. and one against which all others 
should be measured. Yet as we have seen, whilst able to articulate a view of the person in 
positive idealistic terms, most respondents did not see themselves as able to live up to this 
'ideal' in real terms.
The findings support the popular contemporary view held by some sociologists that 
traditional determinants of social relationships, particularly those related to social class, are 
gradually being replaced by a process of'individualisation' which emphasises choice, and 
that identities are based on lifestyle as opposed to socio-economic position (Beck, 2001). 
They also echo the observation made by Ball et al. (2000) who have asserted that young 
people see themselves as individuals in a meritocratic setting, and not as classed members 
of an unequal society. Pakulski and Waters (cited in Reay, 2000, 675) have argued that 
issues of exploitation and exclusion based on distinctions between class are disappearing 
within public policy, and that the lack of collective political action is further confirmation 
of the irrelevance of class. The findings crucially draw attention to the apparent 
incongruity between the discourse of individualism and any possibility of political action. 
This is a theme discussed further in Chapter Six.
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Conclusion: A homogeneity of discourse
The main government discourses were identified as economic competitiveness, social 
inclusion and the related discourses, implicit within these, of the value of education, 
individual responsibility, and equality of opportunity and meritocracy. These 
discourses legitimised and perpetuated policy movements around instilling a culture of 
learning into the population, learning as an investment for reward, the onus of 
responsibility on the individual to learn, and the idea that society is inequitable but that 
individuals have agency and the power to effect change for the better. The interview 
data on education reveals, moreover, that the most respondents' views about their own 
educational experiences and their opinions on education policy discourses to a large 
extent reflected the discourses of individual responsibility, equality of opportunity and 
meritocracy. Most respondents believed in the intrinsic value of education, 
meritocracy and individual responsibility, and that they had benefited from equality 
opportunity policies, and indeed, saw their own lives as testimonies to the success of 
government policies and initiatives in education. In summary of the chapter so far 
then, there was a remarkable uniformity between the broader government and policy 
discourses, and the discourses communicated by the respondents on the subject of 
education.
Articulations about their own and other people's educational chances seemed to suggest 
that the majority of respondents were unaware of (or chose not to talk about) the 
implications and impact of structural constraints on the kinds of choices and decisions 
available to themselves and others. Indeed, the discrepancy between, for example, 
respondents' positive articulations about their educational opportunities and experiences of 
education, and the governments' concerns about the obstacles to learning currently 
prevalent in British society, may even suggest that these respondents were one step ahead 
of the government in their discursive promotion of individual responsibility. Personhood 
was seen as both a universalised phenomenon, in the sense that everyone was 
fundamentally equal, and as differentiated, in the sense that some people had drawn the 
short straw. However, drawing the short straw was down to individual responsibility: most
respondents appeared to believe that when it came to education, structural constraints on 
the individual were not a problem, and if they were a problem, that it was up to the 
individual to cast them aside. These findings illustrate the power of the neo-liberal 
discourses to locate responsibility in the individual, and to pathologise any 
underachievement as individual failure (Bauman, 2005).
The data show that the ways in which respondents constructed their everyday identities 
were fundamentally different to the ways in which they constructed their student identities: 
whereas talk on identity emphasised 'race', talk on education downplayed 'race'. What is 
of crucial importance here is how discourses of individualisation were drawn upon by the 
respondents in their talk around experiences of education and their opinions on government 
discourse around education, in which the effects of class, race and gender were divorced 
from the effects of equality of opportunity.
PART THREE: RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON RACE, CLASS AND GENDER
In contrast to the apparent lack of reflexivity amongst the majority of respondents on how 
discourse 'positioned' them in society, a small number of respondents talked about how 
external factors and structural constraints impacted on their own and other peoples' lives. 
In the final part of this chapter, I will explore some of the issues around choice and 
limitations in relation to race and class which were talked about by these respondents. 
They suggested that the processes of individualisation, to some extent at least, concealed 
underlying structural inequalities, in which mixed race or black working-class people did 
not have the same opportunities as everyone else. This supports the idea discussed in 
much of the educational literature, that structural inequalities circumscribe the kind of 
choices which are actually available to some people (Ball et al., 2000; Archer et al, 2003). 
Despite this, however, the respondents who held these views appeared to be no less 
embroiled within the discourse of individualism than other respondents. Their opinions 
may be framed within the liberal belief that the individual is a self-directed and distinctive 
entity affected by external variables such as socialisation and context, but simultaneously 
separate from these influences (Kitzinger, 1992, 229).
University: 'Breaking the mould'
Reay et al. (2001) have pointed out that the decision to go to university, whilst a routine 
one for most middle-class people, is an active and rationalised one for people from 
working-class backgrounds. Eight respondents explicitly talked about going to university 
(one respondent already had a place), and all would be the first in their families to go. This 
finding sustains the New Labour government's bid to make school-leaving at age 16 a 
thing of the past; their stated aim is to ensure that by 2004 80% of 16-19 year olds will be 
involved in at least another full year of education or training, and by 2010 50% of people 
under 30 will be entering higher education (see Mizen, 2003, 259). However, all of them 
intended to go to 'new' universities, thus supporting the observation that a much higher 
proportion of people from ethnic minority backgrounds go to 'new' than 'old' universities 
(Tomlinson, 2001). This ambivalence around educational choice is a good example of the 
uneasiness which exists between the policy representation of capital as easily convertible 
by individuals themselves, underpinned by New Labour discourse, and the reproduction of 
capital, supported by the theories of Bourdieu.
The theme of'internalised barriers' to success in education was an important one amongst 
some of the respondents, especially around choices they felt were available to them with 
regard to university attendance and employment opportunities. In a study of working-class 
people's participation in Higher Education, Archer et al. (2002) found that respondents' 
narratives supported the idea that working-class people occupy a more 'risky' position in 
society, and that they were more likely to experience disadvantages which prevented them 
from participating in education. Non-participation in education, the authors suggested, was 
one way in which respondents rationally 'managed' this risk. The respondents' 
articulations on going to university were underpinned by the discourses of individual 
responsibility and equality of opportunity, but also in some cases displayed such a 'sense 
of limits'. I will examine what two respondents who intended to go to university, Kelly 
and Bev, said on the subject of Higher Education. Their comments gave an indication of 
how they saw themselves in terms of social mobility and how they felt class and race 
impacted on the choices and decisions they made with regard to university education.
Notably, as in the more general findings on identity and education, gender was not 
mentioned by these respondents as a mediating factor on decisions and choices around 
education. Race and class inequities, one might argue therefore, were seen to exist by 
these respondents, whereas gender inequity was invisible. This supports the post-feminist 
discourse (Whelelan, 1995; Volman and Ten Dam, 1998; McRobbie, 2000) in which any 
notion of gender inequality is regarded as outdated and insignificant.
Whilst Kelly talked positively about going to university, Bev was critical of what she saw 
as a two-tier higher education system comprised of elite and other universities because she 
felt it epitomised the scourge of what she saw as race and class division within British 
society. Only one other student referred to this two-tier higher education system. Lianne 
said that elite universities were set apart from other universities: "In Cambridge and 
Oxford you got to be of a certain class and colour to get into the school. I feel they're a bit 
snobbish." At the same time, Lianne criticised the government for advocating higher 
education as the guarantee of the desired job: "they've got their degree but are working in 
awful jobs and it hasn't taken them anywhere" and contended that the government should 
take responsibility for making false promises and "give you money to pay back loans." 
These views are supported by Archer et al.'s (2002) observation that access to 'better' 
universities was regarded by the respondents in their study as the reserve of (usually 
white) middle-class students with the requisite resources and status. Ruby noted that not 
everyone was equally included in education and the impact this had on employment 
opportunities: "even though people deny that - just look at who's employed in the 
universities - white middle-class."
Bev and Kelly were 'breaking moulds' in that they were the first in their families to study 
in further education, and appeared to be 'moving beyond' old limitations. In the case of 
Bev, however, there appeared to be a tension between staying within the limits of her own 
past experience, and the transgression of those limits and boundaries. Kelly was 'breaking 
out of the mould' in that she had a place at Newcastle University to study Performing 
Arts. Kelly said that most people were put off going to university because it was too hard, 
but that she had got where she was today because she had "knuckled down." She said.
"/ couldn't see myself working in Tesco's and just being happy working in 
Tesco 's all the time, it wouldn 't be challenging. Once I 've learnt how to serve 
the customers and use the till it ends up boring, so I need something that is 
always changing, that's different"
Kelly, the first in her family to intend to go to university, said that although she was 
discouraged from going to university by her family, and did not want to burden her 
parents financially, she "couldn't see any other avenue to take." Kelly's parents may have 
'known their limits' but Kelly felt she also knew hers where these were different to those 
of her parents. Initially her parents were not happy but they reached a solution:
"My dad was like, 'what you going to do when you leave, it's just a waste of 
time, you 're going to be stuck back here, you can't get a job '....but now they 're 
more kind of proud cos I 'II be the first one to go in the family and the first one 
that's wanted to go in the family, and they 're being really supportive. If dad 
hadn 't saved for my wedding he wouldn't have had money to give me to go to 
university and I couldn 't have gone. So I got university instead of a wedding!"
Like Kelly, Bev pushed the limits in so far as she was the first in her family to go to 
university, but 'knew her place' when it came to the choice of university. Bev's 'place' 
was determined by entrenched class and race norms which she believed could not be 
personally challenged. For her, personal choice of necessity had to be compromised by the 
need to be self-protective in a society in which "race underlies everything." Bev talked 
about class and race interchangeably, frequently appearing to refer to both race and class 
when she was talking about either race or class. Her reference to 'we' was a reference to 
working-class black, mixed race and minority people who 'made the most of what they 
had'. Again, this 'we' did not refer to women. Her argument was not only that they ['we'] 
would not be able to rupture the educational bastion of the middle and upper-classes, but 
also that they would not want to. I have included this rather long quote to allow the reader 
to engage with Bev's train of thought.
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"Why would you want to put yourself in a racial environment for three years, 
no sensible person would put themselves somewhere where you could be at 
harm whether mentally or physically?....Here [at the FE college she was 
attending] they said if anyone wanted to apply to Cambridge they said they 
could bring people from Cambridge in to talk about it, and everyone laughed 
'that's for white people' and the black and Indian people all laughed. As far 
as we're concerned we're working-class people, always have been. 
Cambridge is a place where the Queen's children go, and the Queen is not 
associated with us! As far as she's concerned we are the people who pack her 
food, that's it! We wouldn't be able to mingle with people from that class 
because as far as they 're concerned we are scum. Now to put yourself in an 
environment where you are considered the lowest of the low when you could 
be somewhere else, get a degree and have a nice time with it, meet people on 
your level, you're not going to put yourself there if you have any sense. A 
friend Yolanda got a first class degree at Stratford University, and got into 
UCL but she would not go therefor the simple fact that that is not her level of 
people, as far as she's concerned even though she's got her degree she's not 
above none of us. I think that's the difference, the snobbery you would get 
from people who are classed as higher class than you or have always had 
money. So for us to get a degree is something special in a sense, to say, even 
though we 've not been brought up like you the brain's are not different, it's 
just something you 've stamped on us cos you want to make yourself look 
bigger, it's just the status at the end of the day and that status is what causes 
the harm. Cos if you think you 're better than someone else you automatically 
get nastiness."
"If I got a place at Cambridge tomorrow I wouldn't go.... that's not my bag at 
all. If I'm going to go somewhere I want to know that I'm free to learn, that's 
it, I don '/ want the pressure of class being put on me, or my race, or people 
telling me I 'm beneath them. "
Bev, who was doing an Access to Higher Education course and intended to go to 
university to study psychology, talked about 'breaking out of the mould', and 
simultaneously remaining within a 'safe territory' in which she would not experience race 
or class discrimination. She talked about people taking responsibility for their own 
learning, and asserted that many black and/or working-class people out of habit, 
consciously or unconsciously, were restricted by self-perceptions and preferred to stay in 
familiar 'comfort zones' rather than attempt to eradicate structural and personal barriers. 
She expounded about race and class segregation and the role of the government in 
deliberately maintaining these divisions where these were perpetuated along class lines. In 
her view, the "brain's are not different" but that, within the hierarchical framework which 
existed in Britain, people were either "classed as higher" or as having something 
"stamped" on them. In a study on class done thirty years ago, Sennett and Cobb (1972) 
interviewed working-class people on how class impacted on their sense of self, where 
personal failings and the belief that middle and upper class people had the right to judge 
them were dominant themes. The researchers showed how the class system contains a set 
of pervasive beliefs which are held in place through, and gain strength from their 
'naturalness'. In this vein, Bev remarked that the "little people" were kept in their place by 
a strict social order headed by a government which did not allow for the mixing of classes 
because it did not serve the interests of a hierarchical society:
"The education system don't like mixing people, they don't even like mixing 
what they consider normal people with disabled people, so why they going to 
mix classes? I think they like to keep people down, this country loves to think 
that they need people above other people to control the little people. The only 
time you come together is when you bump into each other in the street - they 
don't want people to be taught to grow up together and to accept each other. "
"The problem is, if everyone is educated to a high level who's going to be left 
to do the crap? The government ain 't going to allow that, cos they themselves 
have nannies, and have people to take their trash away, so they 're not going to 
educate those people."
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Bev was clearly putting the onus of responsibility on the government, rather than on the 
individual, in so far as she saw the experience of exclusion on the grounds of race and 
class as something fundamental to society, and therefore uncontestable. Her articulations 
may be understood in terms of the Bourdieu's (1977) idea of symbolic violence and the 
unequal distribution of social capital. This concept of symbolic violence has also been 
drawn on in literature on race. Barker (1981), for example, calls it a theory of 'pseudo- 
biological culturalism': race exclusion and antagonism are justified because it is 'natural' 
for the dominant group to defend its interests against outsiders because they are different, 
where such naturalisation arises out of'common sense' notions of culture which develop 
over time. Authors like Gilroy (1993) on the other hand, who build on the work of Barker 
(1981) show how black people draw on culture to contest and resist dominant forms of 
personhood.
Bev also saw race and class as underpinning the division between vocational and higher 
education, and between ordinary and elite universities. Bev was standing both on the 
inside, in terms of her experience of race and class exclusion, and on the outside looking 
in, in so far as she had the capacity to analyse and critique the situation. Bev's perspective 
oscillated between one which can be analysed within the context of Bourdieu's (1977) 
concept of 'habitus', and Beck et al.'s (2001) individualisation theory. On the one hand, 
she claimed that people were not themselves responsible for where they were positioned in 
society, that the dominant culture 'transmitted' to the marginal culture but not the other 
way round, and that as a black, mixed race and working-class person contestation of 
hierarchy was extremely limited. On the other hand, she defended her (and her friend's) 
decision not to go to an elite university from a position of agency, presenting this choice 
as an autonomous one. This may be understood as a form of resistance against 
assimilation into what Bev saw as the 'white' racist and classist institution of higher 
education, in which attendance at such a university could be a scourge rather than a 
blessing. Bev's comments are reminiscent of the working-class girls in McRobbie's 
(2000) study who saw the middle-class girls as 'snobs' set apart by their accents and 
parents' wealth, and saw themselves as able to enjoy themselves as be educated, but where 
educational competitiveness and their own achievement was a means of exposing the
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system as a complete waste of time (57). Beck et al. (2001) have claimed, it is incumbent 
upon individuals to perceive themselves as at least partly shaping their own lives, and has 
suggested that a practical indicator of 'living one's own life' theory is the presence of 
aspects of an individualistic and active narrative form in people's own biographies, in 
which life's events are attributed not to external causes but to elements of the individual's 
own choices, abilities, capacities, etc. (25).
Internalised barriers to learning
Ruby and Aasha said that many black and mixed race did not reap the benefits of equal 
opportunities in education because they had been brought up to believe that 'education 
was for others', where these ideas were firmly entrenched into their way of thinking and 
could not be easily challenged. Aasha claimed that the root of the problem could not be 
rectified by simply creating opportunities for black and mixed race because people 
themselves settled into and maintained particular prescribed roles which they were not 
even aware of. She said:
"/ think it's the way you think about yourself - class is more of a stratifier here 
than in the States, race is more in the States - the way a lot of young black 
people grow up thinking that they have a particular set of opportunities that I 
think is smaller than the way white people are thinking. It's more than just low 
expectations, because it's not like you desire all those things but you just think 
oh I 'II never make it because I won't have the chances, I think there's also 
people who don't even desire those things, because if you're not socialised 
into thinking that you will have this kind of education, you will do this, you 
will have these professional aspirations, you will go to university, I think it's a 
totally different way of thinking. "
Ruby talked about how some people living in poverty believed that education could not 
have anything to do with them. Like Aasha, she believed that race was stratified by class 
in Britain, and said that the government had to look at all the ways in which "especially
young black men get[ting] excluded from early on despite equal opportunities." For Ruby, 
individualised attention and support from college staff is a crucial factor in breaking these 
accepted norms.
"Learning has been very much class-based for long time. It is harder for some 
people to believe that education or taking a different route can do anything for 
them. It's about having the opportunity to do the exploration, and the support 
and the follow-up and the continuity, to choose to do something else, but that 
involves the attitudes of the lecturers as well. "
"It's very hard to learn if you have massive debts, you 're a single mother, you 
live in poor housing, you have immigration problems. Some people are quite 
down-trodden and can't imagine that education could have anything to do 
with them. I genuinely believe that if people were given individualised 
attention and support and the work to have those opportunities, to explore, 
things would be different some people are quite down-trodden and can't 
imagine that education could have anything to do with them. "
Ruby described her experiences of school education in the 1970s as a mixture of 
discrimination, low self-esteem and low self-expectations, and a lack of agency regarding 
the decisions which were made for her about her schooling. Part of this early education 
had been in an approved school, a place she believed she had been sent to due to the kind 
of ignorance which existed at that time around people who were trans-racially adopted. 
The historical dimension is of importance here. The implementation of assimilation 
policies, when policies to 'spread the children' to avoid high numbers of minority pupils 
in urban areas, were at their height during the 1970s (see Tomlinson, 2001). Persons were 
seen less in individualistic and differentiated terms, as in terms of their membership within 
particular 'cultural communities'. It was also a time when racism was not widely 
understood as a political issue, and where it was acknowledged, it was seen to occur at a 
group rather than an individual level. Ruby said that having the "opportunity to go on to 
FE was the best thing that ever happened to me."
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Only one respondent, Nichole, talked about having overcome the specifically internalised 
racial barriers to personal achievement referred to by Aasha:
"/ used to wonder why I found it hard to get jobs, whether it was the colour of 
my skin or something else, but now I know I can go out there....[now I] think 
that all I need to do is get on with life and not let the colour barrier come into 
it because you won 7 achieve anything. "
Perspectives on assimilation, separatism and discrimination
In this section I will focus on what some respondents said on the subjects of assimilation, 
separatism and discrimination. Aasha saw the issue of internalised barriers to learning as 
connected to the issue of assimilation. Amongst the black people she knew, resistance to 
'whiteness' was the dominant discourse in education, and that many black people had 
been socialised into believing that 'being educated' was tantamount to capitulation to 
'whiteness'. For many black and mixed race people, the pressure to assimilate and keep 
themselves separate meant a constant search for the middle-ground between these two 
positions for black and mixed race people. In the past, she had had to negotiate and define 
her own position as a mixed race person in relation to this discourse, and in relation to 
what she perceived as the prejudice of black people:
"// 's the whole thing of giving in to a mainstream culture, you 're making a 
point by not doing it, you reject all that stuff, cos maybe in part all that stuff 
rejected you and your people a long time ago, so why buy into that....! find it 
strong among black friends I have and the peer pressure I get in terms of 
mixing with whites and doing what white people do. You can choose to 
become educated, but even within that don 7 become part of the mainstream 
white culture, don 7 be friends with white people, have your own, and I know 
there was very much, from the other side, discrimination, and it was all self- 
perpetuating - oh the blacks want to keep separate so we don 7 want anything 
to do with them, you know, all these things become a vicious circle. "
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The work of Robert Park (1952) is useful for understanding Bev's and Aasha's 
perspective. Park claimed that in the face of threat from minority groups, the dominant 
group acts to try and preserve its status through community cohesion. In response to the 
racial prejudice such conflict engendered, subordinate groups could either assimilate or 
take a separatist position, whereby assimilation was more likely when the economy was 
strong, and separatism more likely when it was weak. In Fordham's (1988) study, 
discussed above, those who took on a raceless persona and assimilated into the 'white' 
school culture were the most 'successful' students, whilst others tried to juggle allegiances 
towards their school and their community, thus sacrificing both their cultural integrity, and 
being cautious about not appearing too 'white'. This study reveals how a race discourse - 
in this case a discourse of 'whiteness' - may override a class discourse, and underpin 
official education discourse. Within the context of both Parks' theories and Fordham's 
research, Aasha's analysis (and Bev's analysis in the previous section) gives some 
indication as to the kind of tensions possibly faced by some mixed race people vis a vis 
education: On the one hand they try to align themselves with, and assimilate into, the 
dominant group in order to achieve a certain level of status and acceptance, whilst on the 
other hand they try to maintain a degree of separatism. In other words, they try to strike a 
middle-way, as in 'if you can't beat them join them, but don't go the whole way'.
The pressure from black and mixed race people on black and mixed race people not to 
assimilate referred to earlier by Aasha, was also talked about in explicit terms by Aleasha. 
The pressure on Aleasha not to sacrifice her cultural integrity (Fordham, 1988) was a 
complex issue in so far as she was accused of acting 'too white', but was also not accepted 
by black people. She said: "It's like who wants to accept you? They don't want to accept 
you as being black and they really don't want to accept you as being white, so what am I?" 
Her experience was of "constantly being bullied" and ostracised for "acting too white", 
where she described this as being this synonymous with being intelligent:
"Black people won't talk to you ij you show knowledge or intelligence. The 
other day 1 was talking to a boy and he was like you 're so white, you act like 
white people, and I 'm like, just because you see an intelligent black person in
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front of you that means they're acting white? I'm like, to be black and to be 
intelligent that means you 're trying to act white? "
Aleasha referred to what she saw as the problem of cultural separatism in her class in 
which black people tended to stay on one side of the room and white people on the other. 
Her view was that it was the responsibility of the teacher to conciliate the space between 
black and white, and create a "mixture of cultures in a class." However, whilst conceding 
that making girls and boys work together in the classroom was, in her experience, 
successful in breaking down gender divisions, "forcing cultures to mix might not work." 
Like Aleasha, Anabel emphasised that the teacher was crucial in helping to alleviate this 
sense of inferiority, and believed that students would be motivated to learn if they could 
gain a sense of stability and equality with others. However, she also said that teachers 
were afraid of "getting involved for fear of losing their jobs" over accusations of 
favouritism or race discrimination.
Universalism as a solution?
Nadia's opinions were controversial in today's context, yet I believe they are indicative of 
an undercurrent of discontent felt amongst a significant section of the population around 
the position of ethnic minority people have in Britain today. Nadia was in favour of a 
universalism in which everyone lived according to their individual/collective inclinations 
as long as these occurred within a universalist nationalist framework. Whilst free to 
practice their own customs, minority people should assimilate into the mainstream culture. 
Nadia viewed non-assimilation as wilful separatism as this was neither in the interests of 
her children's education, nor of British society generally, and moreover, had resulted in 
the violation of the rights of the dominant host group. In Nadia's estimation then, and with 
reference to Park's (1928; 1964) theory of dominant versus subordinate, the dominant 
group had failed to preserve its status and the minority group were now in control.
In stark contrast to Bev, Ruby and Aasha, who criticised the rhetoric around equal 
opportunities in education for being divorced from the political and social reality of
people's lives, and favoured a more culturally relativistic, pluralistic and individualistic 
understanding of persons and cultures, Nadia endorsed the universal equality principle and 
believed that everyone could and should be equally included in British education and 
society. Whilst Bev, Ruby and Aasha, focussed on the grey area around the individualistic 
discourse of'self-responsibility' in relation to the take-up of education of black/working- 
class/poor people, Nadia saw the problem, quite literally, in terms of black and white and 
placed the onus of responsibility squarely onto the (black/working-class/poor) individual, 
where the individual who did not conform was regarded as the 'problem'. Indeed, Nadia 
believed that the government had, in all good faith, actually over-stepped the mark in its 
commitment to equality, and had been duped by the 'problem' people who have had 
everything offered to them yet refused to take the bait.
"People choose to live in this country and don't behave in a way that is 
beneficial to this country - like not learning the language, and I get irritated 
that my children can't understand their accent. I feel this equality thing has 
gone too far, personally. That sounds very racist doesn 7 it? I think everybody 
is entitled to believe in whatever culture, follow whatever culture they want, 
and have whatever religion, and it is wonderful that children are taught about 
different religions and different cultures and things. But what I do object to is 
where it impinges on other people's way of life. They segregate themselves 
within the society, they close themselves off, refuse to mix with the rest of 
society. It's a bit of a generalisation I know, I mean I met plenty that proved 
me wrong, but on the whole it is one of my real irritations, I suppose. "
Anabel threw a different light on the issue of assimilation through fluency in the English 
language, and on the correlation between the lack of assimilation and racial separatism. 
Whereas Nadia regarded speaking with an accent as unacceptable behaviour, and saw the 
outcome of this as intentional racial separatism, Anabel remarked that the reason why 
people "not of here" wanted to lose their accents was in order to assimilate and to 
minimise their "inherent sense" of inferiority to white culture, but that they could never be 
successful in this venture. The inability to assimilate and the correlate sense of inferiority
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this engendered, according to Anabel reinforced the connection between people who were 
not white. This again is evocative of Gilroy's (1987) work in which he argues that 
minority people can never really permeate or belong to the nation due to a lack of shared 
history (see Barker, 1981), and that "a foreigner would always be a foreigner" (Anabel).
"Everybody who conies here feels that the white culture is superior to their 
culture. There is this inherent sense that we 're inferior and I guess this is why 
the worldless feel this affinity to any other culture that come here, that is not 
of here. They say people lose their accents so that this difference won 't be so 
pronounced But I can tell you from speaking on the phone, and immediately 
you can tell people's responses to you. "
For Nadia, in the same way as an 'accent' was a marker of difference and should be 
eradicated, race as a visible marker of difference should also be eliminated. She described 
how monitoring forms devised to gather personal information were inadvertently 
discriminatory because they were based on a classificatory system in which identities were 
demarcated and labelled along lines of gender, race, age, etc. Thus one could argue that at 
the core of Nadia's condemnation of racial separatism was a rejection of the concept of 
race. She said:
"// gets ridiculous with these forms - sometimes I say 'mixed race' under 
'other' and sometimes I just say oh none of you business - what's the point, 
why are they asking these questions, it sort of seems racist in a way even 
making it an issue. It's a bit like when you send an application form off for a 
job - wouldn't it be much better if they didn't know how old you were, what 
sex you were, or what race you were or anything, you know, that you 're just a 
name."
Nadia boldly insists on 'political m-correctness'. She rejects culturalism as the root cause 
of division within British society, and claims that her views may be misconstrued as racist 
from the point of view of the average politically correct person who 'embraces' and
'celebrates' all forms of difference. At the same time she sees race and other external 
markers of identity as precisely the foundations upon which discrimination within the 
education system and the labour market rests. Without race there would be no 
discrimination. Nadia's opinions are an unapologetic articulation of what I believe many 
people - who are tired of the politically correct rhetoric around race, culture and 
immigration - actually think. I also see Nadia's comments as indicative of a gradual 
change around what is understood as 'politically correct' in Britain today. The main 
problem with Nadia's argument, is that like so many 'equal opportunists' she is attempting 
to by-pass the very fact of race, gender and class as it is lived in everyday situations. This 
is an important area of debate returned to later in the discussion.
The respondents' articulations discussed in this section all refer to race and class and how 
issues of internalised barriers to achievement, assimilation, separatism, universalism and 
individualisation impacted on theirs and other people's lives. Their opinions, especially 
those of Bev and Nadia, show how a myriad of ideas and concepts can appear to sit 
comfortably side-by-side in someone's mind, but in the context of current theory around 
these issues, contradict each other. The commentaries all indicated that respondents 
believed that equal opportunities policies have failed, either in relation to themselves or to 
other people. Aasha and Ruby talked about the disparity between educational choice and 
internalised barriers. Aasha moreover made a connection between this and how many 
black people especially felt education was 'not for them' because of its association with 
assimilation into white culture, and the pressures from black people not to assimilate 
because of this. Aleasha's experiences underscored this view in so far as she worked hard 
at college and said she was discriminated against by black people for doing so. Bev's 
commentary crucially points to the issue of whether anti-racist/anti-classist theory and 
policy are invalidated by discourses of individualisation and the praxis of individualised 
lifestyles. Nadia's universalistic assimilatory stance begs the on-going question of how to 
account for difference in the context of identity and everyday experience. Far more 
attention, in both research and policy, needs to be paid to the apparent discrepancies 
between contemporary discourses of individualisation, universalism and pluralism, and the 
actual lived experiences of race, class, and those of'being an individual'.
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION
In this final chapter, the main themes arising from the research are pulled together and 
discussed. The aim here is to connect the findings on identity with the findings on 
education. The chapter is divided into three parts: Part One explores the interplay between 
postmodernism, essentialism and individualism, relating the theoretical and policy 
literature to the respondents' constructions of personhood, their experiences of education 
and their articulations around education policy discourses. Part Two discusses the 
dominant discourse of individualism evident in the policy analysis and the interview 
findings on education, and the concomitant absence of 'race'. Part Three examines the 
research findings within the context of a feminist emancipatory project which has mixed 
race women in post compulsory education in mind.
PART ONE: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POSTMODERNISM, 
ESSENTIALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM
The findings in this study question the appropriateness of current conceptualisations of 
personhood as de-racialised in both the theoretical and policy literature, and in public 
discourse. Contemporary postmodern/ post-structuralist theories on identity, race, and 
mixed race accentuate the socially constructed nature of identity. The selected policies, on 
the other hand, refer to personhood largely in terms of the rational, autonomous and 
'unfinished' self. This perception of personhood has been concurrent with a gradual shift 
towards a universalised notion of the self, evident in public policy and discourse, in which 
all individuals are considered equal in terms of the opportunities available to them, even 
though they may be seen as culturally different. The idea of 'race' is understood as a 
construction with no biological or material value in itself, and has been de-constructed to 
the extent that it appears to have little relevance to contemporary theoretical and 
discursive conceptions of personhood.
The interplay between essentialism, pluralism and individualism - where these sometimes 
appear to be contradictory - in the context of the respondents' articulations around identity
and education is evident in a number of ways: one, the dominant precepts of the self 
within postmodern theories may to some extent be challenged by respondents' race 
essentialist conceptualisations of identity; two, the findings indicate the need for a re- 
appraisal of essentialist theory to incorporate dual-race experience; and three, the idea of 
individualism is not necessarily at odds with race essentialism. The findings, I argue, 
expose the paradox of liberalism as articulated by David Goldberg (1993): race is 
irrelevant but all is race. In the light of the findings, an important challenge for mixed 
race theory appears to be how to successfully integrate the experiences of mixed race 
people into a comprehensible framework of personhood which recognises their 
experiences as racialised, individual and dynamic.
Postmodernism: Limited versatility
Theories of postmodernism (discussed in Chapter One) are useful in providing a 
framework for understanding how identities are variable and subject to change. New ways 
of thinking around identity as socially constructed, fragmented, multiple and shifting have 
allowed mixed race people to define themselves in ways which go beyond the rigid 
essentialism premised on the notion that people possess 'fixed' racial traits, uniting them 
with those within that 'race' and differentiating them from all others (Anthias and Yuval- 
Davis, 1992; Brah, 1996). It has also been helpful for understanding mixed race people's 
personal accounts and experiences (Anzaldua, 1987; Ahmed, 1997; Ifekwunigwe, 1999; 
Mahtani, 2002) and has challenged the view that mixed race people are black, and that 
mixed race identity is inherently problematic or pathological. Concomitant with more 
pluralist and relativist ways of thinking around personhood, has been with an emphasis on 
individual rights. The introduction of a 'mixed race' category in the 2001 census has 
formally endorsed self-identification as mixed race: Instead of a bi-polar conception of 
identity in which mixed race people are thought of as either black or white, a space has 
been created for mixed race people to identify as both black and white.
Considerable discrepancies exist between the findings in my study, which suggest that 
respondents saw their identities as largely 'fixed', and postmodern accounts of identity as
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pluralistic and dynamic. Most respondents' conceptions of mixed race identity were 
representative of the postmodernist position in so far as they advocated the idea of self- 
definition and the freedom to choose how to define yourself, and expressed what might be 
called a 'diversity' discourse of mixed race. Some respondents evoked a race=culture 
equation in their exhortations of cosmopolitan 'anything goes' ideas around mixed race, 
and rendered concepts of race, culture, nationality, religion, etc. as synonymous with each 
other. The race = culture alliance, as argued in Chapter One, is symptomatic of tendencies 
towards a de-racialisation of the person in public discourse, in which the benign concept 
of 'culture' becomes the significant aspect of racial difference in place of 'race'. As 
Frankenberg (1993) has pointed out, cultural difference is harmless and enriching, 
whereas race is not. This 'diversity' discourse was also reflected in many respondents' 
descriptions of their friendships as wide-ranging and diverse rather than race-specific. A 
further finding showed that although few respondents said that they saw their own 
'difference' as an asset, over half the respondents saw other people's curiosity about them 
as positive. This was perhaps an illustration of respondents' desire for the right to be 
equal, and the recognition that they were not equal, in which some respondents saw 
themselves as 'bridge-builders' between today's world and a better future.
Respondents' own constructions of self adhered to the postmodern principles of 
multiplicity and fluidity in as much as they defined themselves as dual-racial/cultural (and 
in a few cases as multiply-racial/cultural) (see Tizard and Phoenix, 2001; Aspinall, 2003), 
and in that many respondents felt that they adapted themselves in different situations 
and/or talked about transiting between, or amalgamating the two 'halves' of themselves. 
Contrary to the commonly held idea that mixed race identities epitomise the postmodern 
subject, respondents saw themselves neither as an amalgam of many different selves, nor 
as fundamentally dynamic. Respondents did not see themselves as 'free-floating' entities 
in the postmodern sense, but rather, communicated ideas around personhood within a 
spirit of'limited versatility'. Thus, one might argue that respondents expressed a pluralist- 
essentialist position in that they saw their identities as variable, but where this variability 
was confined within identification with their parents' heritages.
Essentialism: The significance of'race'
Whereas the previous section examined how respondents' articulations around identity 
reflected postmodernist ideas to a limited extent, and one in which the issue of race was 
frequently concealed within a language of 'diversity', this section looks at the myriad of 
ways in which race was a trenchant aspect of many respondents' lives. Structuralist 
theories are usefully applied to 'raced' ways of thinking around identity which concern a 
notion of the self which is not variable or subject to change. Most respondents made sense 
of their lives through the lens of 'race': for many, race was not an unpalatable or 
unnameable aspect of life as much literature and public discourse would have us believe, 
but rather, was a significant aspect of identity and self-understanding, and intrinsic to their 
experiences of ascription and discrimination.
The concept of 'race' manifested itself in a number of ways in the respondents' 
articulations around the self. First, almost half the sample emphatically stated that race 
and/or colour was not important in how they defined themselves. As such, they appeared 
to reject formal classifications based on external visible aspects of the person which 
distinguished them as 'raced'. Whilst the assertions in themselves suggest that race was 
indeed not a significant aspect in respondents' lives, the direct way in which these claims 
were made indicates that race possibly did have a considerable impact on these 
respondents.
Second, not only did all the respondents identify themselves as mixed race (this was a 
criterion in the sample selection), but many saw being mixed race as an important aspect 
of their identities. Whilst the second point may appear to contradict the first point, it is my 
contention that the 'safety' and freedom to identify as mixed race lay partly in the fact that 
it was not an established homogeneous category. Arguably too, the discrepancy stemmed 
from the desire to be seen for 'who they really are', where this was first and foremost as a 
unique individual and as someone who transgressed, or indeed defied, categorisation. 
Thus for some, it may have been an expression of the right to be different, and perhaps 
also a celebration of their difference. It would, however, be vain to ignore the reasons why
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some mixed race people choose not to identify themselves as mixed race. The apparent 
disregard for categories and the implications this has for a feminist political project will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
Third, self-identification as mixed race, that is to say, as black and as white, was expressed 
by several respondents as an assertion of both parents' racial heritages, where this was 
understood as literally constituting the respondent's identity. This was evident even where 
the father was absent or marginal in the respondent's life, and regardless of whether the 
respondent was brought up in a white or black household. (Two-thirds of the respondents 
were brought up in one-parent households; only in two cases was the mother absent or 
marginal). Many respondents were precise about their exact racial mix - traced back to 
parents and grand-parents - and whilst these articulations appeared to draw on a race 
biology discourse, it is possible that respondents were also referring to a culture discourse, 
in which the race=culture alliance was evoked, and race became synonymous with culture.
Fourth, in asserting their mixed race-ness, some respondents defined themselves in 
relation to homogeneous constructions of race by distancing themselves from what they 
perceived as 'blackness' and/or 'whiteness'. As such, assertions of self were m^Q against 
others. This tendency could be seen in articulations around friendship and experiences of 
discrimination, and also more implicitly in the education findings. Racial distinctions were 
justified by using a race = personality link, in which distinctive attitudes and ways of 
behaving were dependent on a person's race. As in point three, a race biology (and/or 
culture) discourse was evident.
Fifth, the data supports the traditional view that mixed race people are seen as black. This 
suggests that, despite the prevalence of postmodern ideas around hybridity, 
multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism evident in some spheres of public discourse, the 
dominant discourse around 'race' continues to be one which incorporates the idea of 
mono-racialism and homogeneity. The persistence of exclusionary politics, I would argue, 
has emphasised homogeneity and reinforced 'black consciousness' amongst some black 
people, and this has had considerable consequences for some mixed race people who do
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not self-define as black and who have developed a race consciousness which attempts to 
'go beyond' blackness. 'Incorrectly' categorised as black (or as belonging to another 
mono-racial ethnic minority heritage), yet self-identifying as mixed race, caused problems 
for some mixed race respondents in so far as they were seen as neither 'white enough' (by 
white people) nor as 'black enough' (by black people). It is possible that many 
respondents experienced exclusion and misnaming (following the work of Lorde, 1984 
and Young, 1990) on account of the mismatch between the discourse of homogeneity, and 
self-perceptions of their own heterogeneity, and that this contributed to the refusal to 
endorse any form of categorisation, and the assertion of their own mixed race identities.
Sixth, the findings showed that racial discrimination was flagrant. The study focused 
especially on discrimination within families and from black people. Whilst there has been 
a general recognition that mixed race people experience racism from white people (see 
Parker and Song, 2001; Tizard and Phoenix, 2001; Ali, 2003) there is virtual silence on 
the issue of discrimination from black people. This may in part be due to the long 
established view that mixed race people are black, and as such, any discrimination 
directed against them by black people would not be acknowledged as racial 
discrimination. However, in the same way that it is no longer possible to think of black 
and white people in terms of binary opposites, racism can also no longer be seen as a 
unitary process (Rattansi, 1995). As changes occur in the way race and mixed race are 
thought about, ideas around racialisation have also changed, and new forms of 
discrimination and racism are coming to light. The findings suggest that further research 
into the specific nature of the discrimination mixed race people experience needs to be 
undertaken, and the concept of 'racisms' as dynamic social processes which manifest 
themselves differently according to context (Brah, 1996) could perhaps be usefully 
applied in this context. This raises the question of whether a specifically mixed race 
category is needed to counter discrimination specific to mixed race people, and is a 
question which will be referred to later in this chapter. The interview data to some extent 
support findings from earlier studies of mixed race identity such as non-acceptance within 
peer groups, rejection within families, and ostracisation from one cultural heritage.
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To sum up so far, most of the respondents did not accept racial designations, and 
simultaneously felt they were perceived by others in racially designated ways (see Zack, 
1992, 9; 1995). This corresponds with post-structuralist theory in so far as respondents felt 
their identities were to some extent determined by other people's positioning. The 'false' 
categorisations bestowed upon them from outside co-existed with self-assertions as mixed 
race, where this usually endorsed parents' racial heritages, and were sometimes invoked in 
opposition to racially homogenised 'others'. It could be argued that race as a means of 
self-definition - as opposed to race as a means of categorisation - was a powerful aspect of 
respondents' identities precisely because of the denial of their dual-raciality, and their 
experiences of categorisation and discrimination. Self-definition as mixed race may in this 
sense be understood as an act of separation from, defence against, or indeed subversion of 
the rigid boundaries of racial homogenisation imposed upon them from outside.
The combination of findings in the last two sections demonstrates that competing 
discourses were at work - the self as to some extent versatile, and the self bound by fixed 
racial categories, heritages, and experiences of discrimination based on notions of racial 
homogeneity. Whilst useful for understanding certain aspects of respondents' 
conceptualisations of identity, postmodernist theories are difficult to sustain in light of the 
findings which show that 'race' was - in many different ways - a palpable aspect of 
respondents' lives. The findings also challenge essentialist theory which has traditionally 
classified identity in mono-racial and mono-cultural terms. An essentialist model which 
incorporates dual or multiple aspects may therefore be more apt for contextualising the 
respondents' mixed race identities. Root's (1992) assertion that mixed race identities are 
both grounded in duality and multiplicity in that they are socially ambiguous and fluid, 
and yet are contained within typified racial boundaries, is useful for understanding this 
twin position.
Individualism: mixed race as an aspect of personality
Many respondents appeared to have no conceptual difficulty, as we have seen, in isolating 
self-definition as mixed race from 'race' as an external phenomenon. In several
respondents' articulations around selfhood, an easy alignment between mixed race identity 
and personality was also present. In this way, essentialist thinking was refuted by asserting 
an individualist discourse, as in "I am just me", yet was also present in simultaneously 
asserting "I am mixed race." These respondents appeared to be concerned about not being 
seen by others as the unique individuals 'they really are', where being valued as mixed 
race was intrinsic to this sense of self. The different forms of essentialist thinking may be 
explained by the distinctions respondents made between appearance and personality.
Appearance, usually focusing on hair and skin colour, was frequently mentioned. Yet, 
respondents were anxious to put across that their identities were not based on the 
superficial designations of race and/or colour, but on what 'lay beneath' their skin, as in 'I 
am just me', and in so doing, made distinctions between exterior and interior facets of 
identity. Respondents, therefore, separated out what they believed were spurious 
designations of race (categorisation) from a primary sense of self (self-ascription based on 
parental racial heritage), where the latter only was fundamental to mixed race identity, and 
so too, was an intrinsic part of 'who they were'. As such, personality and being mixed 
race were compatible aspects of personhood, and central to their sense of self. The 
juxtaposition of'I am me' and 'I am mixed race' may be indicative of a belief in both the 
right to be a/an (mixed race) individual and the right to be equal to everyone else, and 
supports the view that a category of mixed race was generally not desired by the 
respondents. These observations also support the finding discussed above in which 
respondents drew on a race=personality correlate to distinguish between races, and set 
themselves apart from black people.
The main theoretical challenge which these findings pose is how to reconcile 'raced' and 
'individualist' notions of self. In a recent conference paper, David Skinner (2004) 
discusses how contemporary biology such as DNA testing is being linked to new notions 
of 'who we really are', and that biologism is reopening old debates about sameness and 
difference and providing people with new ways of experiencing and talking about identity. 
In this context, I would argue that the assertion 'I am just me, I am mixed race' need not 
be understood as a purely individualistic articulation, but can be read in terms of
biological heritage as a powerful and unique part of the individual. As such, perceptions 
of the self are ultimately seen as rooted in the biological realm. The findings in this 
section show that not only were elements of postmodernism and essentialism combined, 
but essentialist and individualist aspects of personhood were integrated in respondents' 
constructions of self. This perspective may be described as an essentialist-individualist 
position, in which the idea of a core essential self is reconciled with perceptions of self in 
race biological terms.
To sum up Part One then, a few main points can be made. Many respondents' articulations 
of selfhood were largely consistent with a humanist position, and resonate with the theory 
of biological foundationalism (see Bordo, 1989). They also to some extent reflect the 
notion that the self is socially constituted (see Butler, 1990). Whilst feminist debates have 
centred around the impasse between biologism and constructionism, sociological debates 
around ethnicity, race and mixed race have unambiguously focussed on the sociological 
dimension of race. The findings in this study point to a disparity between respondents' 
perceptions of self in structuralist terms, and sociological theories of personhood which 
view the self as fundamentally 'fluid'. The concept of'race' as a social construction is not 
disputed. The dominance of race, and the persistence of categorisation, and discriminatory 
attitudes and practices in the lives of the respondents indicates a need to retain the concept 
of'race'. It also indicates an unequivocal need to investigate further the meaning of race 
in people's lives and within social discourse. As such, I adhere to the assertion made by 
Parker and Song, that by stripping the term 'race' of all meaning, we are left with an 
'uncompromisingly romantic reassertion of liberal individualism' which ignores socially 
constitutive effects on the person such as racism and racial ascription' (2001,12).
Weekes (1997) has usefully pointed out that black feminist thought has the potential to 
theorise and develop an understanding of how Black women - and here she includes 
mixed race women - come to construct definitions of themselves 'where these are clearly 
situated in the way they experience their social positions and hence their racial identities' 
(1997, 113). Whilst understanding that the notion of 'race' is a product of discourse
without inherent meaning in itself, it is only through the meanings ascribed to this term 
that sense can be made out of respondents' articulations around race.
PART TWO: EDUCATION, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE IRRELEVANCE 
OF RACE
Education models of inclusion have to a large extent assumed that distinctions around 
racial and cultural difference no longer exist. The focus instead has been on the liberal 
discourse of individualism, a position which, I would argue, has been marked by a gradual 
rhetorical shift towards the 'de-racing' of British society and the notion that we are 'all 
just human beings'. As we have seen in previous sections, this discourse was evident in 
the communications of many respondents around personhood. However, whilst the 
findings on identity revealed that respondents frequently combined pluralist, essentialist 
and individualist perspectives in their constructions of the self, and race was an important 
theme in these constructions, respondents' invariably reflected the discourse of 
individualism in their articulations on education, in which race was more or less 
irrelevant.
Equity in education and individual responsibility
The findings on education displayed a resilient correlate between the respondents' views, 
and policy articulations and discourses around education and personhood. The concepts of 
equality of opportunity and individual responsibility were dominant in the respondents' 
articulations around their own educational experiences, and in their opinions on prevailing 
government discourses in education, and most respondents believed in the inherent value 
of education, meritocracy and social inclusion (see Chapter Three for a discussion of 
education/policy discourses). The mass availability of education was in itself a marker of 
an equal society and most respondents saw their own lives as testimonies to the success of 
government initiatives which aimed to provide greater equality of opportunity in 
education. Most respondents believed that they had had the same chances as everyone else 
in education, that everyone 'should get an education', but also that their plans and
'dreams' for the future may not translate into reality. The principal idea expressed by the 
respondents was that in being responsible individuals able to make autonomous decisions 
within an egalitarian system of governance, people were ultimately responsible for their 
own success or failure (see Beck, 2001; Colley and Hodkinson, 2001). As such, the onus 
of responsibility for all of society's ills falls back onto the individual, and inequalities are 
not seen as the responsibility of government.
Inequalities, rather than being seen as 'big issues', are therefore reduced to the problem of 
individuals, or the problem of specific groups of people such as lone mothers. This was 
clearly evident in the articulations of the respondents. The findings on education showed 
that respondents made a distinction between those who were 'equal' in terms of 
educational opportunities and life-chances, and those who were 'less equal'. Personal 
success was down to motivation and commitment, and whilst other people's educational 
choices may be impeded by poverty or disability, most respondents saw themselves as 
exempt from such constrictions. Thus, a dependence/ independence dichotomy around 
freedom of choice and the take-up of education was evoked. However, not only were 
inequalities attributed to individuals themselves, but some respondents also claimed that 
personal success and failure "came from within", and that people were either innately 
predisposed towards learning or not. Inequalities, therefore, were explained in terms of an 
inherent lack within individuals themselves. In light of the findings which showed that 
several respondents saw their own individuality as inextricably linked to their mixed 
race/culture, and some respondents perceived themselves as different to black people, and 
appeared to construct their identities against them, it is not inconceivable that a 
race=personality correlate was manifest in the way in which respondents articulated ideas 
around predisposition.
The findings show how discourses become imbued within the subject, and, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, how the individualised subject becomes the 'object' of 
education. Thus, people are not consciously aware of how they are positioned by the 
discourse of individualism, and yet it is a discourse in which it is incumbent upon them to 
have a sense of control over their own lives (Beck, 2001). It seems that authoritarianism
has disappeared in the kind of language used within discourse, ie. the neo-liberal language 
of freedom of choice and equality of opportunity, and it is precisely this which makes it 
possible to 'buy into' these discourses. This can be seen, for example, in the ways in 
which respondents bought into the discourses of inclusion, meritocracy, and 
responsibility. Critical thinking, therefore, is not to be expected. In this study, any 
criticisms of government tended to focus on particular elements or effects of discourses, 
rather than discourses themselves. The small number of respondents who did talk about 
race, class and structural inequalities nevertheless also claimed that the individual was 
responsible for his or her own learning, thereby suggesting that any resistance to, or 
separation from, dominant discourses in education was regarded as extremely limited.
The irrelevance of race
Through the supposedly 'empowering' framework of education for all, equality of 
opportunity and meritocracy, and the freedom of choice which purportedly goes along 
with this, each person is expected to see herself/himself as equal to the next person. The 
interactional mechanisms by which structure and social inequality were generated, were 
discounted by the respondents. Any differences between people, not only those of 
achievement and failure in education, but also experiences of racial and other forms of 
discrimination were re-directed back onto the person, rather than being attributed to the 
effects of dominant/subordinate power relationships.
Explicit articulations around the race were dropped altogether in discussions around 
education (although in the section above respondents made implicit references to 
distinctions between people along the lines of race), a finding which stood in stark 
contrast to the salience of race in the findings on identity discussed in Part One. 
Respondents' position on race was therefore an ambivalent one: Within the broader 
context of their everyday experiences, many respondents felt excluded and discriminated 
against by others; race was not perceived as a marker of disadvantage, and seen as 
immaterial in terms of the educational choices and opportunities available to people. 
Within the government framework of inclusion and equality in education, however, most
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respondents saw themselves as 'equal to all others'. In an educational context, therefore, it 
appears that respondents had bought into a discourse of whiteness, and the idea of the 
person as 'raceless' (Phoenix, 1997b). This notion of the 'raceless' individual may be 
understood in the context of the postmodernist concept of personhood, in which the self is 
dynamic and has no biological fundament or material value in itself (and supports the 
respondents' ideological conceptualisations of mixed race personhood and friendships as 
diverse, discussed in Part One), and the liberalist concept of the self, in which the 
individual is capable of making rational, utility-maximising choices within a structural 
vacuum. The perceived irrelevance of race is symptomatic of what might be referred to as 
'colour-blindness' to the reality of race (Ahmed, 1997, Tessman, 1999), in which the 
effects of racialisation are maintained precisely through 'race invisibility'. Race, in other 
words, is deconstructed to the extent that it vanishes altogether, and Ihe power differential 
therefore also disappears.
PART THREE: INDIVIDUALISM AND POLITICAL STRATEGY 
A de-politicised subject?
The discourse of individualism, and related discourses of individual responsibility, 
equality of opportunity and de-racialisation discussed in this chapter and in Chapter Three, 
are symptomatic of a shift towards a concept of the subject as universalised and de- 
politicised. The discourse of individualism does not sit well with the respondents' 
experiences of discrimination and racism, which are fundamentally political issues, and 
the implications for a modernist political project which demands a collective political 
identity is potentially far-reaching. Two main strands in feminist theory, which are 
dissociated on the question of the materiality of the body, are central to this discussion: 
Whilst modernist feminist thinkers such as Bordo (1989) have claimed that we need a 
unitary concept of womanhood within which to ground a feminist politics, and that the 
aim of politics should be to resist cultural constructions as they are presented to us, post- 
structuralist feminists such as Butler (1990, 1993) have asserted that the body is the effect 
of discourse, a cultural sign from the outset, and that basing feminist politics on the
materiality of the body is therefore misguided. The main criticism of the postmodernist 
approach is that self-definition and difference leads to political ineffectiveness and 
dissipates the possibility for any collective liberatory action.
The modernist/ postmodernist debate within 'western' feminist philosophy has been 
paralleled by a similar debate in black feminism which has focussed on the requisite of 
race as a social category, as opposed to womanhood, for effective political action. This 
discussion therefore, has centred around the question of the 'materiality of blackness', and 
who could or should be called 'black' in the name of politics. From a modernist black 
feminist perspective, a mixed race category, or a black category which incorporates mixed 
race experiences, is necessary for countering categorisation and discrimination, and in 
working towards greater racial equality. This modernist position has been criticised for 
being a universalistic conception of personhood which results in exclusion and derision 
(Yuval-Davis, 1992; Brah, 1994). Derision and exclusion were cited by many respondents 
as intrinsic to their everyday experiences of perceived difference, categorisation and 
discrimination (but not in education), especially the experience of 'not being black 
enough'. Bakare-Yusuf (1997), with reference to her research with black women, has 
stated that the failure to abandon common ideals once a 'coming together' has been 
achieved
'only serves to show our own complicity in a racist discourse which tries to 
lock black communities in the fixity of its own construction. It also obscures 
the way appeals to communitarian ideals or shared experiences can potentially 
oppress and exclude the very same people it seeks to liberate.' (82)
Latterly, there has been a focus away from the body to political sites of struggle, and the 
ways in which the subject is constructed - often in a plurality of ways - through social 
practices (Mouffe, 1995; Nicholson and Seidman, 1995; Ashenden, 1997). Mouffe's 
(1995) idea that fragmentation enables new constellations of unity in which political 
collectivities and coalitions are formed out of common interests which cut across specific 
identifications, has been particularly useful for contemporary feminist philosophy.
Defining a mixed race identity
Ifekwunigwe has put forward a twofold challenge: one, how to create an inclusive space 
for the construction of complex and multi-layered identities without resorting to 
essentialist or reified categories, or to what Donovan Chamberlayne refers to as 'I am- 
ism': 'I am not Black or White, I am just me' (personal communication to Ifekwunigwe); 
and two, how to forge political and social alliances from shared marginal status 
(Ifekwunigwe, 2001, 45). Tessman (1999) has argued that there is little consideration of a 
politics of racial self-identification that goes beyond essentialism and the aim of 'fitting 
in', and claims that 'not all acts of solidarity consist of casting ones lot, for one can be 
committed to struggle on behalf of a group to which one does not belong and in whose 
fate one cannot share' (280). Omi and Winant (1994) have asserted that racially based 
movements have as their principle task the 'creation of new identities, new racial 
meanings, and a new collective subjectivity' (1994, 90). This assertion may be usefully 
applied to the context of mixed race identity in view of its 'newness' and heterogeneity, 
yet ultimately also sanctions the idea of collectivity.
The ideas put forward by the authors discussed above are laudable in that they attempt to 
incorporate the diversity of mixed race experience into a conception of personhood which 
may simultaneously form the basis for a common politics; however, these views are not 
particularly helpful when applied to the context of the women in this study. As Ali (2003) 
has pointed out, 'it is the inadequacy of 'mixed race' as a single coherent category that 
makes it so theoretically demanding' (2003, 5). As we have seen, respondents' 
conceptions of mixed race identity were extremely diverse, and definitions of self 
encompassed hugely diverse and individual experiences; therefore it is perhaps not 
surprising that in contrast to the ideas of some researchers working in the field of mixed 
race identity, there was no evidence that respondents desired a fixed category of mixed 
race (see Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Olumide, 2002; Rockquemore, 2002). Respondents' ideas 
around mixed race would indeed not sit comfortably with a definitive category of mixed 
race in which members either 'fit' into a black/white binary model (see Tizard and 
Phoenix 1993; Wilson, 1987), or into a binary/diverse ethnic minority model
(Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Mahtani and Moreno, 2001; Alibhai-Brown, 2001; Olumide, 2002).
Whilst there was no evidence of the desire to belong to a category of mixed race, self- 
definition as mixed race was nevertheless an identification with a formally recognised 
mixed race identity or category. It was, indeed, perhaps a forging of respondents' own 
individuality premised on 'insider' knowledge of mixed raceness in which, in the sense of 
an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983), they were united with other mixed race 
people. Mahtani (2002), for example, has suggested that many mixed race women refer to 
themselves as mixed race as a way of 'creating their own linguistic 'homes" (476). In 
Ali's (2003) study, the part which racism played in respondents' lives to some extent 
contributed to their understandings of their positions, and family histories were evoked to 
create links with places and people in the imaginary in order to make sense of 
respondents' 'racial' identities. Ali has argued that these processes may be described as 
'political practices that challenge the constraints of their own identities imposed by 
hegemonic whiteness' (179). Similarly, in my study, respondents drew on ideas around 
their perceived racial heritages in their articulations of self. The question of'belonging', 
inherent within the question of self-identification, may therefore take primacy over the 
desire for an essential category of mixed race. The respondents' assertions of themselves 
as mixed race may also be seen in terms of Bourdieu's (1984) notion of distinction 
(Bourdieu, 1984), in which the process of distinction has the effect of uniting those who 
are the product of similar conditions of existence whilst distinguishing them from all 
others (1984, 56).
Individualism and the question of politics
My data supports McRobbie's (2000) view that feminism has a normalised and 
legitimised 'popular' version, in which women enjoy greater freedoms than ever before, 
and a 'political' version which is virtually redundant in the post-feminist climate of 
today. My main argument here is that the dominant discourse of individualism speaks 
against the possibility of collective political action, in that power relations are created 
within discourse which prevent the development of the political subject. This inevitably
has considerable implications for a feminist emancipatory politics: Where people do not 
feel implicated in power relations, and regard themselves as innocent by-standers, they 
cannot be politically motivated, and the possibility for emancipatory action becomes 
blocked or limited. Whilst some individual respondents may have regarded themselves as 
political, neither politics, nor a political collective identity appeared to be pressing issues 
for most respondents. This lack of politicisation was evident in a number of ways. One, 
only one respondent identified as politically black, and nobody explicitly referred to their 
mixed race identity as a political identity. Two, there was no evidence of a desire for a 
fixed mixed race category, as mentioned above, a finding which was supported by 
respondents' blatant rejection of categorisation. Three, inequality was not seen in political 
terms: respondents either did not believe that structural inequalities existed, or perceived 
themselves as untouched by these inequalities, or assumed that any existing inequalities 
which did exist were the problem and responsibility of people themselves, rather than a 
problem of structure and resources which should be solved by government. Even amongst 
the few respondents who were reflexive about issues of inequality, the imperative of 
'getting an education' was concomitant with 'transcending' inequality; thus, 
responsibility was ultimately to the 'self, and not to a collective 'other'. In dismissing 
'race' as an issue in the context of education, the racial dimension of inequality was also 
discarded. It seems likely that many respondents not only saw inequality in education, but 
also personal experiences of discrimination, as the responsibility of individuals 
themselves. Racism and discrimination as part of everyday life was therefore, literally 
speaking, a normal part of everyday life, and as such were de-politicised issues.
Ruby was the only respondent who identified herself as 'politically black', and also the 
only respondent who specifically talked about a 'newer' community where this was based 
on affiliation through shared marginal status (see Omi and Winant, 1994; Mouffe (1995). 
She talked about how being politically black was unusual today, and that many mixed race 
people had 'moved on' in so far as discrimination was not a dominant issue for them. In 
the quote below, Ruby suggests that the 'different place' which many mixed race people 
were now in was a de-racialised space, and that it was precisely this feature which made it 
liberating. This view supports the idea that discrimination has become naturalised. Being
politically black was for Ruby about the trenchant experience of being racialised, and 
involved a conscious resistance against racialisation and assimilation. She said:
"Being politically black - a lot of mixed race people will not claim that as an 
identity because they 've moved on, they 're in a different place from me - and I 
still am at that place because to me the most distressing experiences of my life 
have been in the way that I have been rejected because of the colour of my 
skin. And being able to use that, being able to claim that identity has enabled 
me to have a voice and explain what it felt like and the effect it '.y had on me 
and to know that people aren '/ going to say oh you 're white really and you 've 
just got a chip on your shoulder. Sometimes I feel I 'm ready to move on to the 
next stage but there's a bit of confusion because I am also Irish, and that isn 't 
included when I take the position of a black person, and I get quite concerned 
about that -1 haven't worked that out and I feel that's the next step. "
Two main strands of liberal thinking within the discourse of individualism were discussed 
in Chapters One and Three: one, the liberal universalist ideology of individualism, in 
which everybody has the same opportunities and is positioned as 'equal to the next 
person'; and two, the liberal particularist ideology of individualism, manifest in the 
multiculturalist discourse, in which everyone has the same opportunities, but may be 
culturally different. In recent years, however, as discussed in Chapter Three, the 
universalist ideology has shifted to subsume the particularist ideology, where the 
discourse of assimilation appears to be the justification for doing so. Within such a 
universalistic framework of personhood, the idea that groups of people have a distinctive 
set of interests is seen as problematic, and as such differentiated approaches to policy- 
making are deemed unnecessary.
The respondents' articulations underscore these two strands of liberal thought, and suggest 
that people's educational needs are generic, and that where differences or inequalities do 
exist, it is down to the individual to 'get over' these. In terms of education, most 
respondents felt equal to everyone else, and expressed their individual needs and
aspirations in universalistic terms, as the same as everyone else's, and not in terms of 
mixed race specificity. In terms of everyday experiences, however, many respondents did 
not feel equal to everyone else and encountered categorisation and discrimination. Here 
too, the problem was defined not in terms of racial structures, but in terms of personality 
and behaviour, and how individual people treated each other. These views, which centred 
around the discourse of individualism, overlapped in Nadia's assertion that the very 
existence of race was the cause of discrimination, and that assimilation must be justified 
as it was the only way of ensuring that everyone would behave in a way that did not set 
themselves apart from others.
Respondents' assertions of their own heterogeneity, and resistance to what they saw as 
homogeneity, may in fact be described as an anti-political stance. Conversely, one might 
argue that respondents' self-identifications in 'race' terms were in themselves individual 
political acts, or acts of resistance against universal norms. The most explicit political 
aspect of respondents' articulations, however, appeared to be the distinction they made 
between daily experiences of race difference, stereotyping, categorisation and 
discrimination, and a more promising future in which the negative effects of race did not 
exist, and where the very presence of mixed race people would contribute to overcoming 
such prejudices and inequities in society. As such, respondents perhaps to some extent 
saw themselves as individually implicated in making the world a better place.
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CONCLUSION
The main themes and issues arising from the research, and the connections between the 
data on identity and the data on education, have been drawn together and discussed in the 
previous chapter. To conclude, the aims set out at the beginning of the thesis are revisited, 
and some final points are made. A key aim of the research was to use the case of mixed 
race women to explore the impact of the concepts of personhood and equity reflected in 
the theory and the policy on the lives of these women. Normative theories, concepts and 
discourses underlying constructions of personhood and equity were examined in the 
theoretical literature on selfhood and in a selection of post-1997 post-compulsory 
education policy texts, and applied to the women researched. Whilst postmodernism is the 
dominant philosophy underlying much of the sociological and feminist literature around 
identity, and stresses the contingent, multiple and 'fluid' nature of identity, government 
and education policy discourses tend to construct the person as 'fixed', rational and 
autonomous. The data reveal that respondents' lives were made up of multi-layered and 
often seemingly inconsistent elements, and that they drew on postmodernist, race 
essentialist and/or individualist discourses in different contexts.
Respondents' constructions of themselves in mixed/race terms may be understood as 
expressions of emerging dissent against homogeneous constructions of race, and may 
signify a desire for heterogeneous understandings of 'race'. The discourse of 'race', 
however, was also a powerful one amongst many respondents in, for example, their 
definitions of selfhood, references to 'others', and in their experiences of categorisation 
and discrimination. The concept of the 'raced' self, therefore, whilst de-stabilising one 
essentialist discourse (in respondents' rejection of homogeneous constructions of 'race') 
may uphold another essentialist discourse. Moreover, these constructions of self may 
represent a demotic or alternative discourse of 'race' which have the effect of de- 
stabilising the dominant universalistic discourse of personhood in so far as they are anti- 
assimilatory and assert notions of 'difference'. One might also argue that respondents' 
constructions of self to some extent challenge the discourse of multiculturalism - which 
promotes diversity and seeks to downplay the significance of'race' - and simultaneously
perpetuates the discourse of 'race thinking' which underlies the discourse of 
multiculturalism. It must be borne in mind that the articulations around mixed race 
identity were made within the context of the increased visibility of mixed race people, and 
the official sanctioning of mixed race as an acceptable identity. Self-definition in mixed/ 
'race' terms may therefore not be a counter-discourse but rather an example of the way in 
which the parameters of the dominant discourse of personhood may shift to incorporate 
different or new elements.
Whilst 'race' in the context of the respondents' everyday lives was a palpable issue, and 
was talked about in a myriad of ways, 'race' in the context of education did not seem to be 
a significant issue. In education, the respondents' views about their own educational 
experiences and their opinions on education policy discourses to a large extent reflected 
the discourse of individualism which underpins the discourses of the value of education, 
individual responsibility, equality of opportunity and meritocracy. Class and gender were 
rarely mentioned in relation to either identity or education. Respondents' exaggerated 
sense of individual agency appeared to give many of them a feeling of considerable 
control over their lives. Many expressed the view that people were to a large extent the 
makers of their own destiny, and that failure was the responsibility of the individual. They 
saw themselves as 'equal' to others, and any inequalities which did exist were 
pathologised and re-directed back onto the individual. Respondents who took a critical 
stance on the government's policies around education, race, class and equality, appeared 
to be no less embroiled within the discourse of individualism than other respondents.
As the discussion of the theoretical literature has shown, many sociologists and feminist 
theorists have attempted to find a theoretical middle ground between postmodernism and 
modernism in which identities (race, class and gender) could be conceived of as multiple 
and shifting, without losing sight of the reality of social inequalities. As such, the 
'deconstructve' dimension of postmodernism has been disregarded by many feminists 
because the preoccupation with difference and the denial of commonality leaves us with 
no theoretical or political tools with which to understand how race, class and gender play 
out in people's lives, and combat oppression (Hartsock, 1990).
From a feminist perspective, for individuals to re-politicise and organise collectively in 
the quest for a 'better' future, re-essentialisation, to some extent at least, is deemed to be 
necessary. However, although essentialist discourse was drawn upon in constructions of 
identity, respondents did not express a desire for a category of mixed race, political or 
otherwise. Nor did they, apart from a small number, indicate a desire for political or 
social change. Mixed race as a discourse/identity therefore, was welcomed, but the 
political dimensions of race, class and gender, and possibilities for reform, were not part 
of that discourse/identity. Rather, respondents were positioned by the discourse of 
individualism and individual responsibility both in their public lives as students, and in 
their everyday personal lives. As such, respondents' articulations on mixed race and 
education were inherently individualising and a-political.
The findings on identity showed that respondents experienced inequality, racialisation and 
discrimination in an everyday context. This indicates that further research on mixed race 
personhood is required to broaden our understanding of the particularities and 
complexities of the mixed race experience, and that some form of political intervention is 
needed to overcome such inequalities and combat discrimination against mixed race 
people. The findings on education, conversely, suggested that there was nothing 
seemingly identity-specific about the experiences of mixed race women in Further 
Education, and respondents' communications on the subject of education offered views 
which may be framed within the government discourses of equality of opportunity and 
inclusion. The ethos of individualism and the 'post-feminist' (and indeed, the 'post-race' 
and 'post-class') stance evident in the findings on education especially (although some 
respondents acknowledged that race and class discrimination/inequality were prevalent 
and had an impact on some people's educational choices), indicate that the sense amongst 
many respondents was that responsibility was chiefly to the 'self and not to the 'other'. In 
this vein, overcoming discrimination may also have been seen as the problem and 
responsibility of the individual who is affected by discrimination.
So where does this leave us in terms of a feminist political project which has mixed race 
women in mind? Whilst the different theoretical approaches to a feminist emancipatory
249
project are useful in terms of the development of theory itself, they appear to be 
untenable in relation to the research data. This is due to the incompatibility between the 
discourse of individualism, a discourse which was dominant in respondents' 
constructions of self and education, and collective action as the basis for change. Within 
the present climate of individualism and the de-politicisation of the subject, the question 
is whether, and to what extent, change can be sought and/or be possible. In terms of 
mixed race personhood and education, one important question is: What potential for 
change can exist in this moment in which the subaltern is not politicised?
One answer may be found in the ideas of Foucault. Discourse, as Foucault argued, is 
never a complete thing, but involves overlapping, contingent and contradictory 
discourses. As such, it is not possible to capture or control discourse - there is always 
some part that 'escapes' which may form the basis of the subaltern or alternative 
discourse and is the potential for change. The subaltern, therefore, is borne out of the 
dominant discourse, and yet may serve to subvert it. In the present climate of 
individualism, the person perhaps cannot see how he or she might be implicated in a 
'better' future, apart from in an individual self-responsible sense. Thus, what is necessary 
here is the unravelling of the ways in which personhood is produced through systems of 
domination, and the discourses upholding these systems, which give people a false sense 
of control over their lives. It is therefore only through a critical approach to discourse and 
an attempt to identify the many taken for granted assumptions around 'race' and 
individualism (and gender and class, and equality of opportunity in education, etc.), that 
discourses may be subverted and subjugated knowledges can determine alternative 
discourses of subjectivity which may lead to progressive change. It is requisite therefore, 
for mixed race people to develop an awareness of how they themselves are positioned by 
the present discourse of individualism, in order for a politics which has the interests of 
mixed race women in mind to flourish.
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SG - Second generation mixed race respondent, ie. one birth parent was mixed race 
(Adriana, Aleasha, Anabel, Brenda, Clara, Nalia, Nichole and Peta).
M - Respondent grew up, or mainly grew up, with birth mother.
F - Respondent grew up, or mainly grew up, with birth father.
MF - Respondent grew up, or mainly grew up, with both birth parents.
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FT - Full-time (courses and occupations were full-time unless stipulated otherwise).
PT - Part-time.
SP - Respondent is a single parent.
Ex-FE - Respondent was no longer enrolled on an FE course, but had been an FE 
student in the last 5 years (Aasha, Brenda, Peta, Ruby, Tania).
The racial self-designations show the respondent's father's heritage first, and her mother's 
heritage second. For example, 'Indian/English' would indicate that the respondent had an 
Indian father and an English mother.
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
INTRODUCTION
a) name and age
b) self-description of'mixed-ness'
c) autobiographical background: who brought up with, and whether in mixed or mono- 
racial household; school attended - type, location, gender/ethnic/class mix
d) course studied, whether full or part-time, academic or vocational
e) occupation, children/dependants, disability
IDENTITY
1. What is important to you in how you define who you are?
2. Do you feel, or have you ever felt 'different' to other people in any way?
3. Optional (older students): Has your sense of'self, or who you are, changed over the 
years? Was there a turning point in your life?
4. How do you think people you don't know see you? If applicable: Does that influence 
the way you see yourself?
5. What does the term mixed race mean to you? How do you feel about this term?
6. Are acquaintances and friends curious about your background? How does this make 
you feel? Optional: Do you feel they want to categorise you, or 'put you in one slot'?
7. Is there a difference between your race and your culture?
8. Do you feel drawn to a particular 'community' or group of people, if so, why?
9. Do you feel you belong more to (X) culture or (Y) culture depending on who you are 
with? Do you feel you need to adapt yourself to different situations?
10. Have you ever experienced discrimination?
EDUCATION
11. Why did you choose this college and the course you are doing?
12. What have the positive aspects of the course been?
13. Have you experienced any problems with the course?
14. How do you see your future?
15. Do you feel you will have the skills and qualifications to be able to do that?
16. What does a 'good' education mean to you?
17. The government talks about 'lifelong learning'. What does this term mean to you, and 
do you think it is a good thing?
18. Do you feel you have had the same chances as everyone else in getting the education
you want?
19. In its Further Education policy the government talks about being 'inclusive' of all 
people. Do you think everyone is equally included in education?
20. Optional: The government also talks about creating a 'culture of learning'. Do you 
think people can learn to want to learn?
21. How do you think the education system could be better?
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